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ABSTRACT
In addition to auditing and tax services, many CPAs now render 
other services to clients, both of an accounting and nonaccounting 
nature. The term most commonly used for these additional services 
is "management advisory services" (MAS).
Questions have been raised both within and outside the pro­
fession about whether the CPA can render MAS to audit clients and still 
remain independent when conducting the audit. Regardless of whether 
he does in fact remain independent, the public must also believe him 
to be independent when performing both functions. This dissertation 
is a study of the latter situation, independence in appearance.
The major objective was to determine the opinions of many 
financial statement users regarding.CPAs who perform MAS for their 
audit clients. This objective was achieved by mailing questionnaires 
to 223 individuals representing the nation's largest financial insti­
tutions. This was not a random sample; and the results are not 
necessarily representative of all members of the financial community. 
There were 160 replies, giving a response rate of 71»7%*
Respondents were provided with a list of 33 specific services. 
They were asked to check those services which they think may result 
in some loss of independence. The results showed that 42% do not 
think that providing any of the services may result in a loss of 
independence; 9% have no opinion; and 49% believe that one or more
of the listed services may possibly lead to a loss of independence.
To gain a better insight as to the seriousness of the independ­
ence in appearance problem, several questions were asked which measured 
the respondents' degree of concern. The most important question asked 
whether CPAs should be prohibited from providing their audit clients 
with the services that they had previously indicated might lead to 
a loss of independence. Assuming that the MAS and the audit were 
conducted by different personnel, 24$ of 149 respondents of the finan­
cial community favor prohibiting one or more of the services.
Referring to specific services, 17$ favor prohibiting CPAs 
from providing the service of mergers and business acquisitions, the 
highest on the list. The other services which apparently require 
CPAs to work closely with top management were also high in disfavor. 
Specifically, these services and the percent of respondents favoring 
prohibition are: executive recruitment, 15$; management audits, 12$;
policy determination, 12$; personnel appraisal and/or selection, 11$; 
and executive and wage incentive plans, 10$. The percentages for the 
remaining 27 services ranged from 10$ to a low of 2$.
Financial executives and analysts were also asked to check the 
specific services that they thought or knew CPAs provided. The replies 
were compared to a comparable survey of CPA firms. CPAs were asked to 
specify the services which they offer clients. A comparison of the two 
surveys showed that respondents generally are aware of the types of 
services which CPAs offer; but some possibly misunderstand the CPA's 
specific role in providing some of the services. This possible mis­
understanding may have been the cause of some of the unfavorable 
replies regarding CPA participation in MAS.
xi
Based upon the survey responses, this author concludes that 
independence in appearance is not now a major problem for the account­
ing profession. He recommends that the accounting profession provide 
more information to the public regarding the CPA's role in MAS, and 
that CPAs insure that they are performing their proper role. He 
also recommends that the profession conduct additional research in 





For many years the accounting profession has wrestled with 
the subject of management advisory services. The controversy centers 
on the desirability of independent certified public accounting firms 
providing these services in addition to the traditional auditing 
and tax services. Accounting literature contains many articles on 
this subject, with arguments both for and against the practice re­
ceiving considerable coverage.
The term "management advisory services" (MAS) is the preferred
1
designation for these types of services. However, the terms "man­
agement services" and "management consulting" are found throughout 
the literature and may be used interchangeably. Briefly stated, we
I ^
are referring to those additional services, both of an accounting and 
a nonaccounting nature, not normally included as part of the audit or 
tax functions. A later chapter will discuss the specific nature of 
management advisory services.
Most accountants agree that CPAs have always provided their 
clients with business advice when they felt they were able to do so.
i
"Final Report of Ad Ho.c Committee on Independence," The 
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 19^9)» 55*
2But this has generally "been incidental to providing them with audit and
tax services. There is evidence that accountants provided MAS as a
distinct function in the early part of the twentieth century. Although
one national CPA firm created a separate MAS department as early as
1908, it has been since World War II that MAS have emerged and expanded
as a separate and distinct area. Most national firms established
2their MAS departments after the end of the second world war. It has 
also been within the last two decades that we have witnessed so much 
attention to this topic in accounting literature.
As a consequence of the increased activity in this field, 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) estab­
lished a Committee on Management Services by CPAs in 1953. The 
objectives of this committee have been to improve and increase the 
services of CPAs to their clients in the field of management advi­
sory services, to improve the prestige of the CPA as an advisor to 
management, and to increase the reliance of the business community 
upon the CPA.^ Through the years the committee has published a series 
of bulletins designed to assist CPAs in providing these types of serv­
ices. In 1969 the committee began issuing Statements on Management 
Advisory Services. They are published for the guidance of AICPA 
members in conducting an MAS practice. To date, three statements 
have been issued, the subjects of which will be discussed later.
CPAs received encouragement from the AICPA to expand in the
2
James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by Certi­
fied Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business Research,
The University of Texas, 1961), p. 12.
3Ibid.
field of management advisory services from a formal resolution by the 
Council of AICPA ' '961 stating:
It is an objecxxv of the Institute, recognizing that 
management service activin.-as are a proper function of CPAs, 
to encourage all CPAs to perform the entire range of management 
services consistent with their professional competence, ethical 
standards, and responsibility.4
This encouragement has been fostered even further by the Committee
on Professional Ethics of the AICPA. Opinion No. 12 of the Code of
Professional Ethics, which covers the area of "Independence," states:
In summary, it is the opinion of the committee that there is 
no ethical reason why a member or associate may not properly 
perform professional services for clients in the areas of tax 
practice or management advisory services, and at the same time 
serve the same client as independent auditor, so long as he does 
not make management decisions . . .  .5
Prom a financial viewpoint there is also a tremendous in­
centive to be a part of the MAS business. In 1966 CPA firms were 
capturing a major share of the approximately $900 million market in 
management consulting in the U.S. One CPA firm grossed an estimated 
$17*5 million in this field alone, while the largest general manage­
ment consultant (non-CPA) grossed $20 million. Furthermore for the 
"Big Eight" CPA firms, the dollar volume of management services op­
erations was expanding at an average annual rate of 15$, as against 
4$ for the consulting business in general, and 10$ for the 45 general
management consultants who belong to the Association of Consulting
6Management Engineers. This aspect is discussed more fully later.
^Code of Professional Ethics— By-Laws (New York: American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 1967)* P» 33*
^Ibid., p. 26.
^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", Forbes, 
XCVIII (October 1, 1966), 57.
The Problem
There is a great demand by businesses for CPAs to provide 
management advisory services. Financially, CPAs find this a very 
lucrative area. The AICPA has promoted and greatly encouraged CPAs 
to push even deeper into this field. There have been no restrictions 
or limitations placed on CPAs by the SEC or any other governmental 
agency regarding their work in management advisory services. With so 
many things going for them, it would appear that CPAs have no problems 
in this area. However, this is not the case.
One primary problem is whether or not providing management 
advisory services is compatible with the CPA's primary reason for 
being, that is, providing auditing services. There are two major 
questions around which the problem revolves: (l) Are CPAs competent
to provide management advisory services? (2) Can CPAs provide these 
services to their audit clients without any sacrifice of their inde­
pendence? Neither question is easily answered.
There are several areas of discussion in these two questions. 
This paper is concerned with only one such area, that of independence 
in appearance of CPAs who provide management advisory services for 
their audit clients. However, each area will be discussed briefly 
below. For although there are several separate and distinct prob- . 
lems, they interrelate. If the reader has some concept of all facets 
of the overall problem of compatibility, he can understand more 
fully the nature of the specific problem.to be explored in depth in 
this study. The following summary should provide the necessary 
insight into the overall problem.
Competence
CPAs should be competent to perform the management advisory 
services which they offer to the public. The accounting profession is 
dependent on public confidence for their survival. Although this 
confidence is necessary primarily in regard to the audit function, 
ineptness in the field of MAS may be detrimental to the profession.
We frequently look with disdain upon any professional person who does 
not measure up to the standards of competence expected. The CPA 
may be thoroughly competent in the field of auditing. But evidence 
of incompetence in any field in which he holds himself out to the 
public, such as management advisory services, will undoubtedly reduce 
his image in the eyes of the public.
Whether or not a CPA is competent depends on how we define 
management advisory services, a subject discussed in detail in the 
next ohapter. There is general agreement that there are two types of 
management advisory services. One type is that which is normally 
considered to be within the realm of accounting. This would include 
such activities as assistance in preparation of operating budgets and 
cash forecasts, cost accounting systems, and inventory control, to 
name a few. There is little doubt regarding the accountants' competence 
in these areas; and very few persons raise questions as to whether the 
CPA has the ability to perform MAS of this type.
The other type of MAS is that which is not generally considered 
to be within the realm of accounting. This type includes services 
that the CPA is not, by his inherent nature as an accountant, educated 
and trained to perform. These services normally may be obtained from 
general management consulting firms. They include suoh areas as
factory layout, executive recruiting, market studies, personnel 
selection, psychological testing, and labor negotiations.
Serious questions regarding competence have arisen relative to 
the latter types of services. Obviously, the mere possession of a CPA 
certificate is not evidence of recognition of the qualifications 
necessary to perform thiB type of work. Of course, there is nothing 
to prevent a CPA from obtaining the necessary education or training 
to perform in specialized fields outside of accounting. Undoubtedly, 
members of many firms have received additional training in selected 
areas, which has qualified them to offer services in these areas.
A firm also may hire specialists in other fields such as marketing 
or engineering if it so desires in order to have competence in these 
various nonaccounting fields.
There presently appears to be no prohibition against the 
employment of non-accountants as members of a CPA firm's staff 
to furnish services that are proper for an accounting firm.
However there appears to be a strong sentiment in support of the 
contention that no firm should render a service through a staff 
man that a partner is not qualified to supervise.7
Although the above quotation was written in 1958? its validity 
remains unchanged today. An addition to the Code of Professional 
Ethics along this line has been recommended by one writer. It would 
read as follows: "A member shall undertake only those accounting and
administrative services that he or a partner of his firm are competent,
Q
as evidenced by training and experience, to perform and supervise."
7
Max Block, "Management Advisory Services— Opportunities and 
Limitations," The Hew York Certified Publio Accountant, XXVIII 
(February, 1958), 39. :
O
Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting's Irresistible Force and 
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review, XLIIT (April, 1968), 272.
A rule similar to this was considered by the AICPA1s Com­
mittee on Professional Ethics in 1958. It was not adopted because
many accountants objected to it, feeling that it would be difficult
9
to interpret and enforce.
Recently the Committee on Management Services has stated that 
general standards analogous to those adopted for auditing are appli­
cable to management advisory services.
1. Management advisory services are to be performed by 
persons having adequate training and experience in both the appli­
cation of the analytical approach and process, and in the subject 
matter under consideration.
2. In all matters relating to a management advisory services 
assignment, an independence in mental attitude is to be main­
tained by the member and his staff.
3. Due professional care is to be exercised in the per­
formance of management advisory services.^
Although members of the AICPA may be called upon to justify 
departures from recommendations of the Committee on Management Services, 
such departures would not be considered as serious as would departures 
from the Code of Professional Ethics. The Institute, therefore, has 
not gone as far as Mr. Kell's recommendation quoted above; but never­
theless there has been an increasing awareness by the AICPA on the 
importance of providing guidelines to members in this area.
Independence
Although there are problems regarding the competence of CPAs
9
^Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics and Public Opinion," 
The Journal of Accountancy, CVI (November, 1958) * 36.
10"Competence in Management Advisory Services," Statement 
on Management Advisory Services No. 2 (New York: American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants, 1969)? PP* 18-19.
to provide some of the services that are currently being offered, 
there appears to be a consensus within the profession that the greatest 
problem regarding the compatibility of auditing and management advisory 
services lies with the question of independence.
The CPA's greatest service to society is his ability to audit 
a client, and render an independent and unbiased opinion to the 
public as to the fairness of the presentation of the financial state­
ments. In this respect he is unique and is so recognized. Various 
laws require CPA audits of firms; and regulations of some governmental 
agencies and stock exchanges frequently require this also. Many 
non-CPAs are completely competent to prepare tax returns, provide book­
keeping services, and perform management advisory services. But the 
CPA is the recognized expert in auditing, being licensed to practice 
as such by meeting the educational and experience requirements of the 
various states. It is his reputation of independence and integrity 
that keeps him in this lofty position. To retain this status, the CPA 
must continue to be completely independent in his audits of clients.
If public confidence should ever cease, or even wane, because of a
loss of independence by the CPA, or because the public thinks there
has been a loss of independence, the CPA's value to society as an 
independent auditor will diminish accordingly. He then will be no 
different than the non-CPA.
A later chapter will explore the problem of independence in 
much detail. The basic outline of this problem is presented here.
In performing an audit, the CPA must be in fact independent. In
addition, the public which includes investors, government officials, 
and the general public, must believe that he is in fact independent;
that is, he also must he independent in appearance. No one disputes-—  
these statements. There are a number of factors or situations which 
possibly could result in the loss of audit independence by CPAs.
Since this paper is concerned with the area of management advisory 
services, the discussion will be limited to that facet.
Rephrasing the question which we asked previously, can CPAs 
provide management advisory services to their audit clients without 
sacrifice of independence in fact or in appearance? The problem is 
limited to audit clients for whom the CPA provides MAS. Since we are 
concerned with the possible loss of audit independence, there is no 
problem in providing MAS to clients for whom the CPA does not also 
serve as auditor.
There is no disagreement among accountants that the profession
would suffer greatly if CPAs should ever lose audit independence as
a result of being involved in an MAS engagement for an audit client.
Fortunately, there has been no evidence that this has ever occurred.
As part of his doctoral research, Dr. Arthur A. Schulte, Jr. sent
inquiries to all of the state boards of accountancy asking if they
had ever had to take disciplinary action on loss of independence in
any case where MAS was a factor. He received replies from 44 of the
11boards, with none ever having had such a case. This, of course, 
does not mean that there has never been any instances of loss of in­
dependence in this manner. It is a very difficult problem to research. 
Evidence that audit independence has in fact been lost as a result of 
MAS obviously would prove the point. But lack of such evidence does
11 "Final Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The 
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 1969)i 52.
10
not prove the converse. No doubt it could happen. The difference of 
the nature of necessary attitudes between auditing and MAS suggests 
this. As discussed in a well-known auditing textbook, management 
advisory services often must be sold.
To achieve results in consulting engagements, it is sometimes 
necessary to be persuasive— to convince the client and his entire 
organization of the merits of the system or policies recommended 
by the consultant. This type of salesmanship may not come easily 
to the accountant. By nature and training he may be averse to 
making definite recommendations until he has gathered incontra- 
vertible evidence, but success in management consulting may 
demand strong persuasive conviction based on factual evidence 
which is by no means complete. 12
The attitude depicted above is completely different from the type
necessary in auditing.
Most GPAs seem to think that there is little chance of a loss 
of independence in fact associated with management advisory services.
If a CPA has lack of integrity in this matter, he probably is not 
adhering to the ideals of the profession in other areas. But although 
the evidence, or lack of it, seems to indicate that this is no major 
problem at the present time, it would take only one case, particularly 
by an individual with a large national CPA firm, to make it a major 
problem. Therefore, we should not forget that it could happen and 
should remind ourselves of the consequences if it does happen.
As mentioned previously, it is not enough for the CPA to be 
in fact independent. It is also vitally necessary that the public 
believe that he is in fact independent. Those individuals who rely 
on financial statements, and who must make decisions based on the data 
presented therein, must have full confidence that the CPA has been
1 P
Walter B. Meigs, Principles of Auditing (Homewood, Illinois: 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1959)» P * 750.
completely independent in conducting the audit upon which his opinion 
of the financial statements is based. It makes no difference how 
independent he is in fact, if the users of the financial statements 
believe him to be otherwise. Consequently, the Code of Professional 
Ethics requires that the CPA avoid any relationships which might 
suggest a conflict of interest to outside observers. Rule 1.01 of 
the Code expressly prohibits members to render an opinion on state­
ments of firms in which they have a financial interest, or for which 
they serve as officers or directors.
There are many individuals both within and outside the account­
ing profession who believe that providing MAS to audit clients could 
suggest a conflict of interest to outside observers. As quoted earlier, 
Opinion 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics states that there is no 
ethical reason why CPAs may not provide such services to their audit 
clients. This is presently the official position of the AICPA. never­
theless, some CPAs still argue, and there is some empirical evidence 
to support them, that many outside parties feel that there is a loss 
of independence by CPAs who provide MAS to their audit clients. If 
a large number of outside observers, who therefore constitute the 
public, believe that there is a loss of audit independence under 
these circumstances, the accounting profession does have a problem.
To summarize briefly, there are two major problem areas 
which question the compatibility of the CPA auditor providing man­
agement advisory services. These are "competence" and "independence." 
The problem of competence is relevant to the CPA who offers MAS to 
both his audit clients and also his non-audit clients. This area 
alone could be the subject of considerable research.
12
The problem of independence has two facets, both relevant 
only when the CPA provides MAS to those clients for whom he also serves
as auditor. Independence in fact is a problem which cannot be com­
pletely resolved except in a negative manner. That is, it can only 
be stated that providing MAS causes a loss of independence in fact 
when actual cases are proven illustrating this point. Most CPAs do not
feel that this is a major problem at the present time.
Independence in appearance is a problem if interested outside 
observers are worried about CPA participation in MAS. This is true 
regardless of whether or not there has been a loss of independence 
in fact.
This study is directed to this latter problem. Recognition 
is given that the other problem areas exist. They have been discussed 
in order that the reader could receive an overview of all of the 
implications involved when CPAs offer management advisory services 
to the public. But the remainder of this dissertation emphasizes 
the question of independence in appearance.
Area of Discussion for This Study
This dissertation is aimed toward determining the effect of 
management advisory services by CPAs on the users of financial state­
ments. Specifically, the central theme is to ascertain whether or 
not the user of audited financial statements believes that the CPA's 
independence is lessened by his participation in management advisory 
services for his audit clients.
There has been research of this nature done previously. Two
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doctoral dissertations, one completed in 1964 anc* one in 1965* have 
included this topic as part of the research. Specific findings from 
this research are discussed later; but generally both authors con­
cluded that a substantial number of outside observers were concerned 
over the possible loss of independence by CPAs who provide MAS to their 
audit clients.
In the fall of 1969 ^he AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence 
included as a part of its summary of observations and recommendations 
the following:
. . . the committee believes that so long as a significant 
minority of users of financial statements has a concern that the 
rendition of management advisory services (all or some), or the 
manner in which they are rendered, raises questions as to an 
auditor's independence, the profession needs to be sensitive to 
their concerns and address itself to themJ 3
The committee also recommended that the committee on professional 
ethics and the management services committee of the AICPA keep the 
practice of management advisory services under constant surveil­
lance. Additionally, it recommended continued liaison with user 
groups to keep the profession aware of the views of those outside
of the accounting profession who also have a vital stake in the
14continued independence of the profession.
Although this dissertation was begun before the report from 
the ad hoc committee was published, research has- been in accordance 
with the committee's recommendation. Opinions of third parties re­
garding the subject of M S  and independence were obtained. The
11
"Pinal Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The 
Journal of Accountancy, CXXVIII (December, 19^9)» 55*
14Ibid.
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"basic methodology used in obtaining these opinions was the question­
naire. It was sent to 223 financial executives and analysts of the 
nation's larger financial institutions, specifically, banks, insur­
ance companies, mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, and 
brokerage firms. It asked specific questions regarding the CPA and 
MAS, and also requested additional comments pertinent to the subject.
A very respectable response i-ate of 71*7% was obtained; there­
fore, the findings are significant to the accounting profession. As a 
result, it is anticipated that the conclusions of this study will give 
additional knowledge, as I'equested by the AICPA, to the px-ofession 
regarding the views of outside parties in this matter.
The Ad Hoc Committee on Independence observed that there are 
definite limitations in the use of a questionnaire. This writer 
recognizes these limitations. Anyone who uses this method risks 
the possibility that respondents might not understand some of the 
terms used or that a question may not be phrased cori'ectly, thus 
causing some misinterpretation. Yet it is a valid research tool.
If an honest attempt is made to constiuct a good unbiased question­
naire, the responses do give indications of opinions, even though the 
possibility exists that there may be some misunderstanding. If the 
response is significant, additional research, possibly through per­
sonal interview, can then be conducted to either substantiate or 
maybe refute the original findings.
Although research of this nature has been done previously, 
it was conducted over 5 years ago. The results presented here will 
serve to update previous research, by showing either a continued, 
a lessening, or an increasing concexn by outside observers. Although
the overall objective of this current research is similar to the pre­
vious research, that is, obtaining third party opinions relative to 
CPAs and MAS, the approach is different.
Organization of the Study
Including the introduction and conclusion this study has 7 
chapters. The purpose of Chapter II is to give the reader a compre­
hensive understanding of what is meant by "management advisory services" 
as conducted by CPAs. It discusses pronouncements by the AICPA as to 
the nature of MAS. The chapter also sets forth what other researchers 
have found to be the types of services actually conducted by CPAs.
This writer sent a questionnaire to 16 CPA firms, including 
the "Big Eight" and 8 other large firms. One purpose was to determine 
what specific management advisory services they provide to their 
clients. The results of this aspect of the survey are included in 
Chapter II. Other questions from this survey have relevance to other 
chapters.
Respondents of the questionnaire sent to members of the 
financial community were also asked to indicate those areas in which 
they think CPAs are providing MAS. A comparison of their replies 
to this question with those of the CPAs will indicate whether there 
is any lack of communication between what CPAs are doing in this field, 
and what outside observers think that they are doing. This comparison 
is made in Chapter II.
Chapter III discusses the economic phenomena that has resulted 
in CPA firms practicing in areas that have no relation whatsoever
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to accounting. The financial incentive has been mentioned briefly in 
an earlier section. One question on the survey sent to CPA firms 
asked for the percentage of gross billings that could be attributed 
to MAS. The results of thiB question are included in this chapter.
There is another side to the economic question. This in­
volves the savings to the client and hence to society in having the 
CPA auditor provide the needed management advisory services. This 
is particularly relevant for small clients who have a need for such 
services, but who do not have the resources to hire someone other 
than their regular auditors.
Discussion in Chapter III is pertinent to the question of 
independence. We must weigh the economic benefits society as a whole 
gains from CPAs' participation in MAS, against the possible loss 
society may incur because of a lack of independence by some CPAs 
providing such services.
The problem of independence is the subject of the fourth 
chapter. The focal point, however, is independence in appearance.
The problem of independence in fact was discussed briefly above 
and is mentioned to some extent in Chapter IV.
The primary objective of this chapter is to synthesize the 
opinions of others, in the fields of both education and accounting 
practice. It brings out the pros and cons regarding the question of 
independence as expounded upon in the literature over a number of 
years. It demonstrates that a genuine controversy exists.
Specific results of the empirical research conducted on this 
topic in 1964 and 1965 are discussed. The ohapter also sets forth 
some criticisms by others about this prior research.
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The fifth chapter is the heart of this study. This chapter 
discusses the method of seleotion of respondents, the reasons for the 
specific questions asked, and most importantly the results of the 
questionnaire sent to the users of financial statements. Chapter V 
shows the responses for each question for all respondents. It also 
categorizes some responses according to each group, that is, bankers, 
insurance executives, mutual fund investment officers, and brokerage 
firm representatives. This is done in order to determine what differ­
ences of opinion exist among these various groups.
Very little can be done these days in the field of accounting 
without considering the position of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Certainly, if any group is an interested outside 
party in regard to accounting matters, it is the SEC. Consequently, 
the sixth and final chapter preceding the conclusion covers this area.
The attitude of the SEC in this matter can be of extreme 
importance in trying to determine how far the profession should go, 
or whether it has already gone too far, in the area of management 
advisory services. Therefore, this chapter discusses any pronounce­
ments or positions taken by the SEC or any of its members on this 
subject.
In the final chapter the dissertation is summarized. Based 
on the results obtained from the questionnaires, this writer's con­
clusions and recommendations are presented also.
It is anticipated that this project will make a worthy 
contribution to the literature of accounting. The question of whether 
or not independence in appearance is a problem about which the pro­
fession should be concerned has raged for quite some time. Undoubtedly
the users of financial statements are in a better position to answer 
this question than anyone else because it is around them that this 
controversy revolves. This study does not answer all questions nor 
solve all problems. But it sheds light on the direction which the 
profession should take. It will assist in the determination of 
whether or not the interests of all parties are being served properly 
by the continued participation of CPAs providing management advisory 
services to their audit clients. The conclusions and recommendations 
of the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence were based partly on 
the results of research conducted in 1964 and 19^5- Hopefully, this 
current research will serve to update the previous conclusions.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES
Management Advisory Services Defined
Various writers have provided definitions of management 
advisory services, which this section will present. Although the 
AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has written ex­
tensively on the subject, it has not provided a succinct definition. 
But what it has said will also be summarized here. The purpose of 
this chapter is to give the reader an understanding of the nature of 
management advisory services. After reading the chapter, he may not 
be able to recite a definition; but he should have an insight into 
what is meant when the term is used.
Definition by AICPA
An independent accounting firm's purpose in engaging in man­
agement advisory services is to utilize the essential 
qualifications it has available to provide advice and technical 
assistance which will enable client management to conduct af­
fairs more effectively . . . .
The role of an independent accounting firm in performing 
management advisory services is to provide advice and technical 
assistance, and should provide for client participation in the 
analytical approach and process.^
Management advisory services by independent accounting firms
i
"Tentative Description of the Nature of Management Advisory 
Services by Independent Accounting Firms," Statement on Management 
Advisory Services No. 1 (American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants), February, 19691 P« 1»
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can be described as the function of providing professional ad­
visory (consulting) services, the primary purpose of which is to 
improve the client's use of its capabilities and resources to 
achieve the objectives of the organization. This can relate to 
areas such as:
— The management functions of analysis, planning, organizing, 
and controlling
— The introduction of new ideas, concepts, and methods of 
management
— The improvement of policies, procedures, systems, methods, 
and organizational relationships
— The application and use of managerial accounting, control 
systems, data processing, and mathematical techniques and 
methods, and
— The conduct of special studies, preparation of recommen­
dations, development of plans and programs, and provision 
of advice and technical assistance in their implementation.
Thus the AICPA provides a conceptual description of MAS 
without compiling a list of acceptable services. The reader should 
note, however, that no type of service is expressly prohibited. In 
essence, CPAs are allowed to offer any type of service provided that 
they stay within the bounds of competence and independence. The 
criterion of competence was discussed in Chapter I; independence is 
the subject of Chapter IV.
Definition by Other Writers
Generally, the broad field of management advisory servioes 
can be divided into two distinct types. One writer has classified 
these types as follows: (1) services related directly to the clients
total information and control system, broadly conceived, and (2) 
services totally unrelated to the olients' information and control 
system.^ He refers to the former as "accounting services" and
2Ibid.. p. 3.
^Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting1s Irresistible Force and 
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review. XLIII (April, 1968), 268.
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to the latter as "administrative services."
A total information system or management information system 
may defined aB "the coordination of all of the quantitative con­
trol mechanisms of management in such a manner that with the flow of 
information through the system, management may be apprised, on a timely 
and effective basis of the need for decisions which maximize the 
opportunity for achieving the integration of all quantitative data
4
generated by the system. In accordance with this definition, 
accounting services generally are thought to include those areas 
which are normally within the realm of accounting. This would in­
clude such activities as operating budgets, cash forecasts, cost 
accounting systems, and inventory control.
Administrative services, as defined by Kell, include those 
types commonly referred to as consulting services. These may nor­
mally be obtained from general consulting firms, and are not considered 
to be within the realm of accounting. Repeating the examples mentioned 
in Chapter I, these includes such services as factory layout, exec­
utive recruiting, market studies, personnel selection, psychological 
testing, and labor negotiations.
Some accountants believe that the possible loss of audit
independence is a factor only when administrative services are per-
5
formed. Kell has this opinion. But Schulte believed that both 
areas were factors in the potential loss of independence, and based
^Robert Beyer, "Management Services: Time for Decision,"
The Journal of Accountanoy. CIX (March, 19^5)» 48.
^Kell, op. cit., p. 269.
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his study on this hypothesis.^ In the questionnaire Bent in relation 
to the present study, services of both types were included. Con­
sequently, for purposes of this study, providing either type is 
considered to be a factor in the possible loss of audit independence.
James E. Redfield conducted a very comprehensive study into 
the nature of management services in 1960. In his work he discussed 
5 possible approaches to a definition for management services. Out 
of this evolved the following definition:
Management services by certified public accountants may be 
defined as those services which are designed primarily to furnish 
advice or assistance to management through a professional re­
lationship with respect to planning, organizing, or controlling 
any phase of business activity. As a general rule, these engage­
ments would include those types of service that are intended 
primarily for internal utilization by management, as opposed to 
those types of services that are designed primarily to provide 
third parties with accounting information.7
This definition would encompass both accounting and administrative
services, as defined by Kell.
Previous Survey as to the Nature of MAS
Redfield's questionnaire was sent to 925 individual CPAs 
and firms in Texas. He received 331 replies. In some instances 
results were based on fewer than 332 replies because not all ques­
tions were answered by all respondents.
One question provided a list of 39 possible categories of
Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "The Concept of the CPA's Audit 
Independence and its Compatibility with Management Services" (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 19 6 4)* PP« 20-22.
7
James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Servioes by Cer­
tified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business
Research, The University of Texas, 1961), p. 24*
management advisory services. Respondents were asked to check those 
items which they considered generally to be outside the scope of a 
CPA. This list was based on a pamphlet issued in 1957 by the AICPA 
that contained 35 areas in which some CPA firms had provided manage­
ment services. Redfield added 4 areas to this list. The results of 
this aspect of his survey are shown in Table 2-1. They may be sum­
marized as follows:
1. Twenty-eight categories were considered to be outside the scope 
of the certified public accountant by less than 30 percent of 
the respondents.
2. Three categories were considered to be outside the scope of 
the certified public accountant by from 30 percent to 50 
percent of the respondents.
3. Eight categories were considered to be outside the scope of 
the certified public accountant by more than 50 percent of the
respondents.8
Redfield considered the percentages in the first group as insignif­
icant; but did elaborate on the second and third groups.
By referring to Table 2-1 we can determine that the 3 specific 
categories in the second group are: General management— objectives
and policies (38$); Sales management— prices and results (39$)5 and 
Other professional services— arbitrating disputes (42$). Redfield 
explained that these high percentages were apparently caused by 
possible confusion as to what these areas specifically encompass, 
insofar as the CPA's participation in them is concerned. He then 
explained how from one viewpoint these areas could well be within 




FIRMS SPECIFYING POSSIBLE CATEGORIES OF MANAGEMENT SERVICE 
THAT GENERALLY WOULD NOT FALL WITHIN SCOPE OF CPA
Replies
Percent of 301 
firms indicating
Question "outside the scope"
Check each category which you consider 
to be outside the scope of CPA generally.
General management
Objectives and policies 38
Internal organization 9
Management controls 10
Special investigations: purchase or
sale of business 2
Financial
Structure: types and sources of
capital or financing 3
Requirements: short- and long-term 4
Policies: retention or distribution of
earnings; credit and collection 6
Planning: forecasting and budgeting 3
Finance
Insurance: coverage; records 8
Cost accounting: all phases 1
Pensions and profit sharing 4
Government contracts: all phases 15
Production
Plant & equipment: needs; depreciation 24
Production methods and standards 54
Production control 27
Material handling and control 16
Sales
Distribution and merchandising 64
Sales management: prices; results 39
Packaging and shipping3- 70
Advertising or market research 72
Office management
Accounting systems and records —
Office equipment 2
Office layout and space utilization 13
Office organization 4
Office personnel 7
^hese four categories were not included in the AICPA 





Percent of 301 
firms indicating 
"outside the scope"
Check each category which you oonsider 





Transportation equipment: all phases 61
Personnel
Job classification and evaluation 51
Training: accounting personnel 2
Recruitment or interview: office personnel 18
Compensation and incentives 12
Employee benefit programs 13
Industrial relations3. 66
Safety and health programs ' 84
Research and development
Records and controls 16
Other professional services
Accumulating and reporting trade statistics 21
Arbitrating disputes 42
Assistance in rehabilitating a business 6
Source: James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services
by Certified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: 
Bureau of Business Research, The University of 
Texas, 1961), p. 18.
Reference to Table 2-1 shows that the third group contains 
8 categories that a majority of respondents felt were outside the 
soope of the professional accountant. They are:
(a) Sales— distribution and marketing (64%)
(b) Sales— packaging and shipping (70$)
(c) Sales— advertising or market research (72$)
(d) Traffic and transportation equipment (61$)
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(e) Personnel— job classification and evaluation (51 %)
(f) Personnel— industrial relations (66%)
(g) Personnel— safety and health programs (84$)
(h) Production— methods and standards (54$)
Categories (a) through (d) may be classified as marketing functions; 
whereas, (e) through (h) are related to the field of industrial man­
agement.
The author explained the high percentages of marketing cat­
egories in that most CPAs have little competence or desire to provide 
assistance in this area. He also stated that CPAs who provide 
services of this nature might face some professional and ethical 
restraints that could limit their assistance.
The high percentage of respondents who listed categories 
in the field of industrial management might also be explained on 
the basis of competence. But Redfield did not believe that this 
was necessarily a valid argument.
Although a majority of acoountants apparently have little or 
no desire to provide services in the area of industrial management, 
such assistance would appear to be as much within the scope of the 
professional accountant as within the scope of the professional 
engineer. Admittedly, the knowledge of materials, machines, and 
processes that is acquired through formal engineering education 
is advantageous in many respects, but a foimal engineering edu­
cation frequently is not essential to the competent provision of 
such assistance. In many instances, competence in the area of 
industrial management would be dependent more upon a professional 
discipline designed to develop an ability to think independently, 
to analyze and evaluate constructively, and to solve problems in 
a practical manner, than upon purely technical knowledge. There­
fore, if an accountant possesses sufficient competence in these 
respects, industrial management services would appear to be within 
his scope, with the possible exception of assistance in which 
engineering training and technical competence would tend to be 
more essential than merely advantageous.9
^Ibid., p. 2 0.
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Redfield.'s definition of management advisory services, given 
in the previous section, is all encompassing. Apparently his defi­
nition was "based considerably on the results of his questionnaire.
A majority of CPAs considered most items listed to be within the scope 
of the profession. For those 11 categories which a high percentage 
of respondents did not consider to be within the scope of the CPA, 
Redfield has explained this negative attitude, and apparently con­
cluded that they could be considered within the scope.
There may be some biaB in his conclusions if we try to apply 
them on a national level. He sent his questionnaire only to CPAs in 
Texas; so it was limited to some extent. Nevertheless, the question­
naires were received by representatives of 20 national firms; that is, 
firms with offices throughout the nation, including the "Big Eight."
We might expect that responses by individuals of these firms possibly, 
although not necessarily, reflect the thinking and policy or the firms 
which they represent.
Having looked at what a number of CPAs in Texas considered 
the scope of MAS to be in 1960, we will turn now to a recent survey 
of large CPA firms regarding this same subject.
Management Advisory Services— As Practiced by CPAs
Purpose
The primary purpose of this section is to determine spe­
cifically those areas in which CPAs are currently practicing MAS.
The next major section of this chapter will point out those areas 
in which the users of financial statements think that CPAs are
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performing MAS. Toward the end of the chapter, a comparison will he 
made between what CPAs are doing and what the financial community 
thinks that they are doing in this field. We hope to show whether or 
not there is a lack of communication between these two groups on this 
topic. The relation to the central theme of this paper, independence 
in appearance t is that any laok of understanding by the financial 
community as to the role of the CPA in MAS may contribute to an opinion 
that the CPA does lose independence in performing MAS. If the mis­
understanding is clarified, the potential loss of independence may 
not seem as threatening.
Survey Sample and Questionnaire Construction
The sample for this survey consisted of 16 large CPA firms, 
including the "Big Eight." The 8 other firms were either small 
national firms or large regional firms that perform audits for large 
corporations. Since CPA firms are not listed by size in any publi­
cation, choosing the latter 8 firms was done by picking firms that 
are known to have offices nationally and by reviewing corporate annual 
reports to discover firms other than the "Big Eight" that had per­
formed audits for large corporations.
The sample was limited to the nation's largest CPA firms 
because the objective was to obtain as wide a coverage as possible 
in learning specific MAS areas. Numerous smaller firms may provide 
many of the same services as the larger firms; but it is unlikely 
that they are providing any category of service not performed by at 
least some of the large firms.
Another consideration was that CPA firms selected for this
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survey probably provide close to 100$ of the annual audits of the major 
national corporations (as opposed to small local corporations). Since 
the survey to the financial community was to individuals who are more 
likely to be concerned with annual reports of major corporations, 
we can make a valid comparison of the results of the surveys.
The questionnaire, Survey of Leading CPA Firms (Appendix A), 
consisted of 7 specific questions with number 8 asking for any 
additional comments considered pertinent by the respondent. Some 
questions related more to independence; one related to the economics 
of MAS. These are discussed fully in the applicable chapters. The 
question most relevant to our present discussion is number 7« It 
reads, "From the following list, indicate the types of management 
advisory services which your firm performs. Check as many items as 
are applicable." The list consists of 33 specific services which are 
of the type that CPAs possibly perform. Space was provided for the 
listing of other services if needed.
Questions number 1 and 2 asked whether the firm offered MAS 
to its clients and whether there was a separate management services 
division, respectively. It was anticipated that both questions 
would be answered affirmatively by all respondents; but the questions 
were necessary to assure the validity of responses to subsequent 
questions.
Results of the Survey
Replies were received from 10 of the 16 CPA firms to which 
questionnaires were sent, giving a response rate of 62.5$. Inter­
estingly enough, 5 replies were from "Big Eight" firms and 5 were
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from other firms. Therefore, the response rate for each group was also 
62,5%, All respondents do offer MAS and do have a separate management 
services division. (Questions 1 and 2.)
A summary of responses to question 7 is illustrated in 
Tahle 2-2 in alphabetical order. They are listed in order of fre­
quency in Tahle 2-3. In addition to the listed services, one firm, 
not a "Big Eight" member, added the following types of services which 
if offers: Organization studies, work simplification, feasibility
studies for new businesses, economic studies for various industries, 
hospital dietary analysis, food and beverage cost and operations 
analysis, kitchen design and layout, and hospital cost (Medicare 
cost analysis).
As might be expected, accounting-oriented services rank at 
the top, being offered by 9°$ to 100$ of the firms in all cases.
But even such nonaccounting services as development of work measure­
ment standards, executive and wage incentive plans, executive re­
cruitment, management audits, and sales forecasting are offered by 
70$ to 90$ of the firms. A number of other nonaccounting services 
are offered by 50$ to 60$ of the respondents. Correlating somewhat 
with Redfield1s earlier study was the number of marketing and in­
dustrial management type services that are offered by 40$ or fewer 
of the firms. Pour services— insurance analysis, labor negotiations, 
packaging development, and product engineering— are not offered by any 
of the firms responding to the survey. It is possible that these 
services are offered by Borne of the firms that did not return the 

















Assistance on specific accounting 
problems 100 100 100
Capital budgeting 100 80 90
Computer systems and applications 100 100 100
Development of work measurement 
standards 80 80 80
Distribution channels 40 20 30
Executive and wage incentive plans 80 80 80
Executive recruitment 80 60 70
Factory automation 20 40 30
Financial budgeting 100 100 100
Forms design 80 100 90
Installation of cost accounting 
systems 100 100 100
Installation, review, and improve­
ment of overall accounting 
systems 100 100 100
Insurance analysis 0 0 0
Inventory control 100 100 100
Inventory valuations 0 40 20
Labor negotiations 0 0 0
Maintenance planning and scheduling 80 20 50
Management audits 80 100 90
Material handling 40 80 60
Mergers and business acquisitions 80 100 90
Operations budgeting 80 100 90
Packaging development 0 0 0
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 40 60 50
Plant layout 20 40 30
Plant location 40 20 30
Policy determination 40 20 30
Product engineering 0 0 0
Product pricing 40 80 60
Quality control 40 20 30
Sales forecasting 60 80 70
Salesmen compensation plans 60 60 60
Wage incentives 40 80 60
Warehousing 40 40 40
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TABLE 2-3
TYPES OF MAS WHICH CPA FIRMS OFFER 
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY
Replies
Type of Service Percent of 10 Firms
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 100
Computer systems and applications 100
Financial budgeting 100
Installation of cost accounting 
systems 100
Installation, review, and improvement 





Mergers and business acquisitions 90
Operations budgeting 90
Development of work measurement
standards 80





Salesmen compensation plans 60
Wage incentives 60
Maintenance planning and scheduling 50














One problem with a questionnaire that simply lists a group 
of services with no explanation is that, conceivably, respondents may 
not fully understand a specific item, or may have a slightly different 
interpretation from someone else aB to what an item means. Although 
not indicated in Tables 2-2 and 2-3, some CPA firms did alter some 
of the category titles slightly.
Two firms added the word, procedures, to capital budgeting, 
implying that their firms instruct clients in how to do capital budg­
eting, but they (CPAs) do not perform the capital budgeting for the 
clients. Possibly other CPAs limit their role in this area as well.
One firm indicated that they assisted clients on product 
pricing systems and sales forecasting systems, the implication being 
that the CPA firm does not actually recommend product prices nor does 
it forecast sales.
One respondent changed management audits to read management 
reviews; another changed it to read general surveys. These changes 
would suggest that the firms do not go as deeply into the area as 
the term audit would indicate.
There were several other changes of this type, and the meaning
is clear. To properly evaluate the nature of MAS as provided by CPAs,
one must consider the specific role that the CPA as an individual
plays in performing the assignment. As one respondent commented:
It is one thing for the CPA consultant to actually forecast sales 
for a client and it is something entirely different to advise a 
client as to the most appropriate methods of forecasting sales.
It is also one thing for the CPA to work within a client's or­
ganization on a unilateral basis and it is something entirely 
different to provide consulting advice to a group of client per­
sonnel in order to help them improve the effectiveness of their 
organization in developing solutions to their own problems.
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If there is a lack of communication between CPAs and the 
financial community, it lies perhaps not so much with the types of 
services provided, but rather with the specific role of the CPA in 
performing these services. This aspect will be explored more in 
another section.
Management Advisory Services—
As Viewed by Users of Financial Statements
Purpose
Having learned of specific areas in which the large CPA firms 
are currently providing MAS, we turn our attention now to the users 
of financial statements. Our purpose in this section is to determine 
those services that the financial community thinks that CPAs provide.
As mentioned in the previous section, we will later compare responses 
to determine whether a lack of communication exists between the two 
groups regarding the nature of MAS.
Prom his study in 1964* Schulte concluded that 33$ of the 
respondents to his questionnaire believed that management consulting 
seriously endangers the CPA's independence. "Management consulting" 
was the term he used throughout his questionnaire. Use of this term 
was challenged.
But nowhere in the questionnaire or the article inter­
preting it is there a definition of the term "management con­
sulting." The term may well evoke a reaotion different from that 
evoked by "management services," which is commonly used by the 
profession itself. In any event, it cannot be assumed that all 
the respondents to the questionnaire were familiar with the 
specific services offered by CPA firms as aids to management.
The respondents may have read into the question types of
1
"consulting" which in fact are not commonly engaged in "by CPAs.
CPAs practice in a very wide latitude of areas, as amply 
illustrated in the previous section. Since they are engaged in so 
many areas of "consulting," it is difficult to see how anyone could 
read into the question types of consulting in which at least some 
CPAs are not engaged. Quite possibly some of the 67$ of the re­
spondents who saw no threat to audit independence were also unaware 
of the types of consulting in which CPAs are now engaged. If they 
knew just how far out of the realm of accounting that some CPAs 
have gone, they may very well have had a different opinion, and 
responded accordingly.
Nevertheless, this problem has been avoided in the present 
study. The terms "management advisory services" and "management 
services" were used throughout. The word "consulting" was used only 
once, this being in the cover letter. The term "management con­
sulting" never appeared. Therefore, if there are negative connota­
tions associated with this phrase, they would not be applicable in 
this questionnaire.
One purpose of the current questionnaire was to determine 
whether or not the financial community is aware of the specific 
services that CPAs offer. Therefore, Carey's and Doherty's criti­
cism on this point also has no validity here.
10John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty, Ethical Standards 
for the Accounting Profession (New York: American Institute of
Certified Public Acoountants, 1966), p. 23.
Survey Sample
The "basic purpose of the survey was to obtain opinions re­
garding independence. Consequently, we will wait until Chapter V 
to discuss methodology and reasoning for the sample selection and 
the questionnaire construction. However, since one question dealt 
specifically with the nature of management advisory services, analy­
sis of replies to that question belongs in this chapter. Also, in 
order to properly evaluate the responses, the reader should know 
the composition of the sample and the response rate. These points 
are mentioned here and will be expanded on in Chapter V.
Questionnaires were sent to financial executives and analysts 
of the nation's largest banks, brokerage firms, mutual funds, closed- 
end investment companies, life insurance companies, and property- 
liability insurance companies. One questionnaire was sent to each 
of 220 firms. Because of duplicate replies the total sent actually
11was 2 2 3, and this figure was used as a basis for the response rate.
A summary of the number of responses is shown on Table 2-4* The 
overall response rate was 71*75^ * which is extremely good, and there­
fore gives significance to the replies. The response rate for those 
groups replying ranged from a high of 8 2 . for life insurance 
companies to a low of 57*6$ for mutual funds. The rate therefore 
was fairly high for all categories and extremely high for life 
insurance companies and banks. One group, closed-end investment
11After receiving follow-up questionnaires when they did not 
reply to the first letter, three firms sent back two oompleted ques­
tionnaires each. Since the survey was of individuals and not of firms, 
it was decided to include these additional three questionnaires as part 
of the initial population and to include the replies in the analysis.
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companies, did not respond at all. Fortunately, they comprise 
only 4 out of a total 223 to whom the questionnaires were sent. 
Hence, their nonresponse was not detrimental to the survey as a 
whole.
TABLE 2-4
SUMMARY OF RESPONSES FROM FINANCIAL COMMUNITY
Total Total Response
Types of Firms Sent Responded Rate
Banks n i(a) 90 80,2$
Brokerage firms 39(b) 23 59.0$
Mutual funds 33 19 57.6$
Closed-end investment companies 4 0 0.0$
Life insurance companies 28 23 82.1 $
Property-liability insurance 
companies 8 5 • 62.5$
Totals 223 160 71.7$
f |
Includes two duplicate replies 
^Includes one duplicate reply
Question number 4 of the Survey of Leading Financial Exec­
utives and Analysts (Appendix B) is pertinent to this chapter. It 
states, "From the following list, indicate the types of management 
services which you know or think that some CPAs perform. (You may 
check as many items as you think are applicable.)" The list of 33 
specific items with space for additional services is identical to 
that used in the survey of CPA firms discussed above. The alterna-
tive of checking, "I am not aware of any specific types of manage­
ment advisory services that CPAs perform," was also provided. The 
list was presented alphabetically to avoid emphasis on any one item.
Admittedly, there may be items listed that some respondents 
did not understand. But if they did not know what a specific item 
was, it is unlikely that they would have indicated that they knew or 
thought that CPAs were performing that particular service. Because 
of the caliber of the sample to whom the questionnaire was sent, it 
is reasonable to assume that the respondents are intelligent, respon­
sible individuals; and the probability is very high that they checked 
only those items with whioh they had some familiarity, thus achieving 
the purpose of the question. Possible misunderstanding of the 
specific role of the CPA is any one category is conceivable. This 
problem is discussed later.
Results of the Survey
The results are tabulated in Tables 2-5 through 2-7. Of the 
160 replies received, only 5 (3$) indicated that they were unaware 
of any specific types of management advisory services that CPAs per­
form. One respondent (in addition to the 5) did not answer the 
question.
Of the 5 who were unaware of specific types of MAS, one was 
a representative of a brokerage firm; one was with a mutual fund; and 
3 were with property-1iability insurance companies. Since the total 
population of this latter group was only 8 , this part of Table 2-7 
is probably not too significant. It is interesting to note however, 
that 3 of the 5 were from this very small population.
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TABLE 2-5
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
LISTED ALPHABETICALLY
Replies
Type of Service Number Percent of 160
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 150 94
Capital budgeting 114 71
Computer systems and applications 
Development of work measurement
128 80
standards 76 48
Distribution channels 20 13
Executive and wage incentive plans 92 58
Executive recruitment 71 44
Factory automation 27 17
Financial budgeting 133 83
Forms design
Installation of cost accounting
61 38
systems
Installation, review, and improvement
150 94
of overall accounting systems 143 89
Insurance analysis 51 31
Inventory control 123 77
Inventory valuations 109 68
Labor negotiations 11 -- 7
Maintenance planning and scheduling 21 13
Management audits 107 67
Material handling 15 9
Mergers and business acquisitions 134 84
Operations budgeting 106 66
Packaging development 6 4
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 49 31
Plant layout 16 10
Plant location 25 16
Policy, determination 48 30
Product engineering 8 5
Product pricing 54 34
Quality control 30 19
Sales forecasting 70 44
Salesmen compensation plans 54 34




TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY
Replies
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 150 94
Installation of oost accounting
systems 150 94
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems 150 94
Mergers and business acquisitions 143 89
Financial budgeting 133 83
Computer systems and applications 128 80
Inventory control 123 77
Capital budgeting 114 71
Inventory valuations 109 68
Management audits 107 67
Operations budgeting 106 66
Executive and wage incentive plans 92 58
Development of work measurement
standards 76 48
Executive recruitment 71 44
Sales forecasting 70 44
Forms design 61 38
Wage incentives 58 36
Product pricing 54 34
Salesmen compensation plans 54 34
Insurance analysis 51 31
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 49 31
Policy determination 48 30
Quality control 30 19
Faotory automation 27 17
Plant location 25 16
Maintenance planning and scheduling 21 13
Distribution channels 20 13
Plant layout 16 10
Material handling 15 9
Labor negotiations 1 1 .  7
Warehousing 9 6
Product engineering 8 5
Packaging development 6 4
TABLE 2-7
TYPES OF MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS KNOW OR THINK THAT CPAS PERFORM
RESPONSES CLASSFIED BY TYPES OF FIRMS


















Assistance on specific accounting 
problems 96 96 95 96 40 94
Capital budgeting 82 52 74 57 20 71
Computer systems and applications 79 87 74 96 20 80
Development of work measurement 
standards 50 57 47 39 0 48
Distribution channels 12 9 16 17 0 13
Executive and wage incentive plans 57 65 84 39 20 58
Executive recruitment 62 74 63 21 20 44
Factory automation 19 9 26 13 0 17
Financial budgeting 90 74 90 74 20 83
Forms design 37 44 47 35 20 38
Installation of cost accounting systems 97 83 100 83 20 94
Installation, review, and improvement 
of overall accounting systems 92 74 100 78 20 89
Insurance analysis 31 39 37 26 20 31
Inventory control 86 83 68 57 20 77
Inventory valuations 73 70 79 48 20 68
Labor negotiations 7 9 11 4 0 7
Maintenance planning and scheduling 12 13 26 9 0 13
Management audits 76 57 68 52 20 67
^ h e  number in parentheses indicates the total number of respondents for each type of firm
TABLE 2-7 (continued)
Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total
Firms Funds Co. Co.
Type of Service (90) (23) (19) (23) (5) (160)
Material handling 10 0 16 13 0 9
Mergers and business acquisitions 86 87 84 83 40 84
Operations budgeting 74 61 68 52 0 66
Packaging development 4 0 5 4 0 4
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 26 39 68 13 20 31
Plant layout 11 4 21 4 0 10
Plant location 16 17 26 9 0 16
Policy determination 31 17 63 17 0 30
Product engineering 7 0 5 4 0 5
Product pricing 42 26 32 13 20 34
Quality control 21 21 26 4 0 19
Sales forecasting 58 30 42 13 0 44
Salesmen compensation plans 36 48 42 9 20 34
Wage incentives 38 48 53 9 20 36




Table 2-6 ranks the services in order of frequency. As might 
he expected, those more aligned with accounting rank near the top, 
while those outside the realm of accounting are ranked lower, thus 
corresponding with the CPA responses. One notable exception was 
that management audits was checked by 67$ of the respondents, and 
therefore ranked fairly high; it was high with CPAs also. There is 
some correlation with Redfield's study of Texas CPAs and with the 
CPA survey discussed in the previous section in that marketing and 
industrial management type services tend to be at the bottom of the 
scale. Although a few of these items are in the 30$ and 40$ range, 
there is a dramatic drop (30$ to 19$ and below) for the majority 
of these types of services.
In addition to the 33 items listed on Table 2-5, 8 other 
services were written in by some respondents. These services and 
the number of firms adding them to the list are as follows:
(l) assistance in bank loans and other financing— 4; (2) job. descrip­
tion— 2; (3) consulting for state and local government— 2; (4 ) tax 
return preparation and planning— 2; (5 ) organization charts— 1;
(6) retirement and profit sharing— 1; (7) SEC— 1; (8) legal 
problems— 1.
Most of these 8 items could be considered to be within the 
scope of MAS. CPA firms normally have a separate tax department 
and would not include tax preparation as a part of MAS. It is not 
known what the category legal problems would encompass. It would 
not appear to be the type of service in which CPAs would be engaged. 
Possibly there is some aspect of legal service of which the respondent 
had knowledge of CPA participation.
Comparison of the Surveys
If we compare Table 2-3 with Table 2-6, we can conclude 
that generally there is no lack of communication between CPAs and 
the financial community regarding the types of MAS offered. Those 
services offered by all or almost all CPA firms are the ones that 
most financial executives and analysts think that CPAs provide.
The services that rank far down the list of the financial executives 
are generally offered by only a few CPA firms. It is natural that
there would not be many outside parties aware that a particular
service is being offered when there are veiy few firms providing 
the service.
There are some exceptions to the general conclusion above 
which are discussed briefly below.
Forms design —  90$ of ihe CPAs offer this service, but only
38$ of the financial executives thought that it was being offered.
Inventory valuations —  Only 20% of the CPAs offer this ser­
vice; but 68$ of the financial executives think that they do. This 
disparity may be caused by a different understanding of what the 
teirn-means. CPAs do of course install cost accounting systems, which 
can result in determination of the cost of ending inventoiy for income 
statement and balance sheet purposes. This may be what the financial 
executives had in mind. Generally, however, CPAs do not detei-mine 
the fair market value of inventory unless there is some reason to 
believe that it is below cost. Determination of fair market value 
might have been the interpretation by CPA respondents for the term 
inventory valuations.
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There may be a few other exceptions if we compare differences 
in percentages. However, this in itself is not a valid comparison.
More relevant is the ranking within each group. In this respect 
there is fairly close correlation between CPAs and the financial 
community on most items.
If there is a lack of communication, it is probably regarding 
the specific role of the CPA in performing MAS. Some CPAs who replied 
to the survey made a special point to clarify certain items or to 
explain what they do or do not do in performing MAS. The financial 
community, in general, is aware of the vast array of services being 
offered by CPA firms. It is doubtful, however, whether or not all 
are aware of the limitations which some films have placed on their 
involvement in specific types of services. There are implications 
regarding independence in appearance over this possible lack of 
communication. This particular point is discussed later.
Summary
The nature of MAS from a conceptual viewpoint, as presented 
by the AICPA, to a listing of specific services, as provided by prac­
ticing CPA firms and the financial community, presents a fairly clear 
picture of the subject from which considerable controversy has evolved. 
There is an apparent understanding between CPAs and the users of 
financial statements as to what generally constitutes MAS. There is 
some possible misunderstanding as to how involved the CPA becomes 
when performing these services. The nature of his personal involve­
ment has ramifications regarding both independence in fact and in
appearance* Before considering the effects on independence that 
the nature of MAS may have, however, we will look next at how the 
economics of MAS also merits consideration in the independence 
issue.
CHAPTER III
THE ECONOMICS OP MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES
Purpose
Chapter II showed specifically the types of services that 
the major CPA firms now offer. Many services are accounting oriented; 
hut quite a few are completely unrelated to accounting. At this 
point we should study the question of "why?". Why have CPA firms 
gone so far afield in the nature of services that they provide?
We might explain that certain types of services are a natural ex­
tension of the accounting expertise of the CPA. But obviously such 
things as plant layout and distribution channels would not fall 
into that category.
While not normally presented this way, some reasons for the 
proliferation of MAS can be explained by using economic theory. Our 
discussion will not go too deeply and will be confined to relatively 
simple theory, but will be pertinent nonetheless. The reader should 
receive an insight into the relationship between these two seemingly 
diverse subjects.
Chapter III relates to the problem of independence in two 
ways, both at opposite extremes. The fact that the area is finan­
cially lucrative is one of the potential pitfalls to the state of 
independence. Conversely, the total advantages derived by all business
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firms, which use their CPA auditors for MAS, may benefit society as 
a whole to such an extent that the potential loss of independence 
is negligible by comparison. This specific premise will not be proven 
or disproven here. But the idea is presented for consideration.
Supply and Demand
To obtain what the economists refer to as "market equilib­
rium" for any one product or service, consumers and producers must 
be in agreement as to the quantity and the price. Stated another 
way, the quantity supplied must equal the quantity demanded at some 
specific price. While we cannot state whether or not there is equi­
librium in the MAS market at the present time, supply and demand 
factors are present nevertheless, and therefore serve to explain 
the vast expansion of this market.
Demand
If CPAs are going to provide management advisory services 
successfully, business firms must desire such services and be willing 
and able to pay for them. Thus, there must be a demand for such 
servioes. As stated in Chapter I, the management consulting market 
(CPA and non-CPA) totaled approximately $900 million in 1966, indi­
cating that there has been a demand in the past.
Redfield's study evaluated the past and future demand for MAS 
by Texas CPAs. Regarding past demand, he found that only of the 
respondents (326 firms) had had no demand for MAS, while 65$ had had 
a limited demand, and 34$ a substantial demand. As to whether or not 
the demand had been changing over the last few years, he found that 1$
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(of 317) had experienced a decreased demand; for 16$ the demand had
remained stable; 48$ said it had increased slightly; and 35$ stated
1
that they had had a substantial increase in demand.
The results of one question to CPA firms on future demand are 
shown below.
TABLE 3-1
FIRMS INDICATING CATEGORIES OF MANAGEMENT SERVICE IN WHICH 
INCREASING FUTURE DEMAND WAS ANTICIPATED AND THE 





increased 1 high to
Question demand 35 low
Check each category in which your firm 
expects an increasing future demand:
Accounting systems and records 80 1
Financial planning: forecasting 
and budgeting 73 2
Financial structure: types and 
sources of capital or financing 69 3
Special investigations: purchase 
or sale of business 64 4
Pensions and profit sharing 57 5
Financial requirements: short- 
and long-term 55 6
Management controls 54 7-8
Inventory control 54 7-8
Cost accounting: all phases 52 9
Financial policies: retention or dis­
tribution of earnings; credit and 
collection 49 10
1
James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by Cer­
tified Public Aooountants (Austin, Texas: Bureau of Business














1 high to 
35 low
Check each category in which your firm 
expects an increasing future demand:
Office equipment 46 11
Office organization 45 12
Training: accounting personnel 44 13
Internal organization 43 14-15
Compensation and incentives 43 14-15
Assistance in rehabilitating a business 41 16-17
Office personnel 41 16—17
Employee benefit programs 40 18
General management: objectives
and policies 33 19
Office layout and space utilization 30 20
Recruitment or interview: office
personnel 28 21
Insurance: coverage; records 25 22-23
Purchasing procedure 25 22-23
Plant and equipment: needs; depreciation 22 24-25
Material handling and control 22 24-25
Production control 21 26
Accumulating and reporting trade
statistics 18 27
Job classification and evaluation 17 28
Sales management: prices; results 16 29-30
Research and development: records
and controls 16 29-30
Arbitrating disputes 15 31
Production methods and standards 12 32
Government contracts: all phases 11 33
Sales: distribution and merchandising 7 34
Transportation equipment: all phases 6 35
Source: James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Servioes
by Certified Public Accountants (Austin, Texas: 
Bureau of Business Researoh, The University of 
Texas, 1961), p. 8 5.
It would appear that the overall demand for MAS was expected 
to increase. Since Table 3-1 was not stratified between local firms 
and national firms, the significance is not completely clear. Many 
small firms have never offered a number of various services. There­
fore, these firms may see no future demand for certain services. 
However, Redfield did state:
. . . Insofar as local firms were concerned, the relative im­
portance of the following nine categories of service apparently 
would be greater in the future than had been the situation until 
that time:
1. Pensions and profit sharing
2. Financial planning: forecasting and budgeting
3. Financial requirements
4. Financial structure
5. Assistance in rehabilitating a business
6. Special investigations: Purchase or sale of business
7. General management: objectives and policies
8. Management controls 2
9. Employee benefit programs
One other question was stratified, however. "In the reason­
ably near future does your firm expect an increasing need or demand 
for management service separate engagements as opposed to management 
services performed in connection with other accounting services?"^ 
Results are shown below.
Offices of national firms
with a separate MS dept. Total
Humber of replies 14 325
Percent of total:
Considerably more 72 17
Slightly more 14 49




Apparently a separate engagement would be analogous to 
employing a management consulting firm. The MAS department, or the 
individuals performing MAS are called in to solve a specific problem. 
The problem may have been spotted during the audit; or the client 
may have been the one to discover the problem. Management advisory 
services in connection with other accounting services would seem to 
arise and be performed in conjunction with these other services.
For example, an inventory-type problem may be discovered during the 
audit; and it may actually be Bolved by the audit staff.
That a demand for management advisory services exists and 
will expand seems evident. Not quite so evident, however, is the an­
swer to "why CPAs?". As mentioned above, some aspects of MAS are 
natural extensions for CPAs; but others are not.
Redfield queried his respondents about consulting engage­
ments performed by others outside the accounting profession. He 
specifically wanted to know the opinion of his respondents (CPAs) 
and their clients regarding management consulting engagements of 
non-CPAs as they pertained to: (l) quality of work and/or personnel;
(2) quantity of work performed; (3) fees charged; and (4 ) follow-up 
assistance and advice. "This study revealed that a significant portion 
of the consulting done in Texas has been provided by management con­
sultants that apparently do not maintain a professional attitude in 
their relationships with clients and that openly solicit clients."^
A high degree of dissatisfaction is evident from the results illus­




FIRMS INDICATING THEIR OWN REACTIONS AND CLIENTS’ REACTIONS 










If your firm has knowledge of services 
performed by management consultants, 
indicate the clients' satisfaction and 
your satisfaction with respect to each 
of the areas below, generally.
Quality of work and/or personnel 
Number of replies 223 223




Quantity of work 
Number of replies "219 221





Number of replies 221 224








of the of their
Question respondents clients
If your firm has knowledge of services 
performed by management consultants. 
indicate the clients' satisfaction and 
your satisfaction with respect to each 
of the areas below, generally.
Follow-up assistance and advice





Source: James E. Redfield, A Study of Management Services by
Certified Public Accountants (Austin. Texas: Bureau
of Business Research, The University of Texas, 1961), 
P. 71.
As before, it must be remembered that the study was limited 
to the state of Texas. One cannot necessarily apply these results 
on a national basis. Redfield also suggested that there may have 
been some personal bias existing in the replies. Therefore, we 
cannot use this study as an indictment against all management consult­
ing firms.
Probably the most logical answer to "why CPAs?" is explained 
by the familiarity that the CPA firm has with the client's business. 
The auditors are likely to see problem areas and have potential 
solutions before the client is even aware that a problem exists.
It would be quite natural in these cases to let the CPA firm provide
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the needed management service. Even if the client spots the problem
first, it is usually more convenient and economical to employ someone
already familiar with the firm's operations and system. The rapport
that has already developed between the client's management and the CPA
firm also could be a factor in utilizing the CPA for services in
addition to the audit. This was an explanation of one of the partners
of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.
We have a tremendous edge over the general consultant by 
virtue of our continuing relationship with the client. Part 
of the finesse of management consulting is coming up with a so­
lution that's not beyond the capabilities of the client. We know 
his capabilities pretty well through the audit relationship and 
we don't have to spend weeks learning about the business.5
Also, as mentioned by the author of the article from which that quote
was taken, "Nor does it hurt that a senior partner of the CPA firm
is often on golfing terms or first-name terms with the client's
chairman or president."^
To summarize briefly, there has been a strong demand for MAS
in the past. These services are also currently demanded by many
business firms; and it appears that the demand will continue well
into the future. Our next interest is to examine how and why this
demand is being met.
Supp.1y
To obtain mar^&et equilibrium there must be a supply available 
to meet the existing demand. There must be firms (CPA and non-CPA)
^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", Forbes, 
XCVIII (October 1, 1966)r 60.
6Ibid.
willing to provide the servioes that are needed by the business com­
munity. There has been no reluctance by CPA firms to help satisfy 
this demand.
Redfield found that CPAs provided all of the services listed 
in his questionnaire, although not all firms provided all services. 
Chapter II spotlighted current practice of major CPA firms. Almost 
all of the 33 listed services are provided by some CPA firms; but 
again, not all firms offer all servioes. The point is that the 
accounting profession in general is attempting to meet the demand 
for MAS. The likelihood of their continued expansion in this field 
seems evident.
The trend is unmistakeable. The big accounting firms, with 
their computer knowhow, their top contacts with management, their 
reputation for probity and their wide knowledge of business, 
have no intention of stagnation. They want to expand and manage­
ment consulting has been a natural.?
We must again ask "why?". Why have CPAs wanted to supply 
these services at the risk of hurting their reputations if they should 
prove to be incompetent? Why shouldtthey want to risk the possible 
loss of independence, so vital in the performance of audits which 
are still their "stock-in-trade?" These questions can be answered 
quite easily— the profit motive. As in most decisions of whether or 
not to expand produots or services into other areas, the opportunity 
for profit is normally the overriding factor. Some would not agree 
with this analysis. They would argue that the chance to provide 
additional service for the benefit of the client is the most impor­
tant concern. Undoubtedly, the opportunity for service is a very
strong factor; and CPAb certainly do provide their clients with a much 
needed service. As will he discussed below, CPAs are frequently more 
efficient and less expensive for the client than would be a general 
management consultant. Nevertheless, should the profit incentive 
of MAS for CPA firms ever decrease, so would CPA participation in 
such services. This is not meant as a criticism of CPA firms engaged 
in MAS.
In the United States, • . . , people have been left largely 
on their own to satisfy their wants. But what is the motive of 
people who are left on their own, without guidance from a dictator 
or from government? The answer is profit or, in a much broader 
sense, the opportunity for economic gain. The chance for self- 
improvement in a market economy spurs people to do those things 
necessary to make the economy function.
The prospect of profit encourages businessmen to search for 
better ways of making existing products, . . . .  In their efforts 
to satisfy the wants of people, they are rewarded with profits.6
As implied above, the majority of business firms operate on 
the profit incentive. CPA firms are no different from other firms 
in this respect. They are serving their proper role in our economic 
system. They are supplying a service which is demanded by consumers, 
and are spurred on by the opportunity for profits.
The actual profitability of MAS to CPA firms is not known.
They operate as partnerships and have no requirement to make public 
their profit figures. The lucrativeness of the field is usually 
measured in gross billings of MAS and grosB billings of MAS as a 
percentage of total gross billings. This information is not readily 
available either. As pointed out in Chapter I, in 1965 one CPA firm 
grossed $17.5 million in MAS alone as compared with $20 million for
O
James E. Brown and Harold A. Wolf, Economics: Principles
and Practioes (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co.,
1967), PP. 32-33.
the largest non-CPA management consulting firm. It is a reasonable 
assumption that the field is at least close to the profitability of 
other CPA functions or we would not have witnessed such continued 
expansion.
In 1966 it was estimated that the average percentage of gross 
revenues derived from MAS by the "Big Eight" CPA firms had risen from 
5$ in 1955 "to 15$.in 1965» and were expected to reach 40$ by 1980.^
CPA firms were specifically questioned on this point in the 
survey for this current study. They were asked, "What percentage of 
gross billings do fees from management advisory services represent?" 
The results are shown below.
TABLE 3-3
PERCENTAGE OP GROSS BILLINGS THAT MAS PEES REPRESENT
Replies
Big Eight Other Total
No. Percent No. Percent No. Percent
Less than 10$ 2 50 2 29
10$ —  25$ 3 100 2 50 5 71
26$ —  40$
41$ —  50$
Over 50$
Totals 3 100 4 100 7 100
9
^"Are CPA Firms Taking Over Management Consulting?", op. cit.,
P. 57.
The results appear to correlate with the figures used in the 
1966 estimate. Of all firms answering the question, 71$ checked 
"10$—  25$"; and all the "Big Eight" firms checked this category. Two 
firms indicated that MAS fees account for less than 10$ of their gross 
billings.
Two of the "Big Eight" firms did not answer the question, 
stating that information of this nature was confidential. One other 
firm did no t ' 'Sirs we r this question nor the following one regarding the 
percentage of MAS clients that are also audit clients because 
". . . certain answers imply problems of independence; we disagree 
with this implication . . . ."
We may conclude from this survey that MAS represents a small 
to moderate portion of gross fees for most large CPA firms; and at 
the present time, it does not account for the major share of revenues 
of any firm surveyed. If the estimate of 40$ for the future mentioned 
above is correct, however, it would be of interest to follow-up on 
this aspect in future years.
The next section will demonstrate and discuss the economic 
market structure which has evolved as a result of the supply and 
demand for MAS.
The MAS Market Structure
There are basically 4 major economic market structures of 
which an industry may be a part— pure competition, monopolistic 
competition, monopoly, and oligopoly. This section will look at the 
characteristics of each of these market structures to determine
in which one the MAS market fits.
Some writers have suggested that in order to strengthen 
independence CPAs should be prohibited from providing MAS to their 
audit clients. It is true that such a prohibition would strengthen 
independence. However, we must also analyze the effect on the market 
structure of this type of action. Do we have a better market structure 
because CPAs are providing MAS than we would have if CPAs were re­
stricted in this practice? Does society get a lower price than would 
otherwise be the case? These questions will be answered in this 
section.
By examining the characteristics of each market structure, 
we can determine in which market the MAS industry is a part. Knowing 
this, we can then determine the effect on the market if CPAs were
prohibited from providing their audit clients with MAS.
This analysis will not provide us with a definite conclusion 
as to whether the increased independence, to be gained by restricting 
MAS, would be outweighed by the detriment to society of such action.
But it will point out other factors which must be considered in
deciding whether to take the action which some writers have recom­
mended.
Pure Competition
"In important respects an economy of free, competitive markets
10
in long-run equilibrium is 'the best of all possible worlds.'"
This market structure is commonly referred to as "pure competition"
1 n
Lawrence Abbot, Economics and the Modern World (2d ed.;
New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.), p. 112.
or "perfect competition." The conditions for a purely competitive 
market as outlined by one economist are listed below.
1. There are many sellers and buyers in the market~so many 
that no one of them can influence market price by his own actions;
• • • •
2. The oompeting products are identioal— or so nearly so that 
it is not worthwhile for any buyer to prefer one seller's product 
to another's. The only basis for preference is price.
3. There is freedom of entry into the market. Whenever
newcomers find it attractive to come into the market, no barriers 
stop them. And whenever any seller or buyer finds it unattractive 
to stay in, he is free to get out.
4. Economic advantage is the sole determinent for buyers' 
and sellers' actions. Sellers try to get the biggest profit.
Buyers try to pay the lowest price.^
Probably the third condition is the only one which is appli­
cable to the MAS field. Any CPA firm can offer MAS if it desires; 
and it can easily withdraw such services from the market should this 
prove to be the most expedient thing to do.
Some may argue that there are definite and exacting require­
ments to beooming a CPA; hence, there are barriers to entry into the
market. Although there are definitely restrictions to becoming a 
CPA, this is irrelevant to the MAS market. One does not have to be 
a CPA in order to practice in the field of management advisory serv­
ices. Anyone can become a management consultant. Of course, he 
must have a certain level of competence in order to compete. But this 
again is irrelevant. Incompetence does not prevent entry into the mar­
ket. It merely precludes success in the market, which is the case 
with practically any business endeavor.
Even if it is agreed that the MAS market fulfills the third
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condition listed above, it must fulfill all 4 conditions in order to 
be classified as pure competition. In this respect it fails.
That MAS is not pure competition is most easily illustrated 
with the second condition, "the competing products are identical."
In the MAS market the products are not identical. MAS firms (CPA 
and non-CPA) are selling a service to clients which they hope will 
solve some specific problem. Basically, their objective is the same, 
that is, the solution to the client's problem. But the approaches 
to the solution and the solution itself may differ.
The competence among firms may differ also. The difference 
in competence may result in one firm's solution being better than 
another film's. For example, two firms may be competent to solve a 
particular problem for a client, such as, a cost-reduction program 
of some type. Both firms may provide acceptable solutions which will 
reduce the client's costs. But one solution might reduce costs more 
than the other; hence, it would be preferred.
In addition to any real difference in ability, there may be 
an "imagined" difference. Some MAS firms specialize in specific 
fields and have a reputation for being the "best in the field." They 
may not necessarily be best; but if the clients think that they are, 
thiB may influence their decision to choose one firm over another.
This type of situation cannot occur under pure competition.
Difference in the personality of staff members among firms 
might also be a basis for preference. This could occur even if the 
competence of the firms and the solutions to the problems were the 
same. Hence, there would still be some product differentiation.
Even though pure competition has been ruled out as not
applicable to the MAS market, there are 4 other features of pure 
competition which should be mentioned for the sake of completeness. 
They reinforce the conclusion that MAS does not come under pure com­
petition.
1. There are no ties of loyalty or friendship affecting 
buyer-seller relationships.
2. There is no advertising on the part of individual sellers.
3. Two prices cannot continue to exist side by side for any 
substantial amount of time.
4. No firm needs to make price decisions or have a price 
policy; it simply sells at the xixling market price.^
These conditions are not met in the MAS market. One reason 
that CPAs have been successful in the MAS field is because of the 
audit relationship which has existed with the client, possibly for 
many years.
Although CPAs are not permitted to advertise, there is no 
such restriction on non-CPA firms. Some firms do advertise to a 
limited extent; however, advertising is not a major feature of the 
MAS market.
There can be some difference in prices among firms. One of 
the major advantages which CPAs have in offering MAS to their audit 
clients is that they can provide services at a lower price than any 
other firm. This point will be discussed more fully below. Dis­
regarding MAS for audit clients, there could also be some differences 
among firms regarding their fees for an MAS engagement for a non-audit 
client.
We can conolude that MAS is not a purely competitive market
"because it fails to meet the strict criteria of this type market.
We will now look at monopolistic competition to see how the MAS field 
may fit in there.
Monopolistic Competition
The term monopolistic competition refers to an economic market 
in which there are many sellers, each one offering a slightly 
different foim of a particular economic product. The differences 
among the products, . . . , may he real or imaginary, hut none­
theless there are differences.13
Although there are some similarities between pure competition 
and monopolistic competition, there are some major differences. The 
primary differences are that monopolistic competition contains product 
differentiation, price differentiation, and advertising. There are 
also some differences and similarities regarding the shape of the 
demand curves, profits, and costs, all of which are heyond the scope 
of this present discussion.
Under monopolistic competition there are product differences; 
under pure competition the products are identical. In the previous 
section we pointed out that product differences do exist in the MAS 
market. This is therefore one characteristic which would relate MAS 
to monopolistic competition.
We also rejected pure competition on the grounds that the MAS 
market may have some price differentiation and some advertising.
Both of these conditions would also tend to classify MAS under monop­
olistic competition.
Like pure competition, entry into the monopolistically compet­
itive market is relatively easy. The previous section pointed out that
13Brown and Wolf, op. cit., p. 1 4 8.
this criterion is met in the MAS field. In addition, there are a large 
number of firms in the MAS industry, including many CPA and non-CPA 
firms. Thus the condition of "many sellers" is also fulfilled.
The characteristics of the MAS market which caused us to 
reject pure competition as the applicable market structure are the 
ones which tend to place it Tinder monopolistic competition. Since 
each of these conditions was discussed fully in the previous section, 
no further elaboration iB needed here, However, before deciding 
whether to olassify the MAS market under monopolistic competition, 
we need to examine monopoly and oligopoly.
Monopoly and Oligopoly
These two markets are discussed together because the analysis 
is rather brief for each one.
Under monopoly there is only one seller. Obviously, this 
condition is completely lacking in the MAS market beoause we have 
already seen that there are many sellers in that market. Therefore, 
we can exclude monopoly as being applicable to the MAS field with 
no further elaboration.
The oligopolistic market has only a few sellers. This is one 
major difference between oligopoly and monopolistic competition.
Another difference is that entry into the market is rather difficult; 
whereas entry is relatively easy in the monopolistically competitive 
market.
There are some similarities between oligopoly and monopolistic 
competition. Under oligopoly there may be price differentiation, 
product differentiation, and advertising, just as there is in
monopolistic competition.
Could the MAS market be classfied as oligopoly? Prom one 
point of view, it possibly could. If we were to speak in terms of 
specific services, we might find some particular service which only 
a few firms offer. However, if we look at MAS generally, we find that 
there are many firms (CPA and non-CPA) offering a wide variety of 
services. Not all firms offer all services. But almost all services 
are offered by a large number of firms.
Some may argue that in terms of total fees, a few large CPA 
firms and non-CPA firms dominate the MAS field so completely as to 
make it oligopolistic. However, evidence indicates that this is not 
the case. The many firms in the MAS market, including many large 
firms, would seem to preclude domination by a single firm or even a 
few firms. Consequently, the MAS market does not appear to meet the 
criteria for oligopoly.
Summary of Market Structures
The MAS market meets the conditions of monopolistic competi­
tion. There are many sellers in the industry. There is price and 
product differentiation. Advertising, while not extensive, does 
exist to some degree in the non-CPA firms; and entry into the market 
is not restricted. Thus, while the MAS market has some characteristics 
common to the other market structures, the foregoing analysis strongly 
suggests a classification of monopolistic competition.
Given this conclusion, we will next consider why CPAs offer a 
particular advantage to their audit clients.
Eoonomic Advantage of CPAs to the Client
Mention has been made several times that CPAs are able to 
provide MAS to their audit clients for a lower fee than might be 
charged by other CPA firms or non-CPA firms. The reader should under­
stand why this is possible.
Basically, it is a question of time. CPAs bill their clients, 
both for audits and MAS, according to the number of manhours needed 
to complete the job. When a CPA firm renders MAS for an audit client, 
he already has a basic knowledge of the client's staff and operations. 
He may also have some insight into the nature of the problem to be 
solved since it may have been discovered during the audit. This, 
of course, is not always the case. Nevertheless, beoause of his. basic 
knowledge of the client, the CPA auditor requires less time in ob­
taining background information than some other CPA firm or non-CPA 
firm. Consequently, his cost of performing the MAS is less than that 
of some other firm. The extent of this cost differential depends on 
the particular client and the magnitude of the MAS to be performed.
The oost difference may be small, but it also may be quite substantial. 
This explains why the CPA who performs the audit could charge a lower 
fee for an MAS engagement them some other CPA or non-CPA.
There are two other questions that need to be answered:
(1) does the CPA charge a lower fee? and (2) if he does, why does 
he? This writer believes that in most, if not all, cases the CPA 
auditor does charge a lower fee. As mentioned above, CPAs normally 
bill their clients at a predetermined hourly rate for the number of 
applicable hours. As a result, if the total number of hours to
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perform an MAS engagement is lesB than it would be if someone else were 
to provide the service, the total fee will be less. This writer does 
not believe that a CPA firm would bill a client based on the number of 
hours that some other firm would require to perform a job. Conceiv­
ably, the hourly billing rate could vary among firms. But even in 
this case, it is unlikely that an hourly price differential would 
normally offset the savings in hours.
The other question is, "why do CPA auditors charge less than 
their competitors?". An earlier section in this chapter stated that 
CPAs are interested in profit maximization. Some might argue that if 
the CPA is a rational profit maximizer, he will charge the same or 
only a slightly lower fee than his competitors would charge. In other 
words, they argue that he will take advantage of the time saved to 
do the job to increase his profit on the job. For the most part, 
this argument does not appear to be valid in this type of situation 
for the following reason.
The CPA's primary source of revenue is his audit. For an 
audit client the MAS fee is likely to be substantially less than the 
audit fee. This is particularly true when viewed in the long-run.
The audit is performed annually. MAS is performed one time or 
intermittently. Quite possibly, the client believes that the CPA who 
does his audits should be able to perform MAS engagements for a lower 
fee than some other firm. Consequently, the client would expect a 
lower fee. If the client suspected that his CPA was taking advantage 
of his position and charging a higher fee for MAS than was warranted 
by the time spent performing the job, the client might veiy well 
discharge him as auditor. Therefore, this writer believes that the
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CPA is actually maximizing his profits when he passes cost savings 
to his olient.
Since we have seen that CPAs oan offer an economic advantage 
to their audit clients, we need to determine what would happen if 
CPAs were restricted in the rendering of MAS.
The Effeot of Limiting CPAs in MAS
According to economic theory, we would like an economy in which 
no one could he made better off without someone else being made worse 
off. Economists frequently refer to this idea as "maximization of 
social welfare." It is a complicated subject, and one of which a 
detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Even 
economists are not in complete agreement as to how this ideal state 
can be achieved. Nevertheless, there are certain principles that 
can be discussed, even though they will not be proven here. The 
purpose is to relate these principles to the MAS field in order to 
demonstrate its role in the maximization of social welfare.
To achieve social welfare maximization, all resources must 
be allocated in a manner which will make this maximization possible. 
Economists are in general agreement that pure competition is the best 
type market to achieve welfare maximization. We have already concluded 
that the MAS market is a part of monopolistic competition, not pure 
competition. However, even within a monopolistically competitive 
market, we want to allocate resources in the best manner possible; 
and analysis oan be made on this basis.
As discussed in the previous section, a CPA can and probably
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does, provide MAS to his audit client for a lower fee than some other 
firm because he does not have to spend costly time familiarizing him­
self with the client and his system. This is particularly important 
for the smaller clients who might do without MAS rather than pay the 
increased cost of calling in someone completely unfamiliar with the 
firm.
A number of persons believe that CPA firms should be prohibited 
from providing MAS to their audit clients in order to preclude the
possibility of a loss of independence. What would be the economic
consequences from this type of recommendation?
In the short run at least, this would increase monopoly power
within the MAS market since there would be fewer fiims providing this
type of service. Economic theory suggests to us that such an increase 
in monopoly power reduces the welfai’e of society.
The social benefits to be derived from prohibiting MAS for 
audit clients would be a greater assurance of independence and thus 
usefulness of the CPA audit, which is the primary function of the CPA 
in our society. Thus we must compare these benefits to the social 
costs of prohibiting MAS by CPA auditors. This social cost is the 
increased presence of monopoly power in the MAS market which will 
result in a higher price and lower supply of MAS services. If the 
social costs exceed the social benefits, society would be better off 
by allowing the CPAs to perform MAS for their audit clients.
It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to measure 
quantitatively the benefits and the costs of increased independence. 
Nevertheless, data presented in Chapter V may give some inkling as to 
the benefits because users of financial statements were asked whether
CPAs should "be prohibited from providing MAS to their audit clients. 
Since independence in appearance is extremely important to the account­
ing profession, a high percentage of replies favoring prohibition may 
be considered as indicating that independence in appearance will be 
increased if prohibition is enacted. Conversely, a small number fa­
voring such restriction might suggest that the amount of independence 
in appearance to be gained is not worth the economic cost.
Summary
The strong continuing demand for MAS by the business community, 
along with the profit incentive of providing such services, has ac­
counted for the tremendous growth of the accounting profession in this 
area. The MAS market structure is one of monopolistic competition. 
Although monopolistic competition is not considered as good as pure 
competition for allocating resources, the addition of the CPA firms 
to the market has decreased monopoly power and has led to a more 
efficient allocation of resources than would be the case if buyers of 
MAS had to depend only on non-CPAs for these services.
The specter of loss of independence by CPAs who provide MAS
for audit clients has resulted in suggestions for restricting CPAs
in this field. Such a restriction would reduce competition in this
market. There would be a smaller supply and an increased price for
MAS to purchasers of these services. In effect, we would be "buying"
more independence at the cost of decreased welfare to society because
of increased monopoly power. We need to determine whether the net
- *
effect of such action would increase or decrease the social welfare.
There is no easy answer to this question. This ohapter has 
presented the subject in a different manner than is normally done. 
Hopefully, it sheds some light on additional considerations neces­
sary for an intelligent discussion of the overall problem of MAS and 
independence.
CHAPTER IV
THE QUESTION OP INDEPENDENCE 
Purpose
At this stage we want to examine the potential pitfalls to 
independence that arise when CPAs perform MAS for their audit clients. 
We do not need to elaborate further on the necessity for complete 
independence by CPAs in conducting an audit, a point which was ad­
equately made earlier. The primary objective of this chapter is 
to synthesize various opinions on this subject, as brought out in 
the literature. The major area of interest is independence in 
appearance; but it is sometimes difficult in a discussion to divorce 
this from independence in fact. While the chapter's focal point is 
the former, some mention is made of the latter. We will also examine 
the results of those questions pertaining to independence, asked in 
this writer's survey of CPA firms. The reader will see from this 
chapter that a genuine controversy exists within the accounting 
profession. Hopefully, he will gain an understanding of the argu­
ments on both sides of the question.
Attitude of the AICPA
The position of the AICPA regarding independence iB set forth
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in Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Ethics. It states in part:
Neither a member or associate, nor a firm of which he is a 
partner, shall express an opinion in financial statements of 
any enterprise unless he and his firm are in faot independent 
with respect to such enterprise.
Independence is not susceptible of precise definition, but is 
an expression of the professional integrity of the individual. A 
member or assooiate, before expressing his opinion on financial 
statements, has the responsibility of assessing his relationships 
with an enterprise to determine whether, in the circumstances, 
he might expect his opinion to be considered independent, objective 
and unbiased by one who had knowledge of all the facts. 1
The rule subsequently describes various types of relationships in 
which CPAs may be considered not independent. The prime example is 
when they serve as officers or directors of clients on whose state­
ments they express opinions.
The summary of Opinion No. 12 of the Code of Professional 
Ethics was quoted in Chapter I. In essence, it states that there 
is no ethical reason why CPAs may not perform MAS while serving the 
same client as independent auditor. Some reasoning that led to this 
conclusion is as follows:
The committee does not intend to suggest, however, that 
the rendering of professional services other than the independ­
ent audit itself would suggest to a reasonable observer a 
conflict of interest. For example, in the areas of management 
advisory services and tax practice, so long as the CPA's serv­
ices consist of advice and technical assistance, the committee 
oan discern no likelihood of a conflict of interest arising 
from such services.2
The committee also cautions CPAs to avoid situations in which they
actually make the decisions for management.
To summarize briefly the position of the Committee on
1
Code of Professional Ethics and Interpretive Opinions 
(New York: American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
1970), p. 2.
^Ibid., pp. 24-2 5.
Professional Ethics, they state that the CPA must he independent 
in fact when serving as auditor for a MAS client. They conclude 
that so long as the CPA does not make any final decisions, he is in 
fact independent. The committee implies the necessity for independ­
ence in appearance by requiring the CPA to assess his relationships 
to insure that he would be considered independent "by one who had 
knowledge of all the facts." They conclude that MAS would not 
suggest a conflict of interest to a reasonable observer.
The committee offered no evidence in support of the latter 
conclusion. There is difficulty in understanding how the committee 
could determine that MAS does not suggest conflict of interest to 
an outside observer, when no empirical research had been conducted 
to support this conclusion. The conclusion is not being refuted 
here. The source of contention is the premise on which the con­
clusion is based. This premise has never been explained.
Regardless of the criticism attacking the validity of the 
methods used to arrive at their conclusions, Rule 1.01 and Opinion 
No. 12 stand as written. They represent the official position of 
the AICPA on the subjeot of MAS and independence, and CPAs have con­
ducted their activities accordingly.
Recently the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence studied 
this problem quite thoroughly. Part of their observations and 
recommendations were presented in Chapter I. In brief, they con­
cluded that there is no major problem regarding MAS and independence 
at the present time; but they also recommended that we continue to 
keep informed of potential problems that may arise. Since this was 
an empirical study, it will be explored more thoroughly in the next
major subsection.
The AICPA Committee on Management Services has taken a 
position consistent with Rule 1.01 and Opinion No. 12. Statement 
on Management Advisory Services No. 3. "Role in Management Advisory 
Services," admonishes CPAs to always assume an objective, advisory 
role and to avoid any relationships that place them in a position 
of making management decisions.
Previous Empirical Research
To this writer's knowledge, there have been only two pre­
vious empirical studies conducted in which the opinions of third 
parties were sought on the subject of CPAs and MAS. Dr. Arthur A. 
Schulte, Jr. centered all of his dissertation research on the subject 
of MAS and independence. Although his study included both independ­
ence in fact and in appearance, the most important aspect of his work 
appears to be the results of his questionnaire to outside observers. 
This questionnaire was devoted exclusively to the question of inde­
pendence in appearance.
Dr. Abraham J. Briloff centered his dissertation on accounting 
communication. His questionnaire to third parties covered a wide 
range of areas, of which independence and MAS was only one.
The AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence has also researched 
the problem; but their work was something of a sequel to the studies 
of Doctors Schulte and Briloff.
Both men conducted their research at approximately the same 
time, 1964 and 1965. The results proved quite interesting and have
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generated considerable discussion within the accounting profession.
The findings of each individual as they relate to independence in 
appearance is presented below. Included in this presentation is 
some of the criticisms which other CPAs have written about these 
studies. We will also discuss the research conducted by the ad hoc 
committee.
Study by Schulte
Dr. Schulte's dissertation, "The Concept of the CPA's Audit 
Independence and its Compatibility with Management Services," was 
completed in August, 1964. Part of his research was a survey to 
state boards of accountancy in all 50 states. In this questionnaire 
he was seeking information as to whether or not disciplinary action 
had ever been taken against any CPA because of loss of independence 
in a case in which MAS was a factor. As brought out in Chapter I, 
he received 44 replies, none of which ever indicated such a case.
Dr. Schulte was directing this facet of his research to the question 
of independence in fact.
The bulk of his study, however, was centered on the question 
of independence in appearance. Results of this aspect were published 
in The Accounting Review in 1965 .^
Dr. Schulte sent 1,260 questionnaires to representatives of 
525 financial institutions. The population was divided into 4 groups: 
(1) research and financial analysts of brokerage firms, (2) commercial 
loan and trust officers of banks, (3) investment officers of insurance
■^Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., "Compatibility of Management Consult­
ing and Auditing," The Accounting Review, XL (July, 19^5)> 587-93.
companies, and (4 ) investment officers of domestic mutual funds. He 
sent questionnaires to 5^4 financial executives of the 130 largest 
institutions in these 4 groups. The remaining 756 questionnaires 
were sent to representatives at 395 institutions selected on a 
random basis.
There were 665 replies, representing 76$ of the financial 
institutions contacted. This provided an overall response rate of 
53$• However, some replies were not usable, and 635 (5°»4$) formed 
the basis for his conclusions.
The questionnaire was relatively short, consisting of only 
6 questions. Two of the most important questions were as follows:
4 . Has the expansion of the CPA into the field of manage­
ment consulting affected your confidence in his audit independence?
5. To what degree do you believe that CPAs can perform the 
managerial consulting type of services to management on a fee 
basis and still remain completely independent?4
A scale was provided with each question to allow for varying degrees 
of opinions. By analyzing and combining the replies of these two 
questions, Schulte concluded that 43$ of the respondents did not 
believe that management consulting seriously endangered the CPA's 
audit independence; and 24$ were undecided. However, the remaining 
33$ seriously doubted whether the CPA was able to maintain his in­
dependent state of mind in regard to a client when he also served that
5
client as a management consultant.-'
In stratifying the responses, Schulte found that opinions 
differed significantly between representatives of large firms and 
those of small firms.
^Ibid.. p. 593. ^Ibid., p. 591.
For commercial loan officers from the largest banks, 60$ 
do not believe that management consulting seriously endangers 
the CPA's audit independence} 17$ believe that it does; the 
remaining 23$ are undecided. For their counterparts from the 
randomly selected banks, 39$ not believe that management 
consulting seriously endangers the CPA's audit independence; g 
39$ believe that it does; and the remaining 22$ are undecided.
Similarly, he found that large brokerage firm representatives were
less concerned about CPA participation in such services than were
small brokerage firm representatives.
Schulte believed that this difference of opinion probably 
arose because financial executives associated with large firms gen­
erally read audit reports prepared by large CPA firms with separate 
MAS departments. Hence, the separation of duties decreases the 
chance of losing independence and increases confidence in the reports. 
In fact, several respondents voluntarily indicated that the size of 
the CPA firm was an important factor in judging the compatibility of
7
MAS. This point of Schulte's study is mentioned because we will 
see in Chapter V that it correlates directly with comments made by 
some respondents in this writer's survey. Schulte's general conclusion 
was that:
Acting as a management consultant does suggest a conflict 
of interest to 33$ of the reasonable observers answering our 
questionnaire. Thus, the contention of the AICPA's Committee 
on Professional Ethics that the rendering of management advisory 
servioes would not suggest to a reasonable observer a conflict 
of interest is challenged by the findings of this study.
He realized that some may doubt the seriousness of the findings 
since there naturally can be different interpretations based on the 
same facts. Nevertheless, he believed that since one-third of the 
financial statement users had serious reservations about the propriety
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of CPAs performing MAS for their audit olients, the profession 
needed to study this question further.
Schulte's recommendation for further study has certainly 
been carried out. His article itself has led to considerable dis­
cussion, both pro and oon. Additionally, the AICPA Ad Hoc Committee 
on Independence personally interviewed Schulte in trying to obtain 
data for their study of this problem.
The strongest criticism of Schulte'b study was by Carey and 
Doherty who objected to the term "management consulting," which was 
used in the questionnaire. Their criticism was quoted in Chapter II. 
They followed this criticism with the assertion that:
It is difficult to believe that reasonable observers— stock­
holders, creditors, or other users of financial statements, or the 
business public generally— would see any conflict of interest 
in the fact that the auditor, in addition to giving an opinion on 
the financial statements, also applied his technical knowledge 
and skill to the improvement of management's planning, control 
and decision-making processes.9
They are of course entitled to express their opinion. How­
ever, it seems somewhat presumptuous to attempt to discredit an 
empirical study by merely making a statement to the contrary with 
no support whatsoever.
Schulte later defended his use of the term "management 
consulting" by stating that the types of services CPAs perform are 
not the critical factors. The important point is that the relation­
ship inherent in a consulting engagement may suggest a confliot of 
interest to a reasonable observer. Carey and Doherty countered that
g
John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty, "The Concept of 
Independence —  Review and Restatement," The Journal of Accountancy, 
CXXI (January, 1966), 41•
"management consulting" meant different things to different people.
They believed that a discussion of the subject would more likely
result in sound conclusions if conducted in terms of specific 
10
services.
C. E. Graese, in discussing possible questionnaire bias,
was concerned that the phrase "completely independent," used in
Schulte's fifth question (cited above), may have been misleading.
He stated that the answers may have been different if the word
11"completely" had been eliminated from the question.
Graese also interpreted some of the findings differently than 
Schulte. As pointed out above, the percentage of representatives 
of larger banks and brokerage films with the opinion that MAS are a 
serious threat to independence was considerably less than the per­
centage of the population as a whole. Schulte's explanation was that 
this difference arose because those individuals were familiar with 
large CPA firms with separate MAS departments. Graese differed with 
this interpretation.
I am inclined to believe that a more significant interpre­
tation of this data is that these loan officers and financial 
analysts are better informed as to the nature of management 
services work as performed by CPAs and have probably given 
further thought to the factors which are significant in the 12 
matter of independence and reliability of the auditors' opinion.
Graese generally concluded that the results of the survey were 
10Arthur A. Schulte, Jr., John L. Carey and William 0. Doherty, 
"Management Consulting— Letters to the Journal," The Journal of 
Accountancy, CXXII (April, 1966), 32-34*
1 1C. E. Graese, "Management Services and the Independence Issue," 
The New York Certified Public Accountant, XXXVII (June, 1967)» 434*
121 Ibid.
not really detrimental to the profession. A substantial majority 
were not worried about independence in connection with MAS. He con­
ceded that a substantial minority with doubt would be a cause for 
concern by the profession. However, he did not believe that to be 
the case. Graese suggested a continuing study of this problem. He 
recommended that the profession make every effort to enlighten and
reassure those who have concern in spite of past findings and 
13experience.
Whether or not aocountants agree that Schulte's results are 
cause for concern, they must all concede that they did give evidence 
that many reasonable observers do see a conflict of interest in the 
audit-MAS relationship. Possibly there was bias in the questionnaire 
or misinterpretation of the questions. But this possibility does not 
justify a complete degrading of the results as irrelevant, as some 
have done. Schulte never suggested that CPAs give up MAS. He 
pointed out that his results did raise questions. Realizing the 
limitations inherent in a questionnaire, he recommended that addition­
al research be conducted. He specifically suggested follow-up depth 
interviews in which third parties oould elaborate on their opinions. 
There is no indication that this suggestion has been carried out to 
any great extent. The AICPA Ad Hoc Committee on Independence did 
interview some individuals. This is discussed in a section below.
Study by Briloff
Dr. Abraham J. Briloff conducted a study somewhat similar to 
Schulte's and at about the same time. He sent questionnaires to 177
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individuals. He received 136 replies, of which 72 were from the 
financial community and 64 were from the accounting profession. There 
were approximately 200 questions covering a wide range of topics, hut 
all primarily concerned with accounting communication. There were 3 
questions regarding MAS which are of particular interest here. Two 
questions were:
A. In your opinion, the rendering of management services 
by CPAs in situations where they will also be fulfilling the 
independent audit function will:
(a) Enhance the significance of the auditor's opinion.
(b) Detract from the significance of this opinion.
(c) Have no important effect on the significance of this 
opinion.
B. In your opinion, the rendering of management services by 
CPAs in situations where they will also be fulfilling the inde­
pendent audit function is:
(a) Compatible with the traditions of the auditor.
Incompatible with these traditions.
(b) Compatible with independence of the auditor.
Incompatible with such independence.
(c) An involvement which should be encouraged and extended. .. 
An involvement which should be discouraged and restricted.
The results of these questions were stratified among "Big 
Eight" practitioners, other practitioners, accounting professors, and 
members of the financial community. This last category is the one of 
greatest interest to us. In answering the first question, 53$ of the 
financial community felt MAS detracted from the significance of the 
audit opinion; 17$ said MAS enhanced the opinion; and 18$ thought MAS 
had no effect. Regarding the three parts of the second question, 49$ 
said MAS were incompatible with the traditions of the auditor; 58$ 
indicated MAS were incompatible with independence; and 54$ felt this
^Abraham J. Briloff, "Old Myths and New Realities," The 
Accounting Review, XLI (July, 1966), 492.
involvement should "be discouraged and restricted. Generally, these 
responses were diametrically opposite those given hy members of the 
accounting profession.
Although Briloff's study was conducted at the same time as 
Schulte's, he published his findings about a year after Schulte.
He considered his results entirely consistent with Schulte's and 
was quite vehement in his criticism of Carey and Doherty.
It might well be emphasized that the Carey-Doherty difficulty 
in believing did not move them to ask for a research study to 
be conducted by the AICPA or anyone else to develop data empir­
ically in order to substantiate or refute the Schulte indictment; 
instead their very difficulty in thus believing was presumed to 
negate his findings.
Entirely fortuitously, my study did not use the emotionally- 
charged term "management consulting" and instead used the phrase 
approved by Carey-Doherty, namely "management services." And 
even though I used the phrase which would meet this Carey-Doherty 
test, the results obtained by my inquiry also reject their 
sanguine acceptance of the compatibility of the two functions.
To proceed further, another of the questions of my study 
did do exactly what Carey-Doherty asserted that Schulte should 
have done, namely give the respondents an opportunity to express 
their views regarding "the specific services offered by CPA 
firms as aids to management."^
In this question Briloff listed 12 categories of services. He 
asked the respondents to indicate those services they believed were 
currently being rendered and those services they believed should be 
rendered. Of the 12 listed, there were only 2 in which over 50fo of 
the financial community respondents were aware of CPA participation.
In addition, over 50f° of the financial community approved CPAs render­
ing MAS in only 2 categories— the same 2. These 2 categories were:
(1) Review phases of a business in connection with a plan of the 
accounting firm's client to buy the business; and (2) Review all
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phases of a business in connection with a plan to reorganize the
16company. As before, replies from accounting profession members 
generally differed sharply from the responses above.
Briloff's results must be evaluated in the same light as 
those based on any questionnaire. We must consider the possibility 
that some respondents misinterpreted some of the questions. Never­
theless, his study certainly indicated a very strong probability 
that independence in appearance was a definite problem.
Briloff was somewhat more vocal as to the significance of 
his results than was Schulte.
. . .  It seems clear from the accompanying data that a probe 
directed to persons who are believed to be sophisticated members 
of the financial community as to their awareness of the auditor's 
involvement in these peripheral services, and their views regard­
ing the appropriateness of such services under the circumstances 
here involved, would undoubtedly reject the Carey-Doherty hypoth­
esis. Correspondingly, there is no study known to me which would 
support the assertion that if respondents were made better aware 
of what was swept into the oompound of management services, they 
would not "see any conflict of interest. . . . "  Nor is there, 
to my knowledge, any reported study which would support the 
Opinion No. 12 of the Institute's Committee on Professional 
Ethics.^'
In a book based on his dissertation, Briloff evaluated and 
criticized quite strongly the arguments that had been advanced for 
the continued proliferation of MAS by CPAs. His general conclusion 
is that CPAs should be prohibited from performing MAS for their 
audit clients. Realizing that this would never come about in the 
near future, he offered the following interim recommendations:
1. The American Institute of CPAs and/or the Securities 
and Exchange Commission should move to accumulate better and 
more definitive data regarding the kinds of services presently 
being performed by public accounting firms, and the revenues
l6Ibid., p. 494. 17Ibid., p. 493.
being derived therefrom.
2. The Institute and/or the SEC should move to require 
all proxy statements requesting the shareholders' approval of 
management's engagement of independent auditors to describe 
in some detail any services performed during the preceding year 
by such audit firm other than the independent audit, per se, 
and the amounts paid for such peripheral services.
The AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has 
become more officially involved in the area of MAS. The previously 
mentioned Statements on Management Advisory Services evidence this. 
Whether or not the Institute has gone as far as Briloff recommended 
is questionable. There is no evidence that his second recommendation 
has received any consideration whatsoever. The chances are it has 
not. Strangely enough, Briloff's study, which in its entirety 
encompassed far more than Schulte's, has not received much attention 
in the literature. Yet his recommendations were potentially more 
controversial than Schulte's. A number of writers have commented on 
Schulte's study; but little has been written regarding Briloff's 
work. Briloff was consulted by the Ad Hoc Committee on Independence 
during their research, however. The results of this research are 
discussed below.
Ad Hoc Committee on Independence
The general conclusions and recommendations of this committee 
were disoussed in Chapter I. At this point we want to look at the 
work of this committee to determine the basis for its conclusions.
We are also interested in determining the relationship between this 
committee's research and that of the two previous studies.
1 A
Abraham J. Briloff, The Effectiveness of Accounting Communi­
cation (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 19^7)* P* 194*
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The committee began its work in the fall of 1966, held 10
meetings, and issued its final report in the fall of 1969* As a
part of its approach, the committee interviewed Drs. Briloff and
Schulte to discuss firsthand the negative attitudes which they had
expressed in their articles. The point that the committee seemed
most enthused about as a result of these meetings is that neither
gentleman knew of any situation in which independence in fact had 
19been impaired.
In addition to the above interviews, the committee read 
all known articles on the subject, as well as the statements issued 
by the AICPA Committee on Management Services. Interviews were 
also held with financial statement users representing the American 
Bankers Association, the Financial Analysts Federation, the Finan­
cial Executives Institute, and the Life Insurance Association of 
America. From these groups there were 16 individuals interviewed.
Interviews were held on 4 occasions. At one interview the 
participants were asked to answer Dr. Briloff's question regarding 
the 12 specific services. Although the users asked for clarification 
of the meaning of some services, committee members refused to answer 
such questions. They felt that the participants should be subjected 
to the same conditions as the original respondents, that is, one­
way communication.
The committee later discussed with the participants the 
reasons for their answers. Some users apparently did not under­
stand the nature of the services or the maimer in whioh they were
19"Final Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," The 
Journal of Accountancy, December, 1969? P« 51•
offered. Some participants "based their answers on their opinion
of a CPA's competence to render such services, rather than on the
question of independence. The committee concluded that there was
misunderstanding "by some participants. However, it admitted that
there was doubt in the minds of some users about the appearance of
20
a CPA's independence in some aspects of MAS.
Later the participants were given revised questionnaires.
To the surprise of the committee, other questions of interpretation 
arose. Apparently the questionnaires were revised again. After 
completing this phase of their study, the committee found that there 
was a diversity of opinion among the participants; but no one thought 
that all of the listed services should be prohibited.
The committee provided the following observations:
The committee's study has led to the observation that there 
is substantial misunderstanding as to the nature of management 
services rendered by CPAs and the manner in which such services 
are rendered— there is a definite need for long-range education.
Another observation . . .  is that there are definite limi­
tations on the value of questionnaires on this subject. These 
limitations arise not only from lack of understanding as to 
the nature of management services and how they are rendered 
but also from the difficulty of phrasing questions so as to 
elicit the desired information; and the respondent's difficulty 
in interpreting the questions . . . .
• . . the committee feels that the procedure of conferring 
with the representatives of the user groups was quite satis­
factory, principally beoause of the opportunity afforded to 
engage in dialogue— to clarify, to explain, to explore as the 
representatives of the user groups desired. 1
In 1967 the chairman of the ad hoc committee rendered a 
progress report of the committee's work to that date. The committee 
recognized the limitations of questionnaires. Nevertheless, the 
chairman stated that they were considering sending an additional
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questionnaire to the population to which Dr. Sohulte had addressed
his survey. They had hoped that this would accumulate further 
22
helpful data.
They did not do this. In fact, they decided not to use any 
additional questionnaires.
The committee has given consideration to (1) preparation 
of further questionnaires and/or (2) additional meetings with 
representatives of user groups. We decided not to employ the 
use of further questionnaires as, in our opinion, results ob­
tained through interviews with user groups give more valid 
results. We also concluded that extension of the interviews 
with representatives of user groups would not likely add further 
insights, at least at this point of time, to our exploration of
the subject.23
As stated earlier, one of the general recommendations from the 
committee's study was that the profession keep abreast of user 
attitudes in the future.
At this point some comments are in order regarding the 
committee's work.
Although the committee criticized the use of questionnaires, 
possibly the results of the previous surveys were partially respon­
sible for the committee's formation. Certainly, we had no evidence 
of widespread dissatisfaction among financial statement users prior 
to the research by Schulte and Briloff. Regardless of their limi­
tations, these questionnaires did serve as a basis for further 
research into a very important topic. Much of the committee's work 
centered on these prior studies. To simply write off the future use
22Malcolm M. Devore, "Compatibility of Auditing and Manage­
ment Services— A Viewpoint from within the Profession," The Journal 
of Accountancy, CXXIX (December, 19^7)« 37•
23"Pinal Report of Ad Hoc Committee on Independence," op. cit.,
p. 53.
of questionnaires would not appear to be a wise decision. In fact, 
in any topic concerning large numbers of people, it would be folly 
to conduct in-depth interviews without a prior indication that such 
interviews were needed. This indication can come from questionnaires
Questionnaires also have some advantages over interviews. 
Sometimes people are not inclined to criticize openly, but have no 
compunction about commenting anonymously in a questionnaire.
This writer questions whether the interviewing of only 16 
statement users provided valid results. True, these interviews 
have provided much information upon which to base future research.
But the committee has closed its doors on the matter for the present 
time. It stated that no additional interviews are currently planned.
Discussion by Other Writers
Articles have been published about CPAs and MAS for over 
20 years. Most of the earlier articles did not even use the term 
"management services." Generally, they covered some specific aspect 
in which CPAs oould help their clients. Since the latter half of the 
1950's, articles on this subject have become more and more common.
The question of independence has been brought more to light in these 
later articles also.
The literature concerning MAS and independence is reviewed in 
this section. The presentation is in chronological order beginning 
with 1956. Not eveiy article will be mentioned, only those most 
relevant to our discussion. Upon completion of this chapter, the 
stage will then be set for the results of the current survey on this
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topic, which hopefully will be the latest contribution to the 
literature.
1956 -  1959
One of the earlier articles in this period included inde­
pendence as part of its overall discussion; but it did not concentrate 
on this aspect of MAS. The author was not concerned with accounting- 
type services, but rather with the non-traditional services such as 
market research, job classifications, and warehouse layout. He 
pointed out that a number of objections could be raised about in­
cluding such services as a proper part of the practice of public 
accounting. One of the main objections was the possible loss of 
independence by CPAs who performed such services for their audit 
clients. The author did not indicate whether he personally shared 
this objection on the basis of independence.
Apparently his primary concern was that CPAs may be stepping 
outside the boundaries of the professional accountant by partici­
pation in such a wide diversity of activities. His solution was the 
creation of a new profession. This profession might possibly be 
called the Certified Public Business Advisor (CPBA). The CPBA would 
practice only in the field of MAS. Only persons who met certain
24
levels of competence for specific services would be "certified."
Hence, both the problems of competence and independence would be 
solved. To this writer's knowledge, there has not been anything else 
written by other writers about this idea.
^Charles Lawrence, "Management Services and the Accounting 
Profession," The New York Certified Public Acoountant, XXVII 
(October, 19579» 671-76.
One of the first articles in this period devoted to the
ethical side of the MAS question was by Ira Frisbee. Regarding the
specific point of MAS and auditing, he said, "In my opinion, most
of the management services which customarily are performed do not
in themselves make the auditor nonindependent, although situations
25may exist where he would not be independent." ^ Frisbee's opinion 
was based on the assumption that CPAs serve only in advisory roles.
He believed that if they ever made the decision for management, they 
would cease to be independent. As we will see, this distinction 
between independence and nonindependence is shared by many other 
writers.
John L. Carey, while serving as Executive Director of the 
AICPA, wrote a book concerning professional ethics. It was not an 
official pronouncement of the Institute, and represented his opinions 
only. The .book included a chapter entitled "Ethical Responsibilities 
in Management Services." Very little in this chapter was devoted to 
the question of independence, which at that time was not a boiling 
issue. Generally, his opinion parallelled that of Frisbee.
If a certified public accountant limits his "management 
services" to a technical work and recommendations or advice 
to clients, pointing out alternative courses and their con­
sequences, but leaving the final decision to the management, 
it does not seem that his objectivity as independent auditor 
of the accounts of the same business enterprise need be adverse­
ly affected. The precise type of service might have some 
bearing on the question.26
25■'Ira N. Frisbee, "Ethical Considerations in Rendering Manage­
ment Services," The Journal of Accountancy. CIII (March, 1957)» 33•
26John L. Carey, Professional Ethics of Certified Public 
Accountants (New York: American Institute of Accountants, 195^)i
P. 144.
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Carey also pointed out that tax advice to management "by CPAs 
had long been accepted. Seldom had questions been raised concerning 
impairment of independence in this area. He therefore implied that 
advice to management in other areas is in the same category as tax 
advice and should be considered in this light.
Several articles written during this period dealt quite 
extensively with the opportunities and possible pitfalls for CPAs 
in MAS. But generally they were concerned more with the competence 
of the CPA and merely skirted the question of independence.
One such article delved quite deeply into the opportunities 
and limitations inherent in a MAS practice. This article considered 
many ethical considerations. But it only mentioned, with no elab­
oration, the likelihood of conflict with concepts of independence
27as being deserving of thought.
Another article during this period also devoted considerable 
coverage to the nature of MAS and ways to develop a MAS practice.
A slight mention was made of independence.
I have no patience whatever with those who say that because 
the C.P.A. performs some service for his client beyond the scope 
of the normal audit or tax service, he loses his independence.
He can be just as independent installing a standard cost system 
or a system of internal control or a budgetary system, for 
example, as in making an examination of the accounts and report­
ing upon it. . . . But if he should become involved as part of 
the management team by acting in the capacity of treasurer or 
controller or in making management decisions, then he ceases to 
be a professional and simply becomes just another employee. His
27
Max Blook, "Management Advisory Services— Opportunities and 
Limitations," The New York Certified Public Accountant, XXVIII 
(February, 1958)» 139*
independence vanished with the first act of this nature which he 
performed.^8
Like the other writers, this author saw no threat to audit independ­
ence provided that the CPA did not make management decisions.
A similar opinion was expressed by Thomas G. Higgins, who 
at that time was chairman of the AICPA Committee on Professional 
Ethics. In discussing numerous ethical problem areas, he was not 
overly concerned about independence and MAS. He pointed out that 
there was general agreement that the CPA could maintain his inde­
pendent status provided he kept his MAS relationship at the advisory
29level, as distinct from the decision-making or operating level.
Certainly, there is no basis for disagreement with this 
opinion. Up to that time this was the consensus of those who had 
written on the subject. During this entire period the only concern 
regarding independence was that the CPA maintain an advisory role 
only. Everyone was in general agreement that should the CPA partici­
pate in the decision-making role, he would lose his independence.
Ho writer ever mentioned the appearance of independence in the MAS 
role.
The lack of concern over independence problems is easy to 
understand. During this period MAS as a separate function was 
just beginning to come into its own. Most writers apparently were 
interested only in providing an awareness to CPAs of opportunities
28Clinton W. Bennett, "Management Services by C.P.A.'s," The 
Accounting Review, XXXIII (October, 1958), 611.
29Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics and Publio Opinion, 
The Journal of Accountancy, CVI (November, 1958), 37*
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in this emerging field. As quoted earlier, MAS constituted only 5$ 
of total gross revenues for "Big Eight" firms in 1955* Independence 
did not really seem to he a major problem, and it probably was not.
1960 —  1964
During the early 1960's the accounting profession received 
a new awareness regarding potential conflicts of independence in 
relation to MAS and auditing. University professors in particular 
began to present a different outlook on this question.
George Mead, University of Illinois, wrote an interesting 
article tying in MAS with service and the profit motive. While 
cautioning against the potential loss of independence, he recog­
nized that this negative factor was sometimes offset by the good 
derived from the MAS. His argument was somewhat similar to that 
presented in Chapter III of this paper.
. . .  The profession must take care, then, that each new 
"non-accounting" service deemed professionally compatible, 
apparently increasing service and income, does‘not systematic­
ally undermine its very foundation, . • . creating undue 
pressure on independence . . . .
. . . Independence iB not an end in itself. Neither must 
it be inferred that independence is an all or nothing propo­
sition . . . .  Unless bias is proven, less-than-aloof auditor- 
client relationships only cause degrees of probability or 
measures of doubt as to independence, and even these weakening 
influences may be offset to some degree by raising standards 
of competence and integrity and by broadening public under­
standing. Current practice demonstrates that auditing and 
certain management advisory functions are not incompatible.
During the 19o0's writers began to realize the importance 
of appearance to outside parties, a subject not mentioned in the
^George Mead, "Auditing, Management Advisory Servioes, Social 
Servioe, and the Profit Motive," The Accounting Review, XXXV (October, 
1960), 666.
earlier period. While not referring specifically to MAS, Carman 
Blough mentioned this topic in discussing, "Responsibilities to 
Third Parties."
Other situations are such that third parties are likely to 
assume that the CPA lacks independence, even though he may 
actually he, in fact, quite independent. Since one's usefulness 
as an auditor is impaired by any feeling on the part of third 
parties that he is likely to lack independence, he has the 
responsibility of not only maintaining independence in fact, but 
of avoiding any appearance of lacking independence.31
Robert Trueblood, in writing an article covering many aspects 
of MAS, provided a somewhat simplified approach to the independence 
question. He stated that all phases of a CPA's work— audit, tax,
MAS, and others— are subject to review, examination, and criticism 
by fellow practitioners. Consequently, he concluded that it is
32
difficult to raise questions about the propriety of auditing and MAS.
True, CPAs are subject to a review by their peers to some 
extent. As a practical matter however, we would not normally see 
this unless there was evidence of an ethical violation or of some 
other unprofessional conduct. Consequently, there appears to be 
little validity in using that as a basis for concluding that the 
CPA auditor-MAS relationship offers no possible threat to independ­
ence. It is an oversimplification of the problem.
We should not be too critical, however. Up to that time, 
no one had ever written anything refuting this philosophy. No 
specific problems had ever been reported. There was really little
31Carman G. Blough, "Responsibility to Third Parties," The 
Journal of Accountancy, CIX (May, 1960), 60.
32Robert M. Trueblood, "The Management Service Function in 
Public Accounting," The Journal of Accountancy, CXII (July, 1961), 
42-43.
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reason to question whether or not his attitude was the correct one.
At approximately the same time as Trueblood*s article a new 
concept was advanced. Professors Mautz and Sharaf published their 
monograph, The Philosophy of Auditing. This is a very well written 
paper. Members of the accounting profession have come to regard the 
work quite highly. Their chapter entitled, ’’Independence," provides 
the basis for our discussion here.
Mautz and Sharaf pointed out that auditors must have real 
independence and apparent independence. This, of course, is anal­
ogous to the terms we have used throughout this paper, that is, 
independence in fact and in appearance. They then proceeded to 
present a dispassionate view of 6 different threats to audit inde­
pendence, of which service to management was one. Their concern was 
not for independence of individual practitioners, as such. Rather 
they were interested in independence of the profession as a whole. 
Consequently, they centered their discussion on those characteristics 
that the general public may question as threats to the auditors' 
independence.
The authors refuted the arguments so frequently advanced by 
proponents of MAS that CPAs are merely serving as advisors, and that 
independence is a state of mind.
There tends to come a time in any arrangement for management 
services when the mutuality of interest of the consultant and 
the client becomes so significant that the accountant ceaseB to 
be independent in the sense that we feel he should be for auditing 
purposes. Management requests advice because it expects to use 
it; the consultant gives it to be used; the consultant knows that 
as a consultant he will be judged by the ultimate usefulness of 
his advice in bringing success to management's efforts. He has 
had a hand in shaping managerial deoisions and will be judged by 
management on the same basis that the management itself will be 
judged. How then can he claim to be completely independent?
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. . .  He now has an interest in that company, a financial 
interest based on his prestige as a successful advisor, and his 
interest differs not in kind but only in degree from that of a 
full-time employee.
. . . Does anyone really believe that we can offer the 
managerial consulting type of advice to management on a fee 
basis and still appear completely independent to alert and 
intelligent outsiders? More and more, independent auditors 
will work in the harsh, cold light of public scrutiny; it will 
not be enough that we feel we are independent and can convince 
our clients of the same fact. More and more we will have to 
convince others.^
Their solution for this problem was to provide specialization 
within the profession. In this vein, auditing would be recognized as 
a specialty separate from the other public accounting functions. 
Consequently, those who serve as auditors would perform no other 
functions for their clients. Those performing other functions would 
not engage in audits. Staff members would be declared as either 
auditors or non-auditors and would be restricted to the classification 
which they select. According to the authors, this decision would not 
mean that a man could never change his mind. However, he would be 
committed to work in his area for the foreseeable future.34
Mautz and Sharaf would require this division of duties in 
large CPA firms only.
. . . very few small firms make what may be called a public 
audit. When audits are made by small firms they are of a restrict­
ed usefulness, generally performed at the request.of a bank. Such 
audits seldom carry any implications of general public interest. 
Local banks tend to know local accounting practitioners and to know 
which ones they can rely on. We feel that to restrict in any way 
small accounting firms from performing audits would only make it 
more difficult to service their clients and others with no sub­
stantial offsetting benefits resulting from such restriction.35
33R. K. Mautz and Hussein A. Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing 
(Iowa City, Iowa: American Accounting Association, 1961), pp. 222-23.
34Ibid.. pp. 228-29. 35Ibid., p. 230.
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The authors further suggested that as soon as a certain client "became 
so large that there was substantial public interest in his audited 
statements, auditing and other services should be separated.
Thus Mautz and Sharaf adopted somewhat of a more moderate view 
than Briloff, who would have prohibited MAS and auditing for the same 
client entirely. The accounting profession has never officially 
acted on the recommendations by Mautz and Sharaf. Unofficially, 
many firms follow a policy along the lines of these recommendations. 
This policy may differ among firms. It is not necessarily as re­
strictive as the authors suggested. Each firm generally allows some 
flexibility in this respect. This writer's survey to CPA firms 
asked two questions on this specific point. The results are included 
toward the end of this chapter.
In 1962, Thomas G. Higgins, who was mentioned in the previous 
section, emphasized a point which was then gaining wide acceptance.
There are actually two kinds of independence which a CPA 
must have —  independence in fact and independence in appearance. 
The former refers to a CPA's objectivity, to the quality of not 
being influenced by regard to personal advantage. The latter 
means his freedom from potential conflicts of interest which might 
tend to shake public confidence in his independence in fact.36
This possibly was the first time that these two terms were used. They
have been used quite frequently since then, as have many synonyms for
them.
Regarding MAS, Higgins generally restated his previous position. 
Provided that CPAs merely advise and do not make decisions, he saw 
no problem. He did not discuss the possibility of independence in
•^Thomas G. Higgins, "Professional Ethics: A Time for Re­
appraisal," The Journal of Accountancy, CXIII (March, 1962), 31.
appearance in connection with MAS.
In 1962 a hook edited by Carey restated his position of 1956
that so long as the CPA did not put himself in place of management,
there was no problem of independence. It also stated the exact words
which Trueblood stated about the CPA being subject to review by his
37fellow practitioners. The book reflected the opinions of the AICPA 
Committee on Long-Range Objectives. Both Carey and Trueblood had 
served on that Committee.
One of the first articles devoted exclusively to the com­
patibility of consulting and auditing came in 1963. This article 
took the positive approach. The author, Kenneth S. Axelson, re­
marked that MAS provided only one of several pressures on independence 
for the CPA. The accountant's financial dependence on client fees and 
past personal relationships with management also exerted pressure on 
independence. Yet these pressures have never been seriously ques­
tioned. The author pointed out the pressures on the other side that 
help to insure independence— legal liability, possible reaudit by 
regulatory agencies, and possible review by peers.
Axelson also put forth the argument frequently advanced by 
proponents of MAS, that is, the advisory role of the accountant. 
Furthermore, he stated that consulting fees were generally less than 
audit fees. A poor MAS engagement, either because of quality or lost 
independence, may cost him the audit. Thus this serves to strengthen 
his audit independence.
^John L. Carey (ed.), The Accounting Profession; Where Is 
It Headed? (New York: American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, 1962), pp. 87-8 8.
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The author would not separate the auditing and consulting 
function unless there were a real threat to audit independence. He 
concluded that no such threat existed.
The following year Delmer P. Hylton, an accounting professor, 
wrote an article expressing an opposite view from Axelson. This was 
the first article written exclusively to advance a negative opinion 
on this subject.
His arguments parallelled somewhat those of Mautz and Sharaf.
He refuted the "advisory role only" argument.
. . .  It is true that management is not required to adopt the 
solution recommended by the management consultant, . . . .  Surely 
management does not anticipate ignoring the recommendations of the 
hired consultant; otherwise he would not have been engaged in the 
first place. And if he does not present a solution which manage-,q 
ment believes suitable, he is not likely to be called upon again.
Hylton also brought out another consideration. He admitted 
the unlikelihood of a CPA's deliberately abandoning his independence. 
But he believed that a CPA could unconsciously lose some of his im­
partiality. Thus the CPA could lose independence in fact without 
realizing this loss.
Hylton restated the case for independence in appearance. His 
opinion was that CPAs who provide MAS for audit clients hardly present 
an appearance of independence to outsiders.
His solution to this overall question was the prohibition of 
MAS to one's own audit clients. Although this may cause some ineffi­
ciency and increased costs in performing MAS, Hylton acoepted this as
Kenneth S. Axelson, "Are Consulting and Auditing Compati­
ble?", The Journal of Accountancy, CXV (April, 1963), 54-57*
39Delmer P. Hylton, "Are Consulting and Auditing Compatible?—
A Contrary View," The Accounting Review, XXXIX (July, 1964)« 667*
one of the costs of maintaining independence.
Perhaps the solution to this problem is simply the adoption 
of the practioe of referring the audit client to other C.P.A.s 
when he requests management services, with an explanation as 
to why this is done. Alternatively, the auditor could accept 
the management services engagement and explain to this client 
that he can no longer serve as his auditor. It is believed that 
this policy would do much to further the image of the C.P.A. as 
a truly professional man.^
This period witnessed an increasing awareness by CPAs of the 
potential dangers to audit independence inherent in an MAS engage­
ment. Everyone did not agree with the negative attitudes expressed 
by some writers. But by that same token, we saw a questioning of 
the old ideas. No longer did everyone assume that the problems of 
independence would disappear by merely assuming that they did not 
exist. In the next period we will find that writers discuss the 
subject with even greater intensity than in this past period.
1965 —  Present
Possibly we could call this the "Schulte Era." He published
1
the results of the first known empirical study on MAS and outside 
parties in 1965* Many articles and additional research were based 
on his study. Other articles did appear though. Some made only 
passing comments to Schulte|s work; others did not mention it at all.
The first pertinent article was Schulte's. We have already 
discussed it quite thoroughly in a previous section. We need not 
elaborate further on the substance of his findings. Similarly, the 
Carey-Doherty article and the Graese article need no additional dis­
cussion. Schulte published several other articles after his first
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one in .1965» These generally were an extension and sometimes a 
repetition of what he had said previously. They are indexed in the 
bibliography of this paper if the reader wishes to refer to them.
Briloff also published his findings during this period. We 
have already seen the results of his study.
We must give credit to both individuals for their contri­
bution to accounting literature. If they did nothing else, they 
made the profession aware of the independence in appearance problem. 
Everyone may not agree with their conclusions and recommendations.
But everyone must admit that they provided information where none 
existed previously. Their work set the stage for much of the litera­
ture on this topic during this period. This literature has been 
beneficial. The more a problem is discussed, the more enlightened we 
all become, and the greater our chances of finding solutions.
Felix Kaufman devoted a small portion of a 1967 article to 
the subject of independence. He generally disagreed with those 
individuals who saw threats to audit independence. He made three 
observations about the matter of independence.
First, CPAs have now rendered millions of hours of manage­
ment services to their clients . . . , there are no instances 
. . . confirming the impairment of independence because of 
management services activity.
Second, CPAs have become eminent members of the management 
services field . . . .
Third, some people have applied a rigorous logic to the 
independence issue, concluding that to really achieve audit 
independence an environment must be established in which the 
auditor never has advocacy sentiments about his client . . . .
. . . Audit independence becomes an abstraction rather than 
a positive and viable personal attribute. And it envisages the 
auditor as a virtual automaton bereft of capacity for perception,
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discrimination or moral judgment.^
Although all of the above observations may be true, they 
are not necessarily relevant. They do not really appear to add any­
thing pro or con to the argument. It is particularly difficult to 
understand the relation to independence of Kaufman's second conten­
tion. In his article Kaufman elaborates on the expansion of MAS, 
bringing out facts similar to those discussed in Chapters I and II.
But nowhere does he show the relevance of these facts to the inde­
pendence question.
In the December, 1967 issue of The Journal of Accountancy, 
there was a 3 part article on the compatibility of auditing and 
MAS. Schulte took the viewpoint of an outside observer, discussing 
the results of his survey. Devore gave the accounting profession's 
viewpoint. It was an interim report by the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Independence. His viewpoint generally was included in the final 
committee report, discussed earlier in this paper. Prank J.
Hoenemeyer, an executive vice president with Prudential Insurance 
Company, presented the viewpoint of a financial statement user.
Hoenemeyer's overall opinion was that independence in con­
nection with auditing and MAS was not a serious problem. He believed 
that MAS could lead to a loss of independence but would not lead to 
it because MAS are secondary to auditing. He explained this position.
. . .  By this I mean that the fees produced by the perform­
ance of management consulting are less than those from the 
auditing function. As I view it, the CPA firm gets its manage­
ment service engagements because it is the company's CPA and it
^Felix Kaufman, "Professional Consulting by CPAs," The 
Accounting Review, XLII (October, 1967)* 719*
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is selected as a CPA because it is independent. Another way of 
stating this is that if the CPA firm lost its reputation of being 
independent, it would not then be the auditor and would not then 
be hired as a management consultant.
If management services should grow to the point where they 
are the tail that wags the dog there would be a real impact on 
my thinking.42
In addition to the "could" and "would" distinction, which he 
listed as his first point, Hoenemeyer brought out the following 
points:
Second, some of the functions which a CPA now performs, and 
which are not being questioned, are more likely to lead to a 
loss of independence.
Third, so far as appearance of independence is concerned, 
it is more important to solve the problem of what I call 
multiple-choice or flexible accounting.
Fourth, the biggest problem so far as independence is 
concerned, is that CPAs are selected and paid by the management 
they are supposed to check o n .43
Hoenemeyer had a very good opinion of CPAs and their repu­
tation for integrity. We can conclude that he, as a financial 
statement user, had a positive attitude toward CPA participation in 
MAS, even when the CPA also serves as auditor for the same client.
In Chapter II we saw that Kell classified MAS as "accounting 
services" and "administrative services." This same article by Kell 
further expounded on these services as they relate to audit inde­
pendence .
Accounting-based services have been rendered for over fifty 
years without any effect on either independence in fact or in 
appearance.
. . * Accounting-based management services by CPAs are 
compatible with independence. There should be no question on
^^rank J. Hoenemeyer, "Compatibility of Auditing and Manage' 
ment Services— The Viewpoint of a User of Financial Statements,"
The Journal of Accountancy, CXXIV (December, 1967)» 35*
43Ibid.. p. 33.
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this portion of the issue now; there should "be none in the 
future. I am hopeful that all interested parties can agree 
on this aspect of the controversy.44
All interested parties do not agree with Kell. The evidence 
does not support his statement that accounting-based services have 
no effect on independence in appearanoe. Chapter V will show that 
some third parties look with disfavor on some of these types of 
services as well as some non-accounting oriented services.
Kell focused his attention on administrative services, those 
unrelated to accounting. Even here, he did not regard independence 
in fact as a major problem. He therefore concluded:
Thus the real issue is not management services and.inde­
pendence. It is not accounting services and independence.
It is not administrative services and independence in fact.
The real issue is the incompatibility between administrative 
services for management and the auditor's appearance of inde­
pendence. 43
As a solution to the problem Kell proposed that the AICPA 
formally recognize the two types of services, accounting and adminis­
trative. He further proposed that the rendering of administrative 
services by a CPA to an audit client be identified in Rule 1.01 of 
the Code of Professional Ethics as constituting a relationship which 
is incompatible with independence.4^ His solution was somewhat 
similar to Hylton's proposal 4 years earlier. Hylton did not dis­
tinguish between the two types of services. He also did not 
specifically mention AICPA prohibition, although that was the im­
plication. To date, Kell's suggestion has not been acted on by the
44Walter G. Kell, "Public Accounting's Irresistible Force and 
Immovable Object," The Accounting Review, XLIII (April, 1968), 268.
45Ibid., p. 269- 46Ibid.
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the Institute. There appears to be little probability that they will 
adopt his recommendations in the foreseeable future.
The last article which we will discuss, fittingly enough, was 
a review of the issues that had arisen concerning this problem. The 
authors pointed out the major differences of opinion regarding com­
patibility between proponents and opponents of MAS. "Advocates of 
'incompatibility' have been satisfied to demonstrate that combined 
consulting and auditing has the potentiality for damaging the 
auditor's independence, while the advocates of 'compatibility' have 
demanded absolute proof that independence has been lost."4"^
Using "perceived" independence to mean independence "in 
appearance," the authors summarized the status of the controversy.
A priori analysis indicates that performance of management 
services is entirely compatible with professional independence. 
While there seems to be no basic incompatibility between 
consulting and objective audit independence, the consulting 
relationship is potentially dangerous for maintenance of sub­
jective audit independence. The extent of the danger cannot 
be adequately determined without experimental research. The 
status of perceived independence is a question of fact to be 
determined from surveys of the opinions of third parties.
Previous surveys have shown that a significant number of ob­
servers believe that an auditor's independence is impaired by 
performance of consulting and auditing for the same client, 
but future surveys coupled with public information programs 
may reveal changes in this situation.
The danger to subjective audit independence to which they referred
is the possibility of subconsciously becoming biased or partial.
This factor was discussed earlier in the article by Hylton.
4 D. R. Carmichael and R. J. Swieringa, "The Compatibility of 
Auditing Independence and Management Services —  An Identification of 
Issues," The Journal of Accountancy, XLIII (October, 1968), 705*
48Ibid.
Independence Questions in Survey of CPAs
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Several writers recommended a division between staff mem­
bers who audit and staff members who render MAS. At the present 
time there is no formal requirement for such a division. As a 
part of the current survey of large CPA firms, however, this writer 
asked several questions that had independence implications. We 
have seen earlier from the first two questions that all firms sur­
veyed offer MAS and have a separate MAS department.
The third question and its choice of answers is shown below.
3. Do any of the individuals who perform management ad­
visory services also participate in any audits?
All individuals performing management advisory services 
participate in some audits.
Some individuals performing management advisory services 
participate in some audits.
No individual performing management advisory services 
participates in any audit.
None of them answered the first choice. Eight answered the 
second choice; and 2 answered the third. Even some of those who 
selected the second response modified or clarified their reply 
somewhat. Some firms indicated that dual participation in MAS and 
audits was very minor. In certain instances MAS staff members may 
participate in an audit in a strictly advisory role. For example, 
they may advise the audit staff on certain aspects of the computer 
system. The audit staff can also give valuable information to the 
MAS staff on organizational and other matters.
A related question followed, to be answered based on the 
reply to the previous question.
4. Answer this question only if you answered either of the
109
first two choices in question number 3.
Do the individuals mentioned in question number 3 partici­





All 8 firms that had answered the second choice in question 
3 answered this question. No firm answered, "Yes, always." Six 
firms replied, "Yes, sometimes;" and 2 said, "No, never."
We can see that CPA firms have voluntarily separated the 
audit staff and the MAS staff. There are a few minor exceptions.
This division does not go as far as some authors have recommended. 
However the firms have willingly separated these duties without 
any requirements by the AICPA and without coercion by any other 
group or agency. The firms are aware of the need for avoiding 
conflicts of interest. This self-imposed division of duties 
helps to insure factual independence. We might suspect that 
outside parties would be less fearful of independence conflicts 
under this type of arrangement. Thus independence in appearance 
would be strengthened. Whether or not this is so is one subject 
in Chapter V.
Question number 6 of the CPA survey also had independence 
implications.
6. What percentage of your management advisory clients 




Less than 10$ 0 0
tr\COI 1 11
26$ —  50$ 1 11
51$ —  75$ 4 45
Over 75$ 3 33
Total 9 100
In order to have potential problems of independence, we 
must have a large percentage of firms rendering MAS to a substantial 
number of their audit clients. This proves to be the case. The 
above reply shows that 78$ of the 9 firms answering the question 
perform audits for 50$ of their MAS clients. For the "Big Eight" 
films (not stratified above) 100$ of the 5 answering the question 
perform audits for over 50$ of their MAS clients. These statistics 
do not indicate any problem of independence. However, they do show 
the magnitude of the problem if it is ever proven that a threat to 
independence in fact exists.
To analyze properly this potential threat we would also 
want to know the percentage of gross billings that MAS represent. 
Some writers have used this as a partial criterion in evaluating 
independence. For this survey, the results of a question on this 
point were presented in Chapter III. The reader may recall that 
7 firms answered the question. For no firm did this percentage 
exceed 25$» and for 2 firms it was less than 10$. At the present 
time CPA firms would appear to pass the test on this point.
Summary
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We have seen that there are two extremes regarding solutions 
to the independence question. One group would have CPAs divorce 
themselves completely from performing all types of MAS for audit 
clients. At the other extreme we find those who oonsider it un­
thinkable to suggest the possibility of any threat to independence, 
and would therefore make no changes in the present status. We also 
have the more moderate views which fall somewhere between the two 
extremes. Some suggest that CPAs perform only accounting-oriented 
services for audit clients. Others suggest a formal staff division 
between auditing and MAS. All this discussion is healthy for the 
profession, even if there is controversy. It shows that we are 
concerned about our independence, and that we are willing to search 
for solutions to questions which threaten it. We may not yet be in 
complete agreement as to the proper solution. But those writers 
who keep us aware of the problem remind us of the need to guard 
constantly against any threats to independence in fact or in 
appearance.
This chapter has brought us up to date. We now know the 
opinions which both CPAs and financial statement users have expressed 
on this subject in the past. Our next step is to learn what financial 
statement users ourrently think about CPAs performing MAS for their 
audit clients. The next chapter will present this analysis.
CHAPTER V
THE ATTITUDE OP FINANCIAL STATEMENT USERS 
Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings of the 
survey sent to financial statement users. The chapter includes the 
methodology used in selecting the sample and constructing the ques­
tionnaire. Question number 4 was discussed in Chapter II. The 
results of the other questions are presented and analyzed in this 
chapter.
Sample Selection
The objective was to send questionnaires to individuals who 
use audited financial statements to make decisions. Obviously, there 
are any number of people who fall into thiB category. Another cri­
terion was that the questionnaires be sent only to those individuals 
whose decisions may affect large numbers of people. For example, an 
individual investor who makes a decision to buy stock in a specific 
company may be the only one affected by such a decision. But an in­
vestment officer of a mutual fund buys stock for thousands of investors. 
Consequently, his decisions are of greater significance than those 
of the individual investor, both monetarily and psychologically.
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Chapter I brought out the necessity for public confidence in 
the CPA's integrity in performing audits. The assumption now being 
set forth is that the public is represented and influenced to a great 
degree by representatives of major financial institutions. Therefore, 
the survey was directed to individuals of the financial community 
representing institutions whose financial decisions may be of great 
magnitude. This writer believes that the opinions of the financial 
analysts and executives with major financial institutions give a 
valid indication of the public's confidence in CPA audit reports.
The survey sample was selected on this basis.
The types of films selected were: banks, brokerage firms,
mutual funds, closed-end investment companies, life insurance com­
panies, and property-liability insurance companies. The number of 
firms selected from each group was based on the firms' size. The 
criterion for size differed among the various types of firms.
Bank size is normally measured by total deposits. Therefore, 
the bank sample for the survey consisted of those banks with total 
deposits of $500 million or more. Moody's Bank and Finance Manual, 
April 1969» was the source for determining those banks meeting this 
standard. At the time of seleotion, there were 109 banks in the 
United States falling into this category.
Within banks there are basically two groups who might be 
concerned with audited financial statements-trust officers and 
commercial loan officers. In order to obtain opinions from both 
types, questionnaires were divided between the two groups. Fifty-five 
questionnaires were directed to trust officers, 54 to commercial 
loan officers. Beginning with the largest bank, a questionnaire was
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mailed to the trust officer of every other hank. Beginning with the 
second largest hank,, a questionnaire was sent to the commercial loan 
officer of every other hank. This method assured an even distribution 
according to hank size of questionnaires addressed to trust officers 
and loan officers. Since some questionnaires were returned anony­
mously, and since we cannot he certain in most cases as to who actually 
completed the questionnaires, the results are not stratified between 
these two groups.
Selecting the brokerage firm sample was slightly more diffi­
cult. Total capital is a frequent measuring device for the size of 
brokerage firms. Unfortunately, no data could he found listing 
the total capital of brokerage firms. The overall objective was to 
select a number of firms large enough that they would have indivi­
duals whose jobs were to analyze financial statements in order to 
render investment advice. Firms of this size normally have separate 
research departments. Consequently, the sample consisted of any 
New York Stock Exchange member with 20 or more offices. It was felt 
that this criterion would provide a list of the types of firms de- 
.sired. Using the Commerce Clearing House New York Stock Exchange 
Guide, October, 19^9« 38 firms were selected. Questionnaires were 
addressed to the "Directors of Research" of these firms.
Mutual funds are normally measured by total net assets.
Moody's Bank and Finance Manual again served as the source for selec­
tion. Any mutual fund with total net assets of $300 million or more 
was included in the sample. In some cases, several mutual fluids 
belong to one investment group, but are listed separately by Moody's. 
When this fact was known, the funds were combined; and one
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questionnaire was sent to the group representing all the funds within 
the group. Questionnaires were sent to the attention of "Investment 
Officer."
Moody's lists 4 closed-end investment companies with net 
assets of $300 million or more. A questionnaire was sent to the 
investment officer of each of these 4 firms.
Life insurance companies are ranked according to total ad­
mitted assets. Moody's Bank and Finance Manual was the source for 
this data also. The sample consisted of those companies having 
total admitted assets of $1 billion or more. There were 28 companies 
meeting this criterion; and investment officers of these firms re­
ceived questionnaires.
Total admitted assets was also the baBis for selecting the 
property-liability insurance companies which were included in the 
survey. With $1 billion as the criterion, 8 firms were selected 
from this group.
Altogether, 220 firms were selected to receive questionnaires. 
One point must be remembered. The questionnaires were sent to indivi­
duals representing these firms. The replies therefore were individual 
replies and did not necessarily reflect the opinions of the firms. As 
explained in Chapter II, 3 firms sent 2 replies each. They were 
included in the total response because they were individual replies. 
These 3 additional replies increased the total sample to 223.
This was not a random sample. The sample was limited to larger 
institutions. Therefore, the results are not necessarily represent­
ative of all finanoial statement users. The term "sample" as used in 
this study refers to the individuals to whom questionnaires were sent.
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This author believes that a good response from this type of group 
gives information on which valid conclusions can be drawn regarding 
MAS and independence in appearance.
Another major problem, in addition to sample selection, was 




The primary objective of the questionnaire used in this survey 
was to determine the opinions of financial statement users regarding 
the independence of CPAs who perform MAS for their audit clients. To 
achieve this overall objective, the questionnaire was directed toward 
learning whether these third parties think that audit independence is 
lessened by CPA participation in MAS. Regarding those financial 
statement users who do feel that there is a lessening of independence, 
another objective was to determine the degree of their concern.
There was another point to be considered. Schulte received 
some criticism because his questions revolved around the teim "man­
agement consulting," with no relation to specific categories of 
service. In constructing this questionnaire, this writer believed 
that possibly some third parties might object to CPAs performing 
some services for audit clients, but not necessarily all services. 
Therefore, the questionnaire listed 33 specific types of services 
in which it was known that some CPAs participate. This allowed the 
respondent to check only those which he believed might cause a loss 
of independence.
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A secondary objective of the questionnaire was to determine 
how knowledgeable financial statement users are regarding the specific 
MAS which CPA firms currently render. Chapter II included an analysis 
of the results of this objective.
Construction of Specific Questions
As with any questionnaire, designing the questions was a 
difficult task. The questions needed to be clear and unambiguous.
They needed to be designed so that the specific information desired 
could be obtained. One problem peculiar to questionnaires on MAS 
and independence is trying to assure that the replies are based on 
independence only. Possibly respondents might answer these type 
questions based on their opinions of CPA competence to render MAS. 
Hopefully, the questions were worded in such a manner that the re­
spondents answered them based on their opinions of independence.
The cover letter accompanying the questionnaire also stressed the 
independence factor. The-complete questionnaire with the accompanying 
cover letter and follow-up letters is included in Appendix B.
The first question asked for the type of firm which the re­
spondent represented. Each of the 6 groups mentioned in the previous 
section was listed. The purpose of this question was to allow for 
group identification of the questionnaire in the event that it was 
returned anonymously. This was necessary in order to stratify 
replies according to the type of respondent.
The second question asked, "Approximately how often do you 
analyze (or review) financial statements which have been audited by 
CPAs and on which a report has been rendered?" The questionnaire
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provided 5 possible responses— constantly, frequently, occasionally, 
seldom, and never.
The question's purpose was to insure that the questionnaires 
were completed by the types of individuals for whom they were in­
tended. Whether or not the respondent was specifically designated as 
a trust officer, loan officer, or investment officer was immaterial.
The survey was directed to financial statement users. The results 
of this question would indicate whether the respondents meet this cri­
terion. Obviously, a majority of "seldom" or "never" responses 
would have made the survey invalid for its intended purpose.
The reader might have some misgivings as to what is meant 
by each of the possible responses except "never." Admittedly, there 
is some ambiguity as to the difference between "constantly" and 
"frequently," "frequently" and "occasionally," and "occasionally" 
and "seldom." Quantifying the frequency of financial statement 
analysis is veiy difficult. It does not lend itself to the normal 
measuring yardstick, such as, "so many times a week," or "so many 
statements a day." The author considered several other possible 
responses for this question. But they all were more ambiguous than 
the terms used, and were consequently inferior to the choices decided 
upon. The terms used appeared to present fewer problems than any 
others considered.
The third question with its possible responses read as follows:
Many CPA firms provide management advisox-y services to their
clients. Were you aware of this fact before receiving this
questionnaire?
a. I was well awai’e.
b. I had heard that they do.
c. I was completely unaware.
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This question was ' ■'tended primarily for general information 
about the overall awareness of financial statement users regarding 
CPAs and MAS. If a large percentage of individuals were well aware, 
thiB might indicate, although not necessarily, a better understanding 
of the CPA’s role in rendering MAS. Certainly if a large number of 
respondents were completely unaware, we might conclude that they have 
very little knowledge concerning the CPA's role in such services.
The fourth question provided a list of 33 specific services 
and asked the respondents to check those which they knew or thought 
that CPAs performed. Chapter II elaborated on this question and its 
results quite extensively. No further mention is needed here.
The fifth question led into the independence issue. It asked:
Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients 
whose financial statements they also audit. Do you think that 
providing any of the following services to audit clients may 
possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence?
The respondents were given 3 possible choices. First, they 
could indicate that they did not think that providing audit clients 
with any of the listed services might result in a loss of audit 
independence. Any respondent checking this reply would be expressing 
confidence in the CPA's integrity to perform MAS and auditing services 
for the same client. If a very high percentage of respondents checked 
this reply, this would be evidence that independence in appearance is 
not a problem.
The second possible answer allowed respondents to check those 
specific MAS which they though might result in some loss of audit 
independence. The same list of 33 items presented in question 4 was 
repeated here. They could check as many items as they felt were
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applicable, leaving blank those not considered as a possible factor 
in the loss of independence.
The third possible reply allowed respondents to indicate that 
they had no opinion aB to whether providing any of the services to 
audit clients might result in some loss of audit independence.
The implications of this question are clear. Answers to this 
question can provide concrete evidence that concern over the possible 
loss of audit independence does exist. The question pinpoints this 
concern by indicating the specific types of services about which the 
respondents are worried.
Using the term may possibly in the question may provoke some 
criticism. Some might argue that practically any type service may 
possibly result in lost independence, but that does not mean that the 
service actually would result in lost independence. Hoenemeyer, 
executive vice-president at Prudential, was quoted in Chapter IV 
as saying could does not mean would.
The author agrees with this contention. Those individuals 
who believe that there is no loss of independence or those who have 
no opinion present no cause for concern regarding independence in 
appearance. However, the accounting profession is given some ground 
for concern by those respondents who think that one or more services 
might cause some loss of independence. The degree of concern that the 
profession should have can be measured by the remaining questions. 
Therefore, question 5 shows how many respondents think MAS could 
cause a loss of independence. The other questions show how many 
think MAS would cause a loss of independence.
Question number 6 was applicable only to those individuals
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who had ohecked one or more of the listed services in question 5*
The purpose of this question was to measure the concern of those indi­
viduals who feel that some services might possibly result in lost 
independence. The question read as follows:
If you were to analyze financial statements which had been 
audited by a CPA Who had provided any of the management advisory 
services that you checked in the preceding question, how would 
this affect your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
a. Not applicable . . . .
b. I would have considerably more confidence in it.
c. I would have slightly more confidence in it.
d. It would not affect my confidence in it.
e. I would have slightly less confidence in it.
f. I would have considerably less confidence in it.
It was not expected that anyone would check b or c. If a 
person thinks a specific service may possibly result in decreased 
audit independence, he would not normally have increased confidence 
in the audit report if such a service were performed.
If respondents checked d, they are expressing confidence in 
the CPA. For although they think that certain services may possibly 
result in a loss of audit independence, they apparently are not worried 
about this possibility.
Responses e and f have negative connotations for the CPA. 
Obviously, a high proportion of responses here would be indicative 
of an independence in appearance problem.
Question 6 was written in reference to the individual CPA, the 
assumption being that there was no division between the audit staff 
and the MAS staff. To measure opinions when there is this separation 
of functions was the purpose of question 7»
Only those respondents answering e or f in question 6 were 
asked to answer question 7» The theory here is that if a respondent
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has confidence in the audit report when there is no separation of 
functions, he certainly would have confidence when the audit staff and 
MAS staff are not the same. The question specifically asked:
If the management services that you checked in question #5 
had "been performed "by the same CPA firm that had performed the 
audit, but by individuals other than those performing the audit, 
how would this affect your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
As in question 6, the respondents could express varying degrees of
confidence from considerably more to considerably less.
The aim was for this question to be considered without 
regard to the assumption in question 6. In other words, respondents 
were to express their opinion on MAS being performed when there were 
two separate staffs. Again, it was not expected that anyone would have 
more confidence in the report, because they had already indicated 
that they believed these services could lead to a loss of independence. 
Rationally then, rendering such services would have either no effect 
or a lessening effect on their confidence in the audit report. Un­
fortunately, this question was apparently misunderstood by some 
respondents. Some replies were not logical based on the conditions 
set forth above. This point is discussed below in the section which 
analyzes the responses.
This writer considers question number 8 as the most important 
in measuring the degree to which the accounting profession should be 
concerned about independence in appearance.
Do you think that CPA firms should be prohibited from pro­
viding their audit clients with those services which you checked 
in question #5:
a. assuming that the management advisory servioes and the 
audit are conducted by the same personnel?
Yes No No opinion
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b. assuming that the management advisory services and the 
audit are conducted by different personnel?
Yes No No opinion
c. Not applicable since I did not check any of the services 
listed in question #5*
The importance of a and b is clear. This gives a definite 
measurement of the independence in appearance issue. The question 
differentiates between firms having a separate MAS staff and those 
that do not. It would appear that respondents could not express 
their negative opinions more strongly than saying that certain spe­
cific services should be prohibited. Obviously, a high percentage of
Yes answers would be detrimental to the profession's current position.
On the other hand, a large number of No replies would be a
strong vote of confidence.in the accounting profession. It would
mean that although certain services could possibly lead to a loss 
of audit independence, most respondents do not think that it is a 
strong enough possibility to warrant prohibition of such services.
Question 9 asked respondents to add any other comments that 
they felt were pertinent to the survey. Comments of this nature 
cannot normally be categorized. Nevertheless, some comments provide 
very interesting insights into a number of respondents feelings 
on the subject of CPA independence and MAS. Many of these opinions 
are not and cannot be brought out in objective-type questions. Thus, 
this open-end question served a very useful purpose.
The final question, number 10, was for identification purposes 
only. It asked the respondent to indicate his firm's name. The 
primary purpose for asking this was to reduce the number of follow-up 
questionnaires that needed to be sent to those not responding to the
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original request. Generally, respondents were very cooperative in 
this respect. Only 20 of 160 replies, 1 8 did not indicate the firm's 
name. This did not hamper reply analysis in any way because all re­
spondents did answer question 1, stating the type of firm which they 
represented.
Methodology of Requesting Replies
The overall response rate of 71 • 7i° is separated by types of 
firms in Table 2-4, page 37* Brief mention is made here of the 
manner in which the replies were requested.
A questionnaire with a cover letter explaining the impor­
tance of the survey and asking for cooperation was mailed to each 
of the 220 firms selected as the sample. Each letter included a 
self-addressed, stamped envelope for returning the completed ques­
tionnaire.
A pretest sample of 25 questionnaires was mailed in October, 
1969* The purpose of the pretest was to determine whether respond­
ents appeared to have difficulty in answering or interpreting any of 
the questions. Had any problems of questionnaire construction been 
apparent, corrections would have been made before mailing question­
naires to the remaining 195 members of the sample. Based on the 
pretest, no problems seemed evident; and no changes were made. The 
remaining questionnaires were sent in November. As mentioned earlier, 
a copy of the questionnaire and its associated letters are shown in 
Appendix B.
A second questionnaire with another letter asking for
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cooperation was mailed 12 days later to nonrespondents of the first 
appeal. Another stamped, self-addressed envelope was included. At 
this point the response rate waB 31*8$.
Approximately one month after the second questionnaire had 
been sent, a third and final request was made. Nonrespondents to
*
the previous requests received another questionnaire with a stamped, 
self-addressed envelope. As before, the questionnaire was accom­
panied by a letter stressing the importance of the research project 
and asking for help in conducting the study. At the time this last 
follow-up was mailed, the overall response rate was 58.7%•
Most of the additional replies following the final request 
were received in January, 1970, with a few arriving in February. The 
total response was 160 replies out of 223, or 71»7$» As noted earlier, 
the extra 3 replies (223 rather than 220), resulted from 3 firms 
returning 2 replies each. Apparently, one individual completed the 
original questionnaire, and someone else answered the follow-up 
questionnaire. Since the survey was intended to obtain the opinions 
of individuals and not firms, these additional replies were valid re­
sponses. They therefore were added to the original sample of 220.
Having discussed the manner in which the sample was selected, 
the questions were constructed and the questionnaires were sent, we 
turn now to an analysis of replies to the specific questions.
Analysis of Replies
The first question was one merely of respondent classifi­
cation. The total number of responses stratified by type of firm is
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illustrated in Table 2-4, page 37* Replies to some questions of the 
survey are also stratified according to the type of firm represented 
by the respondent.
Question Number 2
Replies to question number 2 give an indication of whether the 
questionnaires were answered by financial statement users. These 
results are illustrated in Table 5-1•
TABLE 5-1


















Constantly 62 78 79 65 80 67
Frequently 24 18 5 31 20 21
Occasionally 12 4 16 4 0 10
Seldom 1 0 • 0 0 0 1
Never 1 0 0 0 0 1
100 100 100 100 100 100
This table shows that QQ% of all respondents use audited 
financial statements in their work constantly or frequently. Only 
2f> of the total fall into the seldom or never categories. The 
percentages are fairly consistent among all groups of respondents. 
Brokerage firms and life insurance companies apparently use state­
ments more than any other types of firms. The percent of respondents 
in brokerage firms and life insurance companies using financial
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statements constantly or frequently is 9&%» Because there were only 
5 respondents, percentages for the property-liability group may be 
misleading if compared with percentages for other groupB. In this 
table the percentages are fairly consistent with the other groups.
But in some of the tables there are radical differences. Even in 
Table 5-1 property-liability insurance companies show 100% for con­
stantly and frequently, which is slightly above the 9&% for brokerage 
firms and life insurance companies. But with only 5 respondents it 
is not as meaningful as the 96% for these other two groups.
We can conclude from the results of question 2 that the 
survey was completed by persons for whom it was intended. This means 
that the objective of obtaining opinions from knowledgeable outside 
observers who use financial statements has been accomplished. 
Accordingly, this gives significance to the questions regarding 
independence.- It will allow us to draw valid conclusions on third 
party opinions regarding CPA audit independence and MAS.
Question Number 3
The replies to question number 3 further the belief that 
the questionnaires were answered by knowledgeable third parties.
Table 5-2 shows that 86% of all respondents are well aware that 
CPAs provide MAS to their clients; 14% are somewhat aware; and no 
one is completely unaware.
Some possibility exists that there may have been a psycho­
logical reluctance for a respondent to say that he was completely 
unaware, even if he was. If a respondent thought that this was a 
subject about which he probably should be aware, he may have been
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unwilling to admit that he was unaware. Given that this possibility 
existed, it would appear to have had diminutive effects on the overall 
response. Conceivably, if an individual did not check that he was 
completely unaware when he was, he probably selected the second 
choice. Thus the conclusion that 8656 are well aware remains valid.
TABLE 5-2
FINANCIAL COMMUNITY'S AWARENESS THAT CPAS PROVIDE MAS
Percent of Replies
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total 
Firms Funds Co. Co.
(9 0 replies) (23) (19) (23) (5) (160)
Well aware 89 87 84 83 60 86
Somewhat aware 11 3 16 17 40 14
Completely
unaware 0 0 0 0 0 0
100 100 100 100 100 100
The results show a remarkable consistency among the groups. 
All groups, except property-liability, were in the 80$ range for 
well aware.
Question 4 results were previously discussed in Chapter II. 
This analysis can be found there.
Question Number 5
Question number 5 is the first question related to inde­
pendence. This is the question in which the respondents were asked 
to indicate those specific types of MAS which they thought might
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possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence.
In analyzing replies to this question, the author noted 
that 4 were inconsistent. The respondents first checked that they 
do not think that providing any of the services may result in a loss 
of independence. But then they also checked some of the specific 
services. The latter action would indicate that they think those 
specific services may cause some loss of independence. Consequently, 
determining the opinions of these 4 respondents on this question 
was not possible.
One other respondent commented that he thought some services 
could cause a loss of independence; but he did not mark the specific 
services. His reply was considered valid for purposes of this ques­
tion.
Because of the 4 inconsistent answers, the total number of 
replies used in this question was 156 rather than 160. Results 
shown in Table 5-3 are on this basis.
TABLE 5-3
RESPONDENTS' INDICATION THAT SOME MAS MAY RESULT 
IN SOME LOSS OP AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
Percent of Replies
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total
Firms Funds Co. Co.
(87 replies) (23) (18) (23) (5) (156)
None of the
Services 46 43 56 26 0 42
One or more
Services 48 48 33 65 60 49
No opinion 6 9 11 9 40 9
— — ... — — ■■— ■ ■■■■■— ---
100 100 100 100 100 100
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The survey indicated that 49$ of the respondents think that 
a CPA's providing one or more of the listed services to his audit 
clients may result in some loss of audit independence. Forty-two 
percent do not think that any of the listed services may cause a 
loss of independence, and 9$ have no opinion. For purposes in ana­
lyzing the independence ru appearance issue, the no opinion answers 
can be combined with the none of the services replies.
Combining these replies gives us 51$ who have no concern 
about a lessening of independence, and 49$ who think that the pos­
sibility exists. Taken alone with no further analysis, these results 
would indicate a very serious problem for the accounting profession. 
They would imply that almost one-half of the most informed and most 
interested financial statement users question the independence of 
CPAs who provide certain MAS to audit clients.
Analyzing the results further, however, will indicate the 
degree to which these respondents consider the"possibility as a factual 
reality at the present time. The other point of view is that over 50$ 
of the respondents do not even see a possibility that independence 
may be impaired by CPAs rendering any of these services for audit 
clients. Thus the results of the remaining questions are very impor­
tant in trying to determine whether or not a problem of independence 
in appearance does exist.
Analyzing the replies to this question according to the type 
of firm provides an interesting sidelight. The percentage of banks 
and brokerage firms indicating the possibility that some services 
might affeot independence is exactly the same, 48$* This corresponds 
with the percentage of all respondents, 49$* But mutual funds and
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life insurance companies are at opposite ends of the spectrum, 33$ 
and 65$» respectively. Coincidentally, each differs from the total 
by exactly 16$ in opposite directions. The author has no explan­
ation for this divergence between the two groups.
Although 49$ checked one or more of the services, this per­
centage is not applicable to each specific service. Table 5-4 shows 
an alphabetical breakdown of the specific services which respondents 
think may result in some loss of audit independence. The table shows 
the total number and the percentage of respondents checking each item. 
The total used as a base is 155» rather than 1 56. As mentioned above, 
one respondent, although feeling some services could cause a loss of 
independence, did not specify those services. Table 5-5 ranks the 
services according to the frequency with which they were checked.
Table 5-6 categorizes the percentages according to the type of 
respondent.
The analysis from these tables is significant. No one item 
was checked by all respondents. The service indicated by the greatest 
number of respondents as possibly leading to a loss of independence 
was checked by 32$. The bottom of the range was 7$« Therefore, the 
49$ in Table 5-3 should be interpreted in light of the specific 
services.
It is interesting to note the ranking of these services in 
Table 5-5 . We see that mergers and business acquisitions ranks at 
the top. One possible explanation fox' this is the unfavoi'able recent 
publicity regarding "pooling" and business acquisitions. Financial 
journals and newspapers have discussed this topic widely. CPAs have 
received some criticism for some of the presently accepted practices
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in accounting for business acquisitions. Although no question re­
garding CPA audit independence has arisen, many financial executives 
are disturbed about the whole subject of mergers. Conceivably, they 
may have reflected this attitude in their responses.
Other unfavorable services according to the respondents are 
those in which the CPA apparently works closely with top management—  
policy determination, 27$; executive recruitment, 27$; personnel 
appraisal and/or selection, 23$; executive and wage incentive plans, 
21$; and management audits, 19$*
The results also refute claims made by some writers that 
accounting-oriented services cause no concern to third parties. 
Assistance on specific accounting problems, capital budgeting, 
and financial budgeting all ranked fairly high. Yet packaging de­
velopment, material handling, factory automation, distribution 
channels, and several other nonaccounting services are ranked toward 
the bottom of the list. This is completely contrary to what some 
writers have advanced.
This writer is unable to explain this apparent paradox. 
Possibly, the respondents feel that providing MAS which are unrelated 
to accounting is also providing MAS which are unrelated to auditing. 
Hence, they see no conflict between the audit and the services. The 
possibility also exists that some respondents were unfamiliar with 
the nature of certain services and preferred to leave them blank, 
rather than indicate a possible loss of independence from a service 
about which they have no knowledge. Yet we would ordinarily think 
that people would be against CPAs performing some unknown service 
which obviously is unrelated to accounting.
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TABLE 5-4
TYPES OF MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK MAY RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
LISTED ALPHABETICALLY
Replies
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 26 17
Capital budgeting 26 17
Computer systems and applications 17 11
Development of work measurement
standards 15 10
Distribution channels 13 8
Executive and wage incentive plans 32 21
Executive recruitment 42 27
Factory automation 13 8
Financial budgeting 27 17
Forms design 11 7
Installation of cost accounting
systems 19 12
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems 21 14
Insurance analysis 16 10
Inventory control 18 12
Inventory valuations 23 15
Labor negotiations 24 16
Maintenance planning and scheduling 14 9
Management audits 30 19
Material handling 12 8
Mergers and business acquisitions 50 32
Operations budgeting 18 12
Packaging development 12 8
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 36 23
Plant layout 16 10
Plant location 17 11
Policy determination 42 27
Product engineering 16 10
Product pricing 16 10
Quality control 16 10
Sales forecasting 21 14
Salesmen compensation plans 22 14




TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS
THINK MAY RESULT IN SOME LOSS OP AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
LISTED ACCORDING TO FREQUENCY
Replies
Type of Service Number Percent of 155
Mergers and business acquisitions 50 32
Executive recruitment 42 27
Policy determination 42 27
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 36 23
Executive and wage incentive plans 32 21
Management audits 30 19
Financial budgeting 27 17
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 26 17
Capital budgeting 26 17
Labor negotiations 24 16
Inventory valuations 23 15
Salesmen compensation plans 22 14
Installation, review, and improvement
of overall accounting systems 21 14
Sales forecasting 21 14
Wage incentives 20 13
Installation of cost accounting systems 19 12
Inventory control 18 12
Operations budgeting 18 12
Computer systems and applications 17 11
Plant location 17 11
Insurance analysis 16 10
Plant layout 16 10
Product engineering 16 10
Product pricing 16 10
Quality control 16 10
Warehousing 16 10
Development of work measurement
standards 15 10
Maintenance planning and scheduling 14 9
Distribution channels 13 8
Factory automation 13 8
Material handling 12 8
Packaging development 12 8
Forms design 11 7
TABLE 5-6
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS THINK M Y  RESULT IN SOME LOSS OF AUDIT INDEPENDENCE
RESPONSES CLASSFIED BY TYPES OF FIRMS
Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Type of Service
Assistance on specific accounting 
problems 
Capital budgeting 
Computer systems and applications 
Development of work measurement 
standards 
Distribution channels 





Installation of cost accounting 
systems
Installation, review, and improve­















































































































^ h e  number in parentheses indicates the total number of respondents for each type of firm.
TABLE 5-6 (continued)
Percent of Respondents Checking Each Item
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total
Firms Funds Co. Co.
Type of Service (8 6) , (23) (18) (23) (5) (155)
Labor negotiations 17 22 6 9 20 16
Maintenance planning and scheduling 9 13 6 4 20 9
Management audits 20 26 6 22 20 19
Material handling 7 13 6 4 20 8
Mergers and business acquisitions 28 35 22 48 60 32
Operations budgeting 12 17 6 9 20 12
Packaging development 8 13 6 0 20 8
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 26 30 11 17 20 23
Plant layout 12 17 6 0 20 10
Plant location 12 17 6 4 20 . 11
Policy determination 30 22 11 35 20 27
Product engineering 12 17 6 0 20 10
Product pricing 11 17 6 4 20 10
Quality control 12 13 6 4 20 10
Sales forecasting 15 22 6 4 20 14
Salesmen compensation plans 15 22 6 9 20 14
Wage incentives 13 17 11 9 20 13
Warehousing 8 17 11 9 20 10
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The ranking also indicates that the replies apparently were 
not answered on the basis of CPA competence. Those services in which 
the smallest number of respondents seem to fear a possible loss of 
independence are the ones which the CPA as theoretically least com­
petent to perform. This seems somewhat paradoxical also. We would 
expect incompetence to result in bad performance, which might cause 
some compromise to be made in the audit. But apparently respondents 
to this survey were not worried about this possibility. The remaining 
questions will enlighten us as to how worried third parties are about 
those services which they did check.
Question Number 6
The seriousness of the potential independence in appearance 
problem can be measured to some extent by question number 6. In 
this question respondents were asked to indicate how their confidence 
in the CPA's audit report would be affected if the CPA had provided 
any of the services checked in the previous question. The assumption 
in this question was that there was no staff division for audits and 
MAS. The question was applicable only to those who expressed the 
opinion that one or more services may possibly cause a loss of inde­
pendence. There were 77 respondents who had expressed this opinion in 
question 5» Table 5-7 shows how these respondents replied to ques­
tion 6 .
Table 5-7 shows that 25$ would have considerably less con­
fidence and 55$ slightly less confidence. Combining these, we find 
that 80$ of the 77 respondents who think that there may be a possible 
loss of independence when one or more types of MAS are performed, also
138
would lose some confidence in the CPA's audit report if these services 
were performed. The reader should remember that this is with the 
same CPA providing both auditing and MAS. On its face, this would 
appear to be very detrimental to the profession.
TABLE 5-7
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN THE SAME CPA 
PROVIDES MAS AND PERFORMS AUDIT 
BASED ON 77 RESPONDENTS
Percent of Replies
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total
Firms Funds Co. Co.
(42 replies) (1 1) (6 ) (1 5) (3 ) (7 7)
Considerably
more 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slightly
more 2 0 0 0 0 1
No effect 21 9 50 7 34 19
Slightly
less 57 73 50 40 33 55
Considerably
less 20 18 0 53 33 25
100 100 100 100 100 100
The percentage breakdown by firm may be slightly misleading 
because the totals are small. But it is interesting to note again the 
different opinions between mutual funds and life insurance companies. 
The mutual funds show an even split between no effect and slightly 
less. The life insurance companies show only 1% as no effect with 
53$ stating considerably less.
Although Table 5-7 indicates a definitely negative attitude
toward. MAS by third, parties, Table 5-8 probably gives a better perspec­
tive. The table shows the effect on confidence in relation to the 
total number of respondents. Since 79 respondents did not check any 
specific services in Question 5» the assumption is that there would be 
no lessening of their confidence in the audit report if any of the 
services wei’e performed. Looked at from this point of view, only 39$ 
of all 156 respondents would have less confidence in the audit report. 
This is still a fairly high percentage. But it is still based on no 
separation of the audit and MAS functions. Also it is not applicable 
to each type of service. Later questions examine this data from these 
latter two points of view.
TABLE 5-8
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN THE SAME CPA 
PROVIDES MAS AND PERFORMS AUDIT 



















checked 52 52 66 35 40 51
Considerably
more 0 0 0 0 0 0
Slightly
more 1 0 0 0 0 1
No effect 10 4 17 4 20 9
Slightly
less 28 35 17 26 20 27
Considerably
less 9 9 0 35 20 12
Tables 5-7 and 5 -8 show 1$ as having slightly more confidence 
even though some services were checked in question 5* The rep­
resents one individual. It does not seem logical that he would have 
more confidence when he had indicated that he thinks some services 
might cause a loss of independence. The author is unable to explain 
this reply. Possibly he checked slightly more by mistake.
Question Number 7
Like question 6 , question 7 was applicable only to those 
respondents who had checked one or more items in question 5» Further­
more, it was applicable only to those who had said that they would 
have slightly less or considerably less confidence in audit reports 
prepared by CPAs who had also rendered certain MAS. There were 61 
respondents to whom question 7 was applicable; there were 60 replies.
Question 7 was intended to be answered without regard to the 
assumption in question 6. Respondents were to assume that MAS had 
been performed by the same firm that had performed the audit but by 
different individuals. They were to express the effect that rendering 
these services would have on their confidence in the audit report. 
Since the respondents had already indioated that they thought these 
services could lead to a loss of independence, it was not expected 
that rendering such services would increase their confidence in the 
audit report.
Unfortunately, some respondents apparently misinterpreted 
this question. Table 5-9 reflects the replies to this question.
It shows that 2$ would have considerably more confidence, and 13$ 
slightly more confidence. Apparently Borne respondents answered this
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question in relation to question 6. They probably meant that they 
would have more confidence if the MAS were performed by different 
personnel than if they were performed by the same individuals. But 
this was not what was asked. Because of this apparent misinterpre­
tation, the results are not completely meaningful.
TABLE 5-9
EFFECT ON CONFIDENCE IN AUDIT REPORT WHEN MAS AND AUDIT FUNCTIONS 
ARE CONDUCTED BY DIFFERENT PERSONNEL
Percent of Replies
Banks Brokerage Mutual Life Ins. P-L Ins. Total 
Firms Funds Co. Co.
(31 replies) (10) (3) (14) (2 ) (6 0)
Considerably
more 0 0 33 0 0 2
Slightly
more 16 0 0 21 0 13
No effect 13 40 67 21 0 22
Slightly
less 55 50 0 21 50 43
Considerably
less 16 10 0 37 50 20
--- — — — — — — — — —
100 100 100 100 100 100
One point is relevant, however. At least 63$ of those who 
expressed less confidence in question 6, still would have less con­
fidence even if there were a separation of functions. The percentage 
is significant under both interpretations of the question. If the 
question had been answered correctly by all those replying, undoubt­
edly the percentage would have been higher. Those who answered more 
confidence would have answered no effect or less confidence.
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Since the results are not completely valid, a table was not 
prepared showing replies according to type of respondent for the entire 
sample. However, viewed as a percent of the entire response, there 
are at least 38 respondents, 24$ of 156, who would have less confi­
dence in the audit report if certain MAS were performed for the audit 
client even with a separation of functions. As above, this percentage 
most likely would have been higher if the question had not been mis­
interpreted.
Although it is unfortunate that the analysis of question 7 is 
not as complete as it may have otherwise been, this is not critical to 
the analysis of the overall results. Probably question 8 provides the 
best analysis of the extent to which independence in appearance is a 
problem.
Question Number 8
In this question all respondents who had indicated that per­
forming certain services might result in a loss of independence were 
asked whether they thought CPAs should be prohibited from providing 
such services to their audit clients. This question certainly measures 
their degree of concern regarding independence.
The question was divided in two parts. Respondents were first 
asked their opinion based on the assumption that MAS and the audit were 
conducted by the same personnel. Next they were asked to answer assum­
ing that each function was conducted by different personnel.
The question was applicable to the 77 respondents who had 
checked one or more services in question 5* There were 72 replies 
to the first part, as shown in Table 5-*10»
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TABLE 5-10
OPINIONS REGARDING PROHIBITION OP SOME MAS FOR AUDIT CLIENTS 


















Prohibit 73 80 80 80 50 75
Do not pro­
hibit 17 20 20 13 50 18
No opinion 10 0 0 7 0 7
— — --- —— — ----- —  —
100 100 100 100 100 100
A very large majority, 7 5 definitely favor prohibiting some 
types of MAS. However, this question must also be considered in regard 
to the total number of respondents. In this case, those who checked no 
specific services in question 5 are assumed not to favor prohibiting 
any services. This is shown below.
Number Percent
Prohibit 54 38
Do not prohibit 88 62
142 100
The total number of 142 was used as a base rather than 160 
for several reasons. As mentioned previously, for question 5 (and 
hence for question 8) 4 replies were inconsistent and not used. Five 
respondents did not answer question 8a. In addition, 9 respondents 
who did not check any specific services in question 5» did answer
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Yes that certain services should "be prohibited. Actually, they 
should have answered the question not applicable. Apparently, they 
believe that MAS should be prohibited even though they personally 
are not concerned about independence. These respondents appeared to 
know what they were doing. Several of them noted that they knew the 
question was not applicable to them; but they said they wanted to an­
swer it anyway. These 5 were not included in the overall total 
above because it would be misleading to show them as not in favor of 
prohibiting any services, even though they checked no services in 
question 5» Actually, they should be shown as favoring prohibition.
If we do this, the results are:
Number Percent
Prohibit 63 42
Do not prohibit 88 58
151 100
Whichever total is used, 142 or 151, we can conclude that a 
substantial minority of respondents favor prohibiting some MAS when 
there is no separation of the audit and MAS functions.
An analysis of the percentage favoring prohibiting each 
specific service is provided in Table 5“11• The services are ranked 
in order of percentages. There are two columns, one based on a total 
of 53 replies and one based on a total of 141 replies. The 53 came 
from subtracting 1 from the 54 in Table 5“10f shown as favoring 
prohibition. (75% of 72 = 54*) This was the one respondent who 
thought that some MAS could lead to a loss of independence and who 
favored prohibition, but who did not indicate the specific services.
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TABLE 5-11
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS 
THINK SHOULD BE PROHIBITED ASSUMING 
SAME AUDIT AND MAS PERSONNEL
Replies
Type of Service Percent of 53 Percent of 141
Mergers and business acquisitions 66 25
Executive recruitment 55 21
Policy determination 53 20
Management audits 47 18
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 45 17
Executive and wage incentive plans 40 15
Financial budgeting 38 14
Capital budgeting 36 13
Labor negotiations 32 12
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 30 11
Inventory valuations 30 11
Sales forecasting 28 11
Salesmen compensation plans 26 10
Installation, review, and improve­
ment of overall accounting
systems 25 9
Wage incentives 23 9
inventory control 21 8
Operations budgeting 21 8
Plant location 19 7
Computer systems and applications 17 6
Installation of cost accounting
systems 17 6
Maintenance planning and scheduling 17 6
Plant layout 17 6
Product pricing 17 8
Warehousing 17 8
Development of work measurement
standards 15 6
Insurance analysis 15 6
Product engineering 15 6
Quality control 15 6
Factory automation 13 5
Distribution channels 11 4
Forms design 11 4
Material handling 11 4
Packaging development 11 4
The 141 was determined by subtracting this same 1 from the 142 used 
on the previous page.
Based on Table 5-11» it appears that a substantial minority of 
all respondents favor prohibiting CPAs from providing some services 
when the same personnel conduct both the audit and the MAS. There may 
be different opinions as to how to define "substantial." This writer 
feels that 20$ is substantial; and less than 15$ is not substantial. 
Between 15$ and 20$ is a gray area, particularly when there are 
differences of only 1$. One point is evident. A very large majority 
of respondents do not favor prohibition of most services even when 
there is no separation of functions.
The second part of the question, 8b, asked for opinions on 
prohibiting services when there is a separation of functions. Since 
all large CPA firms have separate MAS departments, this question is 
particularly relevant to them.
As before, the question was applicable to 77 respondents who 
had checked specific services in question 5» There were 73 replies. 
Table 5-12 shows that 51$ of 73 favor prohibition under these circum­
stances. There are 40$ who do not think that any services should be 
prohibited; and 9$ have no opinion.
The number favoring prohibition should also be considered as 
a percent of the total number of respondents. Looking at it from 
this point of view, we obtain the following results.
Number Percent
Prohibit 37 24
Do not prohibit 112 76
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TABLE 5-12
OPINIONS REGARDING PROHIBITION OP SOME MAS FOR AUDIT CLIENTS 


















Prohibit 46 60 0 73 50 51
Do not pro­
hibit 44 40 80 20 0 40
No opinion 10 0 20 7 50 9
------ — ■— — — ..... —
100 100 100 100 100 100
The 149 was determined hy starting with 160, subtracting the 
4 inconsistent replies, subtracting 4 respondents who did not answer 
question 8b, and subtracting 3 respondents who did not check any serv­
ices in question 5> "but who said Yes in this question. These 3 are 
similar to the 9 discussed in question 8a. Based on their answer to 
question 5» question 8 was not applicable. If we included them in the 
total as favoring prohibition, the results would be as follows:
Number Percent
Prohibit 40 26
Do not prohibit 112 74
152 100
Whether or not we include these 3 does not really make too 
much difference. In either oase there appears to be a substantial 
minority favoring prohibition of some services.
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Table 5-13 provides a breakdown of percentages by types of 
services. The order of ranking is quite similar to Table 5-11» but 
the percentages are less. The percentages are based on the totals 
of 37 and 149* The 37 is the total favoring prohibition based on 
Table 5-12. (51$ of 73 = 37») The 149 is the same total explained
on the preceding page.
This table indicates that very few persons favor prohibiting 
any of the services when there is a separation of functions. The two 
highest ranking services are mergers and business acquisitions. 17$» 
and executive recruitment, 15$• Whether these percentages of dis­
favor should be considered serious or substantial is subject to debate. 
Probably either side could make a good case. Generally, however, 
there appears to be no great support by financial statement users for 
prohibiting MAS performed for an audit client when there is a sep­
aration of the MAS and audit functions.
Question Number 9
Question 9 asked respondents for any additional comments which 
they felt were pertinent to the survey. Forty-four respondents 
commented, which is 39$ of 160. Some comments were quite short; 
others were very long. Naturally, these comments cannot be mechan­
ically catagorized and analyzed on a percentage basis, as with the 
objective-type questions. They do, however, present some veiy in­
teresting insights into the opinions which many outside observers 
have about CPAs and MAS.
There were 10 respondents that specifically stated that 
their confidence in the audit report generally depended on the
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TABLE 5-13
TYPES OP MAS WHICH FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES AND ANALYSTS 
THINK SHOULD BE PROHIBITED ASSUMING 
DIFFERENT AUDIT AND MAS PERSONNEL
Replies
Type of Service Percent of 37 Percent of 149
Mergers and business acquisitions 70 17
Executive recruitment 59 15
Management audits 49 12
Policy determination 49 12
Personnel appraisal and/or selection 46 11
Capital budgeting 41 10
Executive and wage incentive plans 41 10
Financial budgeting 41 10
Assistance on specific accounting
problems 32 8
Inventory valuations 32 8
Labor negotiations 30 7
Sales forecasting 30 7
Installation, review, and improve­
ment of overall accounting
systems 27 7
Inventory control 24 6
Operations budgeting 24 6
Salesmen compensation plans 24 6
Computer systems and applications 19 5
Installation of cost accounting
systems 19 5
Plant location 19 5
Product pricing 19 5
Wage incentives 19 5
Maintenance planning and scheduling 16 4
Plant layout 16 4
Warehousing 16 4
Development of work measurement
standards 14 3
Insurance analysis 14 3
Quality control 14 3
Factory automation 11 3
Product engineering 11 3
Distribution channels 8 2
Forms design 8 2
Material handling 8 2
Packaging development 8 2
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individual CPA firm. They stated that such factors as size, repu­
tation, and integrity had a bearing on their confidence.
Several respondents felt that if MAS are performed, some 
reference to this fact should be made in the footnotes to the financial 
statements.
Appendix C includes some selected comments by respondents.
Some are quite favorable; some are extremely unfavorable. All are 
interesting and informative.
Summary
This section summarizes the results of the questionnaire.
The author's own conclusions as to their significance to the accounting 
profession on the overall question of independence in appearance are 
presented in Chapter VII.
The overall response rate, 72%, was quite high; and a very 
large majority of those responding evidently are frequent users of 
audit financial statements. Thus the survey reached those for whom 
it was intended.
The financial community is about evenly divided in their opin­
ions as to whether any of the 33 listed MAS might possibly lead to a 
loss of audit independence when provided by the CPA auditor. Fifty-one 
percent checked no specific item; 49% checked one or more items.
Eighty percent of those checking specific services would have 
less confidence in the audit report should these services be per­
formed by the CPA auditor. But these respondents as a percentage of 
all respondents total only 39%«
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A majority of those checking specific services, 75%i favor 
prohibiting such services when there is no separation of functions.
As a percentage of the total, 28% favor prohibition of one or more of 
the services under these circumstances.
If the audit and MAS functions are separate, however, only 
51% favor prohibiting one or more services. This is 24% of the total 
number of respondents.
Looking at the specific services, we find that those in which 
CPAs apparently work closely with top management are the ones of great­
est concern. There appears to be no great concern about CPAs perform-, 
ing nonaccounting-type services, as long as they do not seem to be 
closely related to top management.
Percentage-wise, the evidence does not show muoh support for 
prohibiting MAS when there is a separation of functions. Prohibiting 
CPA participation in mergers and business acquisitions is favored by 
17% of all respondents. This is the largest percentage for any 
specific service when the functions are separated.
We have now seen the opinions of a large number of knowledge­
able financial statement users. One other very interested observer 
also exists, the SEC. The next chapter discusses the SEC's position 
on this topic.
CHAPTER VI
THE SEC AND MANAGEMENT ADVISORY SERVICES 
Purpose
Chapter V discussed the opinions of many outside third 
parties who are interested in financial statements. There is 
another third party, however, who has a vital interest in finan­
cial statements and the work of CPAs, and whose opinion cannot be 
ignored. This party is the SEC.
Regardless of the opinions of the AICPA or of financial 
statement users, the SEC's opinion is all important. By law it 
has the authority to take any necessary action to improve financial 
statement reporting. With the stroke of a pen, the SEC could out­
law CPA participation in MAS for corporations registered with the 
SEC. Generally, the SEC has not promulgated accounting principles. 
Nor has it prescribed acceptable and nonacceptable activities for 
CPAs. This job has been left to the accounting profession.
Since the SEC has such far-reaching authority, however, 
we must take cognizance of anything it says on the subject of inde­
pendence. Opponents of MAS have sometimes raised the fear of 
possible government action as one reason for advocating that CPAs 
be prohibited from perforating MAS for their audit clients. Is this 
fear legitimate? This question is discussed in this chapter.
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The purpose of this chapter is to present any pronouncements 
or positions taken by the SEC or any of its members on the subject 
of independence, and more specifically on the subject of MAS. If
the SEC believes that there is a problem of independence, then so far
as the accounting profession is concerned, there is a problem. How­
ever, if the SEC is not concerned, the profession need not be concerned
about government decree or intervention in this area.
Pronouncements by the SEC
Regulation S-X
SEC Regulation S-X provides requirements for the form and
content of financial statements which must be filed in accordance
1
with several laws. Rule 2.01 of the regulation prescribes the 
qualifications of accountants who audit the statements of those firms 
filing with the SEC. Regarding independence, the rule specifically 
states:
The Commission will not recognize any certified public 
accountant as independent who is not in fact independent. For 
example, an accountant will be considered not independent with 
respect to any person or any of its parents or subsidiaries in 
whom he has or had during the period of the report any direct 
financial interest or any material indirect financial interest 
or with whom he is, or was during such period, connected as a 
promoter, underwriter, voting trustee, director, officer, or 
employee.
In determining whether an accountant may in fact be not 
independent with respect to a particular person, the Commission 
will give appropriate consideration to all relevant circumstances, 
including evidence bearing on all relationships between the 
accountant and that person or any affiliate thereof, and will
i
Securities Aot of 1933; Securities Exchange Act of 1934; 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935; Investment Company Act 
of 1940.
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not confine itself to the relationships existing in oonnection 
with the filing of reports with the Commission.
The rule makes no specific mention of MAS. It states only 
that accountants must he in fact independent, and lists several 
relationships in which an accountant would not he considered inde­
pendent. MAS is not listed.
In the second paragraph of the ahove quote, the rule states 
that the Commission will consider all relevant circumstances in 
determining whether an accountant is independent with respect to a 
particular person. This apparently is applicable to specific cases 
upon which the SEC might rule. Conceivably, the SEC might find a 
CPA to he lacking independence in performing MAS for some client.
Even if the SEC were to make such a ruling in a specific case, this 
would not necessarily serve as an indictment of all MAS by all CPAs.
We can conclude that based on Regulation S-X, there is no 
specific prohibition against CPAs providing MAS for their audit 
clients. In an individual case, however, the SEC could find that 
rendering MAS makes a CPA not independent, if evidence were to 
indicate this facti
Accounting Series Release No. 81
To augment Regulation S-X, the SEC from time to time will 
issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR). In some instances these 
releases provide specific accounting procedures which the SEC either 
recommends, approves, or requires. Many releases are merely decisions 
rendered by the SEC on specific cases involving CPAs who are guilty of
^SEC Reg. S-X, 17 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 210.2-01
(1970).
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unethical and. improper professional conduct or of violation of some 
other SEC rule.
ASR No. 81 specifically relates to CPA independence. It is 
entitled, "Independence of Certifying Accountants— Compilation of 
Representative Administrative Rulings in Cases Involving the Inde­
pendence of Aocountants." This release, issued in 1958» basically 
summarizes a number of cases relative to CPA independence which have 
been brought before the SEC during the 14 years prior to the release. 
ARS 81 cites specific cases in which CPAs have been held to be not 
independent, as well as cases in which they were considered to be 
independent. It discusses 34 cases in the former category, and 20 
cases in the latter category.
Many cases concern relationships in which CPAs had a finan­
cial interest in the audited company, or in which the CPA had served 
as director, officer, or employee of the company. The release also 
lists cases in which the wife of the CPA had a direct interest in 
the audited firm.
There is only one case which appears to be related to MAS.
In this case: "Accountants had installed an accounting system and
prepared tax returns for a registrant prior to being engaged to certi­
fy financial statements to be included in a registration statement."^
In this case the accountant was considered to be independent.
A review of Accounting Series Releases issued since 195$ 
revealed no cases decided upon by the SEC relative to MAS and inde­
pendence .
^Accounting Series Release No. 81. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Washington, D.C., December 11, 1958» P» 10*
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So far as official pronouncements are concerned, there is no 
evidence to indicate that the SEC is concerned about CPAs rendering 
MAS to their audit clients. As mentioned above, in an individual case
the SEC could rule that independence had been violated if supported
by evidence. But apparently there have been no such cases of this 
nature in the past.
Unofficial Pronouncements
Naturally CPAs are most concerned and affected by official 
rules, regulations, and decisions of the SEC. However, CPAs must 
also take cognizance of anything said by high-ranking officials of 
the SEC, even when they are not speaking in an official capacity.
The reason we must be aware of these unofficial pronouncements is
that they may be made by someone who is in a position to help make 
them official. Therefore, whenever an SEC representative speaks 
about some particular aspect of accounting, it may be a hint of some 
future SEC aotion.
There has not been too much said by SEC members on the sub­
ject of MAS and independence. 1966 seems to be the only year in 
which some of these unofficial views came to light. An article in 
Fortune made the following comment:
It is ncrteworthy in this connection that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission has been in no great hurry to condemn 
multi-faceted auditing operations. Close students of the 
situation believe that this hands-off attitude reflects the 
view of Andrew Barr, chief accountant of the commission, who 
believes the public is better served by permitting the auditors 
to advise on a fairly wide range of subjects. This view is 
based on the conviction that auditors, as professional men 
bounded by strong ethical canons, will be a strong force for 
more complete disclosure and sounder management methods
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throughout business.^-
Shortly after this article was published, Manuel P. Cohen, 
at that time chairman of the SEC, made a speech before the annual 
meeting of the AICPA. He spoke on several aspects of financial 
reporting and included MAS in his discussion. His comments have 
often been quoted by those who are opposed to CPAs providing MAS 
for audit clients.
However, a word of caution is in order with respect to 
what one of your prominent members describes as "consulting 
services which cannot be related logically either to the fi­
nancial process or to broadly defined information and control 
systems, [such as] market surveys, factory layout, psychologi­
cal testing, or public opinion polls." And, I am disposed to 
add, executive recruitment for a fee. An accountant who directs 
or assists in programs of this kind raises serious questions 
concerning his independence when it comes time to render to 
creditors, to investors and to the public his opinion on the 
results of the programs. Public accountants should carefully 
reconsider their participation in these activities lest their 
continuation and extension undermine the main function of the 
independent accountant— auditing and the rendering of opinions 
on financial statements.5
V
Mr. Cohen apparently was not concerned with accounting- 
oriented MAS. But he left little doubt that he was definitely 
opposed to the nonaccounting types of MAS. A warning of this nature 
coming from such a high source as the chairman of the SEC should 
have caused some concern within the accounting profession. As will 
be discussed below, it apparently caused no concern.
One month after Mr. Cohen's speech, an article in The Wall 
Street Journal included the following statement:
^T. A. Wise, "The Very Private World of Peat, Marwick, and 
Mitchell," Fortune. LXXIV (July 1, 1966), 130.
^Manuel F. Cohen, "The SEC and Accountants: Co-operative
Efforts to Improve Financial Reporting," The Journal of Accountancy, 
CXXII (December, 1966), 57.
The SEC will.move against such firms if they do not "recon­
sider" their outside services and stick to their principal job, 
says Andrew Barr, chief accountant of the SEC. "The commission 
doesn't want to deal with the problems of financial reporting 
or conflicts of interest by ultimatum but we will if we have to, 
he declares. Mr. Barr will give no specifics, but he notes that 
without certification from the SEC, a CPA cannot audit corporate 
reports.
This statement by Mr. Barr was in complete contradiction to 
the comment in the Fortune article quoted above. The possibility 
exists that the Fortune article was incorrect in stating that Mr. 
Barr was in favor of MAS. It is also possible, of course, that Mr. 
Barr's opinion on this subject changed. What would appear to be 
most likely, however, is that Mr. Barr was merely reflecting and 
expanding on the opinions of the SEC chairman, Mr. Cohen.
Regardless of the reasons for the apparent about-face of the 
SEC, these unofficial pronouncements evidently had little effect on 
the accounting profession. Opponents of MAS used these comments as 
a warning flag that the profession was headed into trouble with the 
SEC if it did not change its ways. The warnings apparently fell on 
deaf ears. There is no evidence that the profession as a whole waB 
overly concerned about SEC intervention in the MAS field.
Mr. Cohen made his comments in October, 1966. The AICPA 
Ad Hoc Committee on Independence was formed in December, 1966. 
Possibly Mr. Cohen's remarks, coupled with the research by Schulte 
and Briloff, was partly responsible for the formation of the Commit­
tee. Nevertheless, if there was any reconsideration, as urged by 
Mr. Cohen and Mr. Barr, it resulted in no change to current practice.
^"CPAs Under Fire," The Wall Street Journal. November 15,
1966, p. 2.
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Despite the SEC's warnings, it is interesting to note that 
the SEC has taken no action toward reducing CPA participation in MAS. 
Also, as far as this author knows, no member of the SEC has made any 
further public statements regarding MAS since those made in 1966.
In 1969 Mr. Cohen stepped down as chairman of the SEC, and 
Hamer H. Budge was named to replace him. Consequently, if the state-
j
ments made by Mr. Cohen reflected his personal viewpoint, rather 
than a consensus of the SEC membership, they are irrelevant now.
To date Mr. Budge has made no public statements regarding CPA involve­
ment in MAS.
This author considered sending a questionnaire to the SEC 
as part of this current study. It would have been designed especially 
for obtaining opinions from SEC representatives on the subject of 
CPA independence and MAS. However, an SEC official informed this 
writer that any questionnaires sent to the SEC would be returned 
unanswered. He said that the SEC is flooded with questionnaires on 
various topics. He explained that the SEC can give no opinions other 
than the official rules, regulations, and decisions which it period­
ically issues. Officials at the SEC are cautioned against expressing 
their personal opinions via questionnaires lest these opinions be 
construed as official SEC policy. Obviously there could be serious 
ramifications should this occur. Consequently, the SEC has a firm 
policy of not answering questionnaires.
Summary
The accounting profession must be concerned with the SEC's
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offioial position on any accounting matter. Generally, the SEC has 
preferred to allow the accountants, primarily through the AICPA, to 
set the standards of financial reporting and to regulate the conduct 
and activities of CPAs. The SEC has provided no official position 
regarding CPA participation in MAS. Consequently, by its silence 
we can assume that the SEC concurs with the present official policy 
of the AICPA on the subject of MAS.
The profession must also stay alert to statements made by 
SEC representatives, even when they are not speaking on official 
SEC policy. These individuals are aware of the current feeling 
within the SEC. Their unofficial statements may well be a prelude 
to some future official policy. Little has been said, even unoffi­
cially, about CPAs and MAS. Mr. Cohen's 1966 denouncement of CPA 
participation in nonaccounting services seemed very important, as 
well as threatening, at the time. However, he is gone now and his 
past comments presently have little, if any, significance.
Since the SEC has not raised the question, either officially 
or unofficially, about CPA independence when performing MAS for audit 
clients, it would appear that this is not a problem for the profession 
at the present time. This does not mean that it will never be a 
problem in the future. Certainly, we must keep a constant vigil on 
pronouncements by the SEC which may affect the current status. But 
for the time being the SEC seems satisfied to allow the profession 
self-regulation regarding CPA participation in MAS.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Problem
For many years CPAs have provided "business advice to their 
clients. Since World War II this advice has expanded into a formal 
service and has included many business areas, both of an accounting 
and a nonaccounting nature. The term most commonly used for these 
additional services is "management advisory services" (MAS).
Although MAS has been expanding, the CPA's greatest service 
to society is his ability to audit a client, and render an independ­
ent and unbiased opinion to the public as to the fairness of the. 
financial statement presentation. The CPA's "claim to fame" is his 
independence.
Questions have been raised both within and outside the pro­
fession about whether the CPA can render MAS to audit clients and 
still remain independent when conducting the audit. There is a 
question as to whether he can in fact remain independent. There is 
also a question as to whether those persons to whom he is responsible, 
the public, believe him to be independent when performing both func­
tions. This latter situation is frequently called independence in 
appearanoe. No matter how independent in fact a CPA may be, if the 
public does not believe him to be independent, his "usefulness to
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society is diminished. This dissertation has heen a study of the 
problem of independence in appearance.
Objectives of the Dissertation
The major objective was to determine whether or not the 
user of audited financial statements thinks that the CPA's audit 
independence is lessened by his participation in MAS for his audit 
clients. In this respect it was also desired to learn the degree 
to which the user is concerned with this possibility. This objec­
tive was accomplished through the use of a mail questionnaire.
Supplementary to the major objective were several minor 
objectives. One objective was to determine specifically the nature 
of MAS from three viewpoints: (l) as described by various writers;
(2) as practiced by CPAs; and (3) as viewed by financial statement 
users. The latter two objectives were also accomplished through 
the use of mail questionnaires.
The economic system was reviewed briefly to determine where 
the field of MAS should be placed. We considered the effect on 
society if CPAs were to be prohibited from rendering MAS to their 
audit clients.
The literature on the subject of MAS and independence was 
reviewed in order to learn the arguments which have been advanced 
both for and against CPA participation in MAS. This provided a 
background for understanding the nature and importance of the problem, 
independence in appearance.
Pronouncements by the SEC on the subject of independence
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were also reviewed. The SEC has a continuing interest in all aspects 
of accounting. The SEC also has considerable regulatory authority. 
Accordingly, the SEC position on the subject of MAS and independence 
was important to this dissertation.
The findings of the research in each of these above areas 
are presented below in the order of the chapters in which they appear 
in the dissertation. In addition, the author's conclusions on points 
brought out in each chapter are included in each applicable section.
The last section in this chapter presents the author's overall con­
clusions and recommendations.
The Nature of MAS
The AICPA has provided a conceptual viewpoint of MAS with­
out presenting a list of acceptable services. Essentially, the AICPA 
regards MAS as a function of providing technical advice and assistance 
to enable the client to conduct his affairs more effectively.
Various writers have provided their own definitions of MAS, 
which while possibly more precise, do not differ in meaning from that 
of the AICPA. There is general agreement that MAS can be divided into 
two major categories— accounting-type services and nonaccounting-type 
services. There is disagreement, however, as to the effect which each 
may have on audit independence.
A previous study into the nature of MAS, conducted in 1961, 
revealed a very high percentage of CPAs who believed that certain 
services in nonaccounting areas are not within the scope of the CPA. 
These services are primarily in the fields of marketing and industrial
management.
This writer sent a questionnaire to 16 large CPA firms listing 
33 specific types of MAS. Respondents were asked to indicate those 
services which their firm provides to clients. Ten firms, 62,5%, re­
plied to the survey. All of the listed accounting-type services are 
offered hy at least 90$ of the respondents. Many are offered by 100$ 
of the respondents. Some nonaccounting services are provided by 90$ 
of the firms; but some are provided by very few or none of the firms 
responding. A number of engineering and marketing services are in 
this very low category.
This writer also sent 223 questionnaires to financial analysts 
and executives who represent banks, brokerage firmB, mutual funds, 
life insurance companies, and property-liability insurance companies. 
There were 160 questionnaires returned, giving a response rate of 71-7$•
The representatives of the financial community were provided 
with a list of 33 services, exactly the same as those sent to the CPAs. 
They were asked to indicate those services which they know or think 
that CPAs provide. Ninety-seven percent are aware of one or more 
services which CPAs provide. A large number are aware of the account­
ing services and some of the nonaccounting services. In order of 
frequency of responses, the list by the financial community correlates 
quite closely with the list of those services actually rendered by 
CPAs.
This author concludes that, in general, members of the finan­
cial community are familiar with the types of MAS currently being 
offered by CPA firms. There is no lack of communication on this 
point. However, there is possibly a lack of understanding by some of
these representatives regarding the specific role of the CPA in 
performing certain services. Some CPA respondents made special 
points to clarify or explain their position in performing MAS. The 
possibility exists that some members of the financial community are 
unaware of the limitations which some firms have placed on their in­
volvement in specific types of services. Consequently, some financial 
executives might be concerned about independence because of a misunder­
standing about the CPA's specific role.
The Economics of MAS
There has been a strong demand for MAS by the business commu­
nity. Evidence indicates that this demand will continue to increase 
in the future. Because of the profit potential, as well as "the oppor­
tunity for service to their clients, CPAs have been quite willing to 
help satisfy this demand.
The author concludes that MAS is a form of monopolistic com­
petition. This market structure is not considered to result in an 
optimum allocation of resources, as is pure competition. However, 
if CPAs were prohibited from providing MAS for their audit clients, 
competition would be z-educed; and the monopoly power of the remaining 
firms would be increased. Consequently, the monopolistic competition 
which we now have is better for society than the monopolistic competi­
tion we would have if limitations were placed on CPA participation in 
MAS.
Suggestions have been made that CPAs be prohibited from pro­
viding MAS to audit clients in order to stz'engthen independence. We
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must weigh the social costs of prohibiting MAS by CPA auditors 
against the social benefits of increased independence. If we find 
that the degree of independence to be gained is exceeded by the social 
costs of limiting MAS, then we should not restrict MAS. Admittedly, 
quantitative measurements of this type are very difficult. Neverthe­
less, it certainly is an important factor which must be considered 
before taking any drastic steps to reduce the MAS which CPAs now 
render to their audit clients.
The Question of Independence
The AICPA has officially sanctioned MAS, even when performed 
for audit clients. Opinion No. 12 of the Code of Professional Ethics 
states that there is no ethical reason why CPAs may not perform MAS 
while serving the same client as independent auditor. In addition, 
the AICPA has encouraged CPA participation in MAS through its Commit­
tee on Management Services.
The most recent statement by the AICPA on this topic of MAS 
is a report by the Ad Hoc Committee on Independence. This committee 
conducted a three year study during which they reviewed all pertinent 
literature and previous surveys, and conducted interviews with 16 
members of the financial community. The committee concluded that 
there is no problem of independence in appearance or in fact at the 
present time. It recommended that the profession keep abreast of 
developments in this area that could alter its conclusions in the 
future.
The first known empirical study on the topic of MAS and in­
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dependence was conducted in 1963-64 "by Dr. Arthur A. Schulte, Jr.
He sent 1,260 questionnaires to members of the financial community.
He concluded that 33$ of the 635 respondents believed that there 
was a conflict of interest when the CPA provided MAS for his audit 
clients.
In another study conducted at about the same time, Dr.
Abraham J. Briloff had similar findings. He found that 54$ of the 72 
financial community representatives replying to his survey felt that 
MAS detracted from the significance of the audit opinion. He found 
also that 49$ believed MAS were incompatible with the traditions of 
the auditor; 58$ believed MAS were incompatible with independence; 
and 54$ felt involvement in MAS should be discouraged and restricted.
Articles have been written about MAS for over 20 years. But 
emphasis on the independence issue has been most pronounced during 
the past 10 years. Some authors have used Schulte's study to support 
their contention that outside third parties are concerned about the 
CPA's independence when rendering both auditing and MAS. Other authors 
have attacked Schulte's study on various grounds as not really indica­
tive of the opinions of third parties. Regardless of one's position 
on this subject, the controversy has been good for the profession.
It has enlightened members as to both sides of the argument. It has 
also let the public know that we are concerned enough about our inde­
pendence to discuss and work toward solutions to the problems which 
threaten it.
As part of his survey to CPA firms, this writer asked several 
questions related to independence. The survey showed that all CPA 
firms responding have separate MAS departments. In response to another
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question it was learned that 8 out of 10 firms responding have some 
individuals who perform MAS and participate in audits. Two firms 
out of 10 have no individuals performing hoth functions. Further 
questioning of the above 8 firms which have some dual participation 
revealed that 6 firms have individuals who sometimes participate in 
audits of clients for whom they have performed MAS. Two firms never 
have individuals participating in both functions for the same client.
The survey also showed that 78$ of the CPA firms perform 
audits for over 50$ of their MAS clients. This does not mean that 
there is an independence problem. However, it shows how extensive 
the problem could be if a loss of independence in fact were proven 
to occur in such circumstances.
In terms of fees, 5 out of 7 CPA firms said that MAS accounts 
for 10$ to 25$ of their gross billings; 2 firms replied that it was 
less than 10$. In this respect, MAS, while no doubt, a lucrative 
business for CPAs, still plays a secondary role in the overall revenue 
structure at the present time.
Some CPA respondents added comments to the questionnaire to 
explain or modify some answers. Basically, they were showing a case 
for independence. Based on the answers to the questions and the 
additional comments, this writer concludes that the CPA films are 
attempting to prevent circumstances that might cause them to lose 
independence in fact. Some controls, such as separate MAS depart­
ments, also help independence in appearance.
The Attitude of Financial Statement Users
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To accomplish the dissertation objective of measuring the 
extent of the independence in appearance problem, questionnaires 
were mailed to 223 individuals representing the nation's largest 
financial institutions. This is the same questionnaire discussed 
on page 16 4* As mentioned there, it received a very high response,
160 replies, or 71«7$» In analyzing the results for some questions, 
not all 160 replies could be used.
Eighty-eight percent of those responding indicated that 
they analyze or review financial statements constantly or frequently. 
Ten percent use them occasionally, and only 2% use them seldom or 
never. Thus, the author concludes that the overwhelming majority 
of the questionnaires were answered by those individuals for whom 
they were intended. This gives significance to the replies of the 
other questions.
The survey also showed that 86% of all respondents are well 
aware that CPAs provide MAS to their audit clients; 14fo are somewhat 
aware; and no one is completely unaware.
Respondents were provided with a list of 33 specific MAS.
They were asked to check those services which they think may result 
in some loss of audit independence. Forty-two percent of the re­
spondents do not think that providing any of the services may result 
in a loss of audit independence; 9$ have no opinion; and 4S$ believe 
that one or more of the listed services may possibly lead to a loss 
of independence. This writer believes that the 49$ is not significant 
when interpreted in light of the specific services and the other
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questions. It shows that these respondents think the services 
could lead to a loss of independence. It does not mean that they 
think the services would lead to a loss of independence.
Analyzing the replies in relation to specific services, we 
find that the percentages range from a high of 32$ to a low of 7$» 
Respondents are concerned most with mergers and business acquisitions 
(32$) resulting in a loss of audit independence than with any other 
service. All services in which CPAs apparently would have to work 
closely with top management in order to perform the service ranked 
near the top of the list.
Contrary to popular belief, respondents generally are no 
more concerned with nonaccounting services than with the accounting- 
type services. The number, of respondents concerned about some of 
the nonaccounting services in many cases was considerably less than 
the number concerned about accounting-type services. This is appar­
ently the first time that this fact has ever been noted. Therefore, 
this author concludes that it is erroneous to automatically exclude 
accounting-type services in discussing problems regarding MAS and 
independence. Potential problems exist in both types of services.
The seriousness of the independence in appearance problem 
was measured. Respondents were asked to indicate how their confi­
dence in the CPA's audit report would be affected if the CPA had 
provided any of the services which they think might possibly lead 
to a loss of independence. This question was asked assuming there 
was no staff division between auditing and MAS. As a percentage of 
156 respondents, 12$ would have considerably less confidence in the 
audit report under these conditions, and 27$ would have slightly
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less confidence.
A similar question was asked assuming that auditing and MAS 
are performed by different individuals. This question was apparent­
ly misinterpreted by some individuals. Hence, the results are not 
as meaningful as it was hoped they would be. We can state, however, 
that at least 24$ of 156 respondents would have less confidence in 
the audit report if certain MAS were performed even with a separation ~ 
of functions.
To obtain a better indication of the degree of concern of 
outside third parties, one question asked l'espondents whether they 
think that CPAs should be prohibited from providing their audit 
clients with the MAS which they had checked in the previous question. 
They were asked to answer the question assuming: (1) that MAS and 
the audit were conducted by the same personnel; and (2) that each 
function was conducted by different personnel.
Based on the first assumption, 38$ of 142 respondents think
i
CPAs should be prohibited from providing one or more of the 33 listed 
services to their audit clients. Assuming a division of functions,
24% of 149 favor prohibiting one or more of the services.
To be significant these replies must be analyzed in relation 
to the specific services. Assuming no division of functions, the 
percent favoring prohibition for specific services ranges from a 
high of 25$ to a low of 4$» Mergers and business acquisitions is 
at the top (25$) and from 15$ to 21$ of the respondents favor pro­
hibiting other services requiring CPAs to work closely with top 
management. Specifically these services are: executive recruitment,
policy determination, management audits, personnel appraisal and/or
selection, and executive and wage incentive plans.
Assuming a division of functions, the ranking is quite similar; 
but the percentages are less. In this case 17% favor prohibiting 
mergers and business acquisitions, the highest on the list. The others 
listed in the above paragraph ranged from 10^ to 15$. The low for the 
entire list of 33 services was 2fo.
Based upon the survey responses, this writer does not believe 
that independence in appearance is a serious problem for the account­
ing profession at the present time. A very high percentage, 49% think 
that one or more of the listed services might possibly cause some loss
of audit independence. But when we measure the degree of this concern,
we find little support for prohibiting these services when the audit 
and the services are performed by different personnel.
It is quite true, of course, that independence could be 
strengthened by prohibiting MAS for audit clients. However, this 
author does not feel that the good to be gained from such a drastic 
measure would offset the disadvantages to the clients, to the pro­
fession, and to the public, at the present time. There are other
measures which could be taken, completely unrelated to MAS, which would
also strengthen independence. Such things as rotating auditors yearly, 
or even government payment of auditors fall into this category. But 
the necessity for measures such as this haB not yet been proven. This 
writer does not believe that the case for complete prohibition of MAS 
by CPA auditors has been proven yet either.
As with any questionnaire, there is always the possibility 
that percentages as raw figures are misleading. This author recog­
nizes this limitation. But in ranking the services, we cannot deny
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that respondents are most concerned about the services in which CPAs 
apparently would work closely with top management to provide the 
service. They are on the preceding page. If any problem does exist, 
it would seem to be with these services. The recommendations at the 
end of the chapter will say more about this point.
There is another reason why this author has concluded that 
independence in appearance is not a significant problem. As mentioned 
above, in this author's opinion the results as shown do not indicate 
a high degree of concern by third parties. The percentages conceiva­
bly could be less. If some respondents have a misunderstanding as to 
the role of the CPA in specific services, they may feel that such serv­
ices should be prohibited. Yet if they had a better understanding of 
what the CPA does and does not do, their fears might be alleviated.
Of course, the converse could be true also. Some respondents might 
object to certain services if they knew more about them. But this 
writer is inclined to believe that the latter situation is less likely 
than the former.
There is one other factor that possibly makes the percentages 
against MAS slightly higher than they may have been otherwise. By 
their comments, several respondents revealed that they have absolutely 
no confidence in CPAs anyway. This lack of confidence is not based on 
MAS, but on other factors in the accounting profession with which they 
disagree. In all cases these respondents advocated prohibiting all of 
the listed services. Because of their attitude toward CPAs generally, 
it is doubtful that prohibiting the services would restore their con­
fidence in the accounting profession.
The SEC and MAS
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CPAs must be concerned with all SEC pronouncements, both 
official and unofficial, regarding accounting matters.
The SEC requires that accountants who serve as auditors be 
independent in fact. It specifically points out certain relation­
ships in which CPAs are not considered to be independent. MAS is 
not included in this category. A review of published decisions by 
the SEC regarding accountants and independence revealed no cases in 
which MAS was a factor in any decision.
There has been little said -unofficially by SEC staff members 
regarding MAS and independence. The most noted statement was by SEC 
Chairman Manuel F. Cohen in 1966, speaking before the annual meeting 
of the AICPA. At that time he denounced the nonaccounting services 
offered by CPAs to their audit clients. He hinted at future SEC 
action if CPAs did not reconsider their position in offering these 
services. However, Mr. Cohen is no longer with the SEC; and nothing 
else has been said publicly since 1966 on this topic.
The author concludes that the profession need not be concerned 
about the SEC's attitude regarding MAS at the present time. His opin­
ion is that unless there is evidence that MAS presents a serious threat 
to independence in fact, the SEC will not be inclined to limit CPA 
participation in such services.
Previous research by others has found no known cases of lost 
independence in which MAS was a factor. Should such a case of any 
magnitude ever come to light, there is a good probability that the SEC 
would change its position on MAS. However, in such an instance, the
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profession would be faced with a reappraisal of its position anyway.
But until then, the SEC will most likely be content to allow the 
aooounting profession to continue to regulate CPA activities in this 
field without intervening.
Overall Conclusions and Recommendations
This author concludes that knowledgeable third parties are 
generally aware of the types of MAS which CPAs presently render to 
their clients. There does in some cases appear to be a lack of 
understanding as to the specific role the CPA plays in rendering the 
service. The AICPA through its Committee on Management Services has 
done an excellent job in informing the CPA of his expected role in 
MAS. The author recommends that the AICPA provide similar information 
to members of the financial community. The purpose in such an educa­
tional program should not be to "sell" MAS or to influence the financial 
executive one way or the other. The purpose should be to provide him 
with information as to what the accounting profession expects of CPAs 
who render MAS. This would give third parties a better basis on which 
they could form judgments about MAS and independence.
The author concludes that independence in appearance is not a 
problem of great concern at the present time. Nevertheless, the third 
parties who do fear a possible loss of independence have centered most 
of their concern on those services in which CPAs apparently would need 
to work closely with top management in order to provide the service. 
These services are: (1) mergers and business acquisitions; (2) execu­
tive recruitment; (3) management audits; (4) policy determination;
(5) personnel appraisal and/or selection; and (6) executive and 
wage incentive plans.
In the past the AICPA has "been reluctant to speak in terms 
of specific services. But in conjunction with the first recommen­
dation, this author recommends that the AICPA inform the public 
as to the CPA's role in those specific services. The role may vary 
slightly among CPA firms. But surely some consensus could be ob­
tained to let the public know just what the CPA is doing when he 
performs these services.
In this regard, the author also recommends that CPA films 
review their own practices in performing these services. Since 
these are the services questioned most by third parties, CPAs 
should insure that they are taking all necessary precautions to 
safeguard independence, and should avoid any acts which may appear 
to justify the fears expressed about these services.
This writer concludes that all types of MAS, both of an 
accounting and nonaccounting nature, must be considered when dis­
cussing the effect on independence. Evidence from this survey 
shows that third parties are more concerned about some of the 
accounting-type services than they are about some of the 
nonaccounting-type services. To automatically exclude accounting- 
oriented services as having no potential effect on independence is 
erroneous. Accordingly, it is recommended that both types be con­
sidered in any discussion of the subject.
This dissertation is not the first research on this topic. 
It should not be the last. Our society is ever-changing; our
f
profession is ever-changing. Accordingly, this author recommends 
that additional research with questionnaires and/or interviews 
be conducted in the future in order that the profession might keep 
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Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806
February 16, 1970
Dear Sir:
Your help is needed in a very timely and important research 
project being conducted at Louisiana State University. As part 
of my dootoral dissertation for a Ph.D. in Accounting, I am attempt­
ing to determine specifically the nature and extent of management 
advisory services of leading CPA firms. I am also surveying finan­
cial executives and analysts of major financial institutions to 
obtain'their opinions as to what constitutes management advisory 
services by CPAs and their feelings on CPA participation in such 
activities.
There appears to be a lack of communication between CPAs and 
the financial community as to what CPAs are doing in this field, 
and as to what safeguards CPA firms have to insure auditing independ­
ence. So far, results of the survey to the financial executives 
indicate that some fear a possible loss of independence by CPA firms 
whioh offer certain management advisory services to their audit 
clients. By using the results of both surveys, the accounting pro­
fession will be able to make a better decision as to how to allevi­
ate these fears.
As one of the leading CPA firms, your response is vital to 
this survey. You also have a stake in the final results; because 
this is an area in which the accounting profession as a whole, and 
CPA firms in particular, are greatly involved. It is quite likely 
that the results of this survey will be published in a leading 
accounting journal. Therefore, your response may affect the future 
course of the accounting profession in this increasingly important 
area.
The enclosed questionnaire should take no longer than 10 minutes 
to complete. Your cooperation will be most helpful in resolving these 
new problems that have arisen between the accounting profession and 
the financial community. All replies will be held in strict confi­
dence and none will be identified in any way.
A stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your conven­
ience. Your prompt reply and assistance would be greatly appreciated.
Sincerely yours,
Pierre L. Titard, CPA
TELEPHONE 343-4620
PIERRE L. TITARD 189
CERTIFIED  PU B L IC  ACCOUNTANT 
P . O. BOX 2 2 9 7 2  
BATON R O U G E, L O U ISIA N A  7 0 8 0 3
March 6, 1970
(Name and address of firm)
Attn: Managing Partner, Management Services Division
Dear Sir:
Two weeks ago your help was requested in solving a difficult problem 
of the accounting profession* As mentioned then, I am attempting to 
determine specifically the nature and extent of management advisory 
services of leading CPA firms* Results will be included in my dootoral 
dissertation for a Ph.D. in Accounting at Louisiana State University.
In another survey I have received an extremely good response from the 
representatives of the financial community. I asked for their opinions 
as to what constitutes management advisory services by CPAs and their 
feelings about CPA firms which participate in these activities. Using 
the results of both surveys will provide the accounting profession 
with an insight into the extent of this problem area.
As you are probably aware, the AICPA "Ad Hoc Committee on Independence" 
has recently suggested that the profession keep abreast of the views of 
outside parties on this matter. These surveys should enable some of 
their recommendations to be carried out. Since the results of both 
surveys will quite likely be published in a leading accounting journal, 
your reply can affect the future course of the profession in this 
important area.
To reach a logical conclusion a representative number of questionnaires 
must be returned. The response to date has been satisfactory. How­
ever, your reply will give added assurance that the final results 
validly represent the majority of those surveyed. Therefore, I am 
again asking for your cooperation on this project.
If you have already replied to this survey, no additional response is 
necessary. However, if you have not yet replied, I would be most 
grateful if you would complete the enclosed questionnaire and return it 
in the stamped self-addressed envelope, included for your convenience. 
It should take no longer than 10 minutes; and it would help substan­
tially in compiling the overall results. Naturally, all replies are 
strictly confidential and will not be identified in any way.
Sincerely yours,
Pierre L. Titard
SURVEY OP LEADING CPA FIRMS
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1. Does your firm offer management advisory servioes (as distin­
guished from audit services) to its clients?
_______Yes
_______No
Note: If the answer to the above question is "No", the remaining
questions need not be answered.




3. Do any of the individuals who perform management advisory services 
also participate in any audits?
_______ All individuals performing management advisory servioes
participate in some audits.
_______ Some individuals performing management advisory services
participate in some audits.
_______ No individual performing management advisory services
participates in any audit.
4» Answer this question only if you answered either of the first two 
choices in question number 3*
Do the individuals''mentioned in question number 3 participate in 





5 . What percentage of gross billings do fees from management advisory 
services represent?
_______ Less than 10$
  1056 —  25$
  26$ —  40$
_______41$ —  50$
_______ Over 50$
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6. What percentage of your management advisory seo'vi-ses clients are 
also audit clients?
________ Less than 10$
  10$ —  25$
  26$ —  50$
 51$ —  75$
_______ Over 75$
7. From the following list, indicate the types of management advisory 
services which your firm performs. Check as many as axe appli­
cable.
__Assistance on specific 
accounting problems
Capital budgeting
_Computer systems and 
applications
Development of work meas­
urement standards 
Distribution channels






installation of cost 
accounting systems
installation, review, and 
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8. In the space below please add any other comments you may feel 
may be pertinent to this survey.
9. In order that you will not receive any further correspondence 
regarding this questionnaire, please indicate the name of your 
firm on the line below. All replies will be held ir. strict 




CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT 
P. O. BOX 2 2 9 7 2  
BATON ROUGE, LO UISIA N A  7 0 8 0 3
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Dear Sir:
Your help is needed in a very timely and important research project 
"being conducted at Louisiana State University. For a number of years 
many firms of certified public accountants have been engaged in 
consulting type work, frequently referred to as management advisory 
services. These services are in addition to the traditional auditing 
and accounting services normally provided by CPA firms. Several 
questions regarding independence of CPAs who practice both auditing 
and management advisory services have arisen that yet are unresolved. 
The accounting profession must be made aware of the opinions of 
individuals in your field on this matter of independence in order 
that the business community and society as a whole can be best 
served.
Since many of the decisions which you must make are based on finan­
cial statements, the accounting profession must insure that you can 
rely on CPAs' opinions when expressed in regard to the fairness of 
financial statement presentation. By answering the enclosed ques­
tionnaire you will enable the accounting profession to meet better 
its obligation to you.
The enclosed questionnaire Bhould take no longer than 15 minutes to 
complete. Your oooperation will be most helpful in resolving these 
questions on independence. All replies will be held in strict 
confidence.
A stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your convenience. 
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Dear Sir:
Two weeks ago your help was requested in solving a difficult problem 
of the accounting profession. As I emphasized to you at that time, 
your opinion is vitally needed in trying to resolve several questions 
regarding independence of CPAs who practice both auditing and man­
agement advisory services*
If the accounting profession is to insure that you are provided with 
financial statements upon which you can place your full confidence, 
it must have the opinions of individuals in your field regarding 
this matter.
Conclusions of this study will be based on an analysis of responses 
received. Unless a representative number of questionnaires are 
returned, the conclusions reached may not validly represent the 
opinion of the majority of financial executives and analysts sur­
veyed. Your opinion is needed in order to insure that the results 
do refleot the feelings of the majority.
If you have misplaced the original questionnaire, another is en­
closed. It should take no longer than 13 minutes to complete. A 
stamped self-addressed envelope is included for your convenience in 
replying.
Please return the questionnaire as soon as possible. If you have 
already replied to this survey, disregard this request and accept 
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CERTIFIED  PU B LIC  ACCOUNTANT 
P . O. BOX 2 2 9 7 2  
BATON R O U G E. LOUISIANA 7 0 8 0 3
December 16, 1969
Dear Sir:
Approximately one month ago you were ashed, to participate in a re­
search project being oonducted at Louisiana State University.
Possibly itB nature and importance were not completely understood. I 
am compiling the results of this researoh as part of my dissertation, 
necessary for a doctoral degree in accounting. The results could 
have far reaching implications for individuals in your field as well 
as for the accounting profession.
As explained in the earlier correspondence sent to you, some questions 
have been raised regarding the independence of CPAs who practice both 
auditing and management advisory servioes. The accounting profession 
has been unable to resolve some of these questions because they di­
rectly concern the opinions of financial executives and analysts.
If meaningful results are obtained from this survey, they will quite 
likely be published in a leading accounting journal. This will en­
lighten the members of the accounting profession as to your feelings 
on this matter and could have a definite effect on the future course 
of CPAs in this area.
But to have meaningful results which can influence the profession, a 
representative number of questionnaires must be returned. The re­
sponse to date has been more than satisfactory. However, your reply 
will give added assurance that the final results validly represent 
the opinion of the majority of those surveyed. Therefore, I am again 
asking for your cooperation on this project.
It is possible that you have already replied to this survey. If so, 
no additional response is necessary. However, if you have not yet 
replied, I would be most grateful if you would complete the enclosed 
questionnaire and return it in the stamped self-addressed envelope, 
included for your convenience. It should take no longer than 15 
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1. Which type of firm do you represent?
a» Bank a^*-_____  Mutual fund
b* Brokerage firm e. r • insurance company
   Closed-end investment f. PT,nnori+ , . ..
company ------ Property-liability
insurance company
2. Approximately how often do you analyze (or review) financial
statements which have been audited by CPAs and on which a report 
has been rendered?
a .______ Constantly d._____  Seldom
b._________ Frequently e._____  Never
o.______ Occasionally
3. Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to their 
olients. Were you aware of this fact before receiving this 
questionnaire?
a .  I was well aware.
b .______ I had heard that they do.
c .  I was completely unaware.
4. From the following list, indioate the types of management services 
which you know or think that some CPAs perform. (You may check 
as many items as you think are applicable.)
_Assistance on specific 
accounting problems
_Capital budgeting
jComputer systems and 
applications
_Development of work meas­
urement standards
Distribution channels
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4. (continued)
^Installation of cost 
accounting systems
^Installation, review, and 














_I am not aware of any specific types of management advisory 
services that CPAs perform.
Many CPA firms provide management advisory services to clients 
whose financial statements they also audit. Do you think that 
providing any of the following services to audit clients may 
possibly result in a CPA's losing some of his audit independence?
a. I do not think that a CPA's providing his audit clients
b.
with any of the services listed below may result in a loss 
of any of his audit independence.
I think that providing the following services to audit 
clients may result in some loss of a CPA's audit inde­
pendence:
(Check any items that you think may result in some loss of 
independence. You may check more than one item. This list 
is exactly the same as the one on the previous page.)
_Assistance on specific 
accounting problems
^Capital budgeting
_Computer systems and 
applications




^Executive and wage 
incentive plans
Executive recruitment
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5. (continued)
______Factory automation ______Product engineering
Financial budgeting Produot pricing













o.______I have no opinion as to whether providing any of the above
services to audit clients may result in some loss of a 
CPA's audit independence.
6. If you were to analyze financial statements which had been audited 
by a CPA who had provided any of the management advisory services 
that you checked in the preceding question, how would this affect 
your confidence in the CPA's audit report?
a ._____ Not applicable sinoe I did not check any of the services
listed in the preceding question.
b . would have considerably more confidence in it.
c^   I would have slightly more confidence in it.
do It would not affect my confidence in it.
e .____ _J[ would have slightly less confidence in it.
f .______I would have considerably less confidence in it.
Sales forecasting 
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7. If you answered j u , b^, c^, or cL, in the preceding question, 
please disregard this question. If you answered e. or f. in 
the preceding question, please answer this question.
If the management services that you ohecked in question #5 had 
been performed by the same CPA firm that had performed the audit, 
but by individuals other than those performing the audit, how 
would this affect your confidenoe in the CPA's audit report?
a . _I would have considerably more oonfidence in it.
b  . I would have slightly more oonfidence in it.
c .______It would not affect my confidence in it.
d. I would have slightly leBS confidence in it.
e . I would have considerably less confidence in it.
8. Do you think that CPA firms should be prohibited from providing 
their audit clients with those services which you checked in 
question #$i
(Please answer both a. and b. or c.)
a. assuming that the management advisory services and the audit 
are conducted by the same personnel?
 _Yes  No  No opinion
b. assuming that the management advisory services and the audit 
are conducted by different personnel?
______Yes  No  No opinion
c .______Not applicable since I did not check any of the services
listed in question
9. In the space below please add any other comments that you feel 
would be pertinent to this survey.
10. In order that you will not receive any further correspondence re~ 
garding this questionnaire, please indicate the name of your firm 
on the line below. All replies will be held in strict confidence 
and will not be identified in any way.
APPENDIX C
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SELECTED COMMENTS FROM QUESTION NUMBER 9
Question 9 in the Survey of Leading Financial Executives 
and Analysts asked respondents for any additional comments which they 
felt were pertinent to the survey. Comments were made by 44 of the 
160 respondents. Below are oomments made by some of the respondents. 
They are not in any particular order. These oomments are presented 
in order to provide additional insight into the opinions which some 
respondents have on the subject of CPAs and MAS. The space between 
the typewritten lines separates the comments of the various indi­
viduals.
While there is a potential problem, ie., independence and 
management services, I don't think it's insurmountable. I think 
the big eight CPA firms can handle the problem satisfactorily 
for the most part. The problem may be most serious for smaller 
CPA firms where one client may be a substantial part of their 
practice.
It has been my experience that it is impossible for an 
accountant to retain critical objectivity in his audit of the 
results of methods that he may have recommended as a management 
consultant or of personnel that he may have had a hand in employ­
ing. Additionally, I do not believe that the accountant can be 
objective in auditing the work of other accountants in his firm 
that are performing what are essentially management functions.
The fact that accountants are selected by and work closely 
with management is enough of a deterrent to independence without 
further complicating it by becoming involved in management.
I think that when CPA firms get too involved with overall 
management problems they may lose some of their audit independence 
and objectivity.
In instances when accountants are retained for advisory serv­
ice beyond that normally falling within the definition of normal 
accounting practice, I feel a referenoe should be made in the notes 
to the financial statements evidencing the nature and extent of the 
advisory service performed.
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I've seen some accountants (CPAs) who tarnished their inde­
pendence when they provided management services, the results of 
which they audited. Others seem to do this without a problem. . .
Although there may be some question of the sacrifice of in­
dependence, let's not legislate advice of accountants out of 
existence unless you want to deal small business a near-fatal 
blow.
Management consulting services provide an opportunity for 
even closer insight into a client's business which helps, I think, 
in providing audited statements. Loss of independence comes from 
something other than a closer association with the client's 
business.
To the extent that CPAs become more closely identified with 
their clients, the audit becomes more of an informational device 
than an independent opinion. If this becomes the case, bankers 
will no longer require a certificate and that portion of the 
CPA's business will disappear.
It is my belief that any reliable CPA firm will have as its 
first concern the reputation of that firm. If the firm is 
reliable, I see no reason why the two functions cannot both be 
performed by the same group of accountants, as one function is 
for internal use and the second (public accounting) is not.
You must judge the character and reputation of the CPA as 
in any other business relationship. Even with no advisory serv­
ices, there is some small percentage of CPA work that is unaccept­
able as in any profession.
How can a profession, dedicated to protecting the "public" 
against financial misrepresentations, maintain its complete 
independence when it is favored with a little something on the 
side? I think the better firms try to remain objective, but 
they are human too.
I think CPAs have no independence. They can be replaced 
by another firm if they don't bend. Only th.?. SEC has power.
I am sorry but I no longer believe that the accounting pro­
fession is sufficiently independent of its clients on matters of 
importance to financial analysts. Auditors have entered the world 
of financial public relations and have lost stature thereby.
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An audit, to "be independent, must be independent.
I do not believe any specific service performed by CPAs 
jeopardizes their independence. The real danger, in my opinion, 
is that if a CPA firm has a sizeable consulting contract with a 
client company, they could lose the consulting contract aB a 
result of taking a hard line during the audit. Therefore, an 
unscrupulous CPA firm might compromise their audit in order to 
keep the lucrative consulting contract.
At the request of the AICPA, the Financial Analysts Feder­
ation last year rendered an opinion on this subject which in 
essence concluded that there is no conflict of interest between 
the audit and business services functions which cannot be ap­
propriately handled by men of integrity.
Only redeeming factor for CPA firms is that they must beoome 
legally liable for statements they audit or I will have no confi­
dence anyway.
With respect to questions 5» 6, J, and 8, my confidence in 
the auditor's opinion is based on the auditor's general reputation 
and character. I would tend to regard (unfairly perhaps) the un­
known auditor with less confidence than the well, known auditor 
with a relatively good record. Confidence boils down to knowing 
the auditor and scope of the audit.
CPA profession should determine to whom it is responsible- 
public, company, lenders, investors, etc. It should make avail­
able upon request details of work certified to in general terms.
In some cases . . . , the advisory service and audit seem to 
be in conflict. Other cases have been noted where the accounting 
firms seemed to be "in the corner" of the company, aggressively 
so, and under such circumstances the same confidence in the audit 
is impossible.
I have long felt that there should be a complete divoroement 
of the audit and advisory service except in routine accounting 
procedures. Accounting should be a "watch dog" and unaffected by 
factors involved in a sense with relationships of any business, 
whether it be the audit per se or an advisory or consulting 
service.
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